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Hans-CHristian Petersen
What do we know about the urban impoverished areas of the world and the 
people living in them? When looking at research reports available so far, the 
answer to this question is relatively sobering. Still, one narration is dominating 
according to which the habitats of the urban poor were solely places of dull 
backwardness, characterised by spatial and mental narrowness. The world of 
the people at the bottom rung of society appears to be widely homogeneous and 
is drawn in grey and black colours. Queries beyond this are rarely found so that 
Markus Schroer correctly speaks of “a reproduction of always the same imag-
es”1 in respect of ghettos, favelas and banlieues.
When applying this perspective, the question of what these ‘narrow habitats’ 
meant for their inhabitants, is ignored. The view from the outside is blind to the 
perspective from the inside. This starts already with the language and the terms 
in which we describe the world surrounding us. The word slum, mentioned in 
the subtitle of this volume, has never been an absolute and neutral term since its 
emergence in the first half of the 19th century, but conveyed stigmatising associ-
ations from the very beginning. Slums were not only places of urban blight and 
utmost poverty, but at the same time ‘conglomerations’ of the ‘outcasts’ of so-
ciety, of the ‘undeserving poor’ who stood outside of society and who could not 
expect any help from it.2 This is why Alan Gilbert has pointed out that language 
matters,3 especially when we are talking about poverty and the people struck by 
it. Terms such as slum are predestined for political instrumentalisation – to men-
tion only the so called ‘slum clearances’ as a wrongly perceived ‘solution’ to the 
1 sCHroer, 2006, p. 250.
2 Cf. amongst others: Dyos, 1967; Jones, 1971; GaskeLL, 1990; Green, 1995; 
LinDner, 2004; koVen, 2006.
3 Cf. GiLbert, 2007.
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problem, be it in Victorian London of the 19th century4 or in current-day Rio de 
Janeiro, where the favelas are ‘cleaned’ by the forces of police and military for 
the FIFA World Cup 2014 as well as the Olympic Games 2016.
If the term gets used in this volume despite its problematic etymology, it is 
due to the circumstance that it is de facto the common description for an urban 
spatial concentration of poverty. This is true historically as well as today and 
is not limited to the English-speaking world, as is demonstrated by the contri-
butions to this volume. This is not designed to advocate a perpetuation of the 
associations inherent to the term, but quite the contrary, these are taken by the 
authors as the starting point for critical reflections and looks behind the alleged-
ly unambiguous facade of the slums.
The volume at hand is the outcome of a conference which was organised 
by the Research Unit Historical Cultural Sciences (Historische Kulturwissen-
schaften, HKW) of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz from March 30th 
until April 1st 2012.5 Almost all of the speakers have prepared their papers for 
publication. Additionally, there are three articles by authors who were contacted 
for the conference, but were unable to attend due to scheduled obligations and 
by those who decided to write a contribution  after having taken part in the 
conference (Loïc Wacquant, Sonja Wengoborski and Jaspal Naveel Singh, Julia 
Röttjer and Jan Kusber). The main concern of the conference was an interdisci-
plinary dialogue on the topic as to how far approaches of cultural sciences can 
contribute to overcome the “exotification”6 of the urban poor and to look at het-
erogeneities and individuality instead of alleged unambiguousness. The concept 
follows pioneering studies by Pierre Bourdieu7, Loïc Wacquant8 and others, who 
perceived the inhabitants of slum districts as individuals, as actively engaged 
people who shape the precarious social conditions around them themselves in a 
process of purposeful adoption. 
The contributions to the volume at hand do not apply a uniform approach, 
but represent just that multiperspectivity which was intended. This is not syn-
onymous with arbitrariness, but results from the consideration that a broad dis-
cussion of different theories and methods is the best way to achieve a picture of 
the urban poor as multifaceted as possible. However, all texts have in common a 
4 Cf. yeLLinG, 1986; aLLen, 2008.
5 Cf. the conference report by PauL frieDL, in: H-Soz-u-Kult, 27.06.2012: http://
hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=4281, 07.05.2013.
6 WaCquant, 1998, p. 203.
7 bourDieu et al., 1993.
8 WaCquant, 2004.
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concurrent examination of structures and individual agency. Processes of social 
polarisation and displacement are linked with the question of what we can say 
about those who are struck by this development. With this in mind, the volume 
is also an appeal for a return of the social question as it has been discussed in the 
English-speaking debate since the middle of the 1990s – for a “New Social His-
tory”, which preserves the critical impetus of social history without abandoning 
the cultural-his torical progresses of knowledge gained in the last decades.9
The chronological frame of the contributions ranges from the 19th to the 21st 
century. As well as a number of historical analyses, there are also articles fo-
cusing on present-day developments. Geographically, case studies of North and 
Latin American, European as well as Indian cities are included, which naturally 
covers only a part of a global theme. Hopefully, the publication of the volume 
may be an incitement for further research in the future.  
At the beginning of the volume stands a text of LOÏC WACQUANT, in 
which the already mentioned question of terminology is examined in detail. 
Wacquant develops an analytical concept of the ghetto as a spatially based im-
plement of ethno-racial closure. At the same time, he strongly argues against an 
intermixture of the terms ghetto und slum by emphasising “that not all ghettos 
are poor and not all poor areas are (inside) ghettos”. In this context he advises 
against an indiscriminate transfer of concepts and terms, originating from the 
US American debate on other - for instance European - societies in order not 
to dilute the analytical categories. Looking at the ghetto, Wacquant makes an 
argument for a perspective which sees the ghetto simultaneously as a sword (in 
the sense of an instrument of isolating certain groups of the population) as well 
as a shield (in the sense of a potential place of mutual support for its inhabitants). 
The following texts are investigating further the possibilities and limits of 
writing about the urban poor. On the basis of examples from early 20th century 
Russian cities Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Vilnius and Odessa, ILYA V. GER-
ASIMOV opposes applying discourse-analytical methods on the main sources 
(i.e. newspaper reports, police and court documents) for the social history of the 
urban poor. Referring to the concept of subalternity, he argues that since lower 
strata did not use discourse, the method of discourse analysis would produce 
misinterpretations. Instead, one would have to go beyond the texts to see actual 
(non-discursive or non-verbal) social practices and their users in a wider con-
9 Cf. amongst others: eLey, 2005, as well as the correspondent discussion of his 
theses in the forum of the am eriCan HistoriCaL reVieW, 2008. As a brilliant 
German-speaking, combative representative is to be named: maDertHaner/
musner, 2007.
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text. Since these practices, the “body talk” of the subalterns as he calls it, also 
carry meanings, and since the historian can learn to understand them, they too 
are open to interpretation. 
My contribution is shedding light on another Russian example: St. Peters-
burg, the capital of late imperial Russia. Looking at two types of sources that are 
quite different at first sight (on one hand a series of articles from a Petersburg 
newspaper and on the other several petitions submitted by ‘itinerant peddlers’ 
from Petersburg’s Haymarket), the epistemic possibilities and limitations are 
discussed to discover the urban poor of former times by documents we find in 
the archives today. The method suggested in the article is a spatial approach, by 
looking at concrete places. Beyond stylistic devices, both types of sources pro-
vide us with information about places which were important to their inhabitants 
and which they regarded as ‘their own’.
MARK D. STEINBERG is also dealing with St. Petersburg, namely with a 
phenomenon which was characterised by Petersburg’s newspapers at the begin-
ning of the 20th century as a “traumatic epidemic of blood and violence”. On the 
basis of a rich collection of contemporary articles, he demonstrates to which ex-
tend everyday violence shaped the life of the inhabitants, particularly in the poor 
districts of the city, how this development was perceived at that time and which 
explanations can be found from today’s point of view. According to Steinberg, 
the violence can be understood best as a blocked agency, resulting from the 
extensive exclusion of the poor from the urban discourse. At the same time he 
is rather sceptical in reading too much into the violence from a retrospective 
viewpoint, concerning, for example, the political dimension of such an agency.
WOLFGANG MADERTHANER takes the well-known picture of Fin de 
Siècle Vienna as a place gathering central cultural innovations of modernity as 
a starting point for shedding light on the ‘other’, the poor Vienna. He makes an 
argument for reading the metropolis as a social text in order to develop an under-
standing of the mass culture of the city. According to Maderthaner, descriptions 
of Vienna can be found especially in the new genre of urban reportage, devel-
oped by figures such as Emil Kläger or Max Winter, which draw another picture 
of the city than the myth produced by elitist discourses and the tourism industry. 
At the same time, reports about these phenomena reflect changes in political cul-
ture, e.g. when the poor masses, which first showed up only as chaotic hordes in 
hunger revolts, became the grass roots of figures such as Franz Schuhmeier and 
Karl Lueger, who, although with quite diverging purposes, now made politics 
with the support of the masses.
Jerry WHite presents Campbell Bunk, a street in the North London dis-
trict Islington, which became one of the poorest slums of 19th century London. 
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White, having worked himself as a public health inspector in Islington in the 
1970s, some 15 years after Campbell Bunk had been demolished, brings in a 
special perspective. Starting his job, he soon realised that the reputation of the 
former slum was hardly less vivid than it had been. He kept on hearing stories 
about it, and in 1986 he published a fascinating study on Campbell Bunk be-
tween the wars based on interviews he conducted with the local inhabitants. His 
contribution to the volume at hand can be characterised as a reappraisal after 
25 years – from the viewpoint of the ‘practitioner’, the historian as well as the 
people living in Campbell Road today.
The article by SONJA WENGOBORSKI and JASPAL NAVEEL SINGH 
also covers the gamut up to the present. They examine the development of the 
Indian metropolis Delhi from two different perspectives: In the first part of the 
article, Wengoborski and Singh are drawing on official documents of city plan-
ning and academic or journalistic writings to characterise the city’s management 
of urban poverty. In the second part, this viewpoint is contrasted with insights 
of modern Hindi literature, which emphasise the lived experiences of the indi-
vidual social actors in the poor milieus of Delhi. In this way, the important role 
women play in keeping families and communities functioning becomes clear 
– an important corrective as against the dominating narrative of official city 
planners, politicians and other ‘strong men.’  
Hauke Jan roLf addresses the issue of the spatial organisation of Nic-
araguan immigrants in Costa Rica’s metropolitan area. Based on interviews he 
conducted with the local inhabitants during his many years of research, he offers 
an intriguing insider perspective on the social networks of the immigrants and 
the importance of certain places for their solidarity. Using the examples of a 
suburban squat, a baseball stadium in San José as well as an inner-city park, Rolf 
is able to demonstrate how Nicaraguan immigrants shape the respective quarters 
and the different functions these places hold. Among others, he identifies trans-
nationalised places – evidence that opens new perspectives for future research. 
The two concluding articles are focusing on urban socio-spatial develop-
ments at the beginning of the 21st century and particularly on gentrification pro-
cesses. inGriD breCkner presents three Hamburg city districts as examples 
of a polarised urban development that is in different stages of gentrification. 
Ottensen experienced urban renewal since the 1970s and gentrification from 
inside as well as from outside. The same process is much younger in St. Pauli, 
where gentrification started after the closing of a huge brewery, which created 
space for new construction process. Something similar is expected or feared to 
happen in Wilhelmsburg – up to now the ‘district of outcasts’ – where two big 
international exhibitions have opened this year. At the same time the examples 
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of Ottensen and St. Pauli make it clear that resolute and enduring protest is not 
without influence and that it can at least partially change the direction of the 
development of city districts. 
JULIA RÖTTJER and JAN KUSBER are dealing with similar developments 
in 21st Century Moscow, the only Megacity in the European context. Looking at 
urban growth, migration and gentrification, they manage to successfully com-
bine historical perspectives with those of the social sciences and to shed light 
on processes that make a currently lacking comparison with Western Europe on 
these topics look promising. The final assessment of Röttjer and Kusber, namely 
that the development of today’s Moscow can serve as “an example of neoliberal 
growth and the absence of comprehensive urban planning”, is appropriate for 
other cities as well. The same can be said for their appraisal that the article is at 
the same time an appeal for a closer collaboration of historical and social scienc-
es mainly dealing with the phenomena in question.
Three further contributions, by Johannes Niedbalski (Berlin) on “Funfairs 
and Amusement Parks. A Social Topography of Pleasure in Early 20th Century 
Berlin”, by Monika Murzyn-Kupisz (Cracow) on urban development and gen-
trification processes in today’s Poland and by Yury Basilov (St. Petersburg) on 
21st century St. Petersburg could not be realized for personal reasons, respective-
ly just due to lack of time. As regrettable as this may be for the volume at hand, 
it is at the same time absolutely understandable. Maybe these yet unwritten texts 
can serve as stimulation for further research and collaboration.
Concluding, I would like to express my gratitude to the Research Unit His-
torical Cultural Sciences (HKW) of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz. 
The financing of the conference as well as the admission of this volume in the 
series “Mainz Historical Cultural Sciences” (Mainzer Historische Kulturwis-
senschaften) were the indispensable basis for the  publication at hand. The two 
colleagues working in the Research Unit’s Office, Kristina Müller-Bongard and 
Cathleen Sarti, were at all times very kind and competent advisors – thanks a 
lot to both of you for the wonderful collaboration! Furthermore I would like to 
thank the head of the Department for East European History at the Historical In-
stitute of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Jan Kusber, for his valuable 
support in developing and realising the project. I am grateful to my colleague 
Christof Schimsheimer for the assistance during the conference and to Diana 
and Helga Weilepp for their patient and very competent replies to quite a few 
questions from my side during the translation of my text. The Department for 
Research and Technology Transfer of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz 
offered the opportunity to proof read the contributions to this volume – a process 
highly appreciated by all authors. And last but not least I am grateful to all au-
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thors who – despite so many other obligations – found the time and the energy 
to revise their presentations for publication. It would be great if this would prove 
to be a beginning for future collaboration.
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A Janus-Faced Institution  
of Ethnoracial Closure 
A Sociological Specification of the Ghetto1
LoïC WaCquant
The scientific mind must form itself by 
continually reforming itself.
(Gaston Bachelard, Psychoanalyse de l’es-
prit scientifique, 1938)
It is a paradox that, while the social sciences have made extensive use of the 
“ghetto” as a descriptive term, they have failed to forge a robust analytical con-
cept of the same. In the historiography of the Jewish diaspora in early modern 
Europe and under Nazism, the sociology of the black American experience in 
the twentieth-century metropolis, and the anthropology of ethnic outcasts in East 
Asia and Africa, its three traditional domains of application, the term “ghetto” 
variously denotes a bounded urban ward, a web of group-specific institutions, 
and a cultural and cognitive constellation (values, mind-set, or mentality) entail-
ing the sociomoral isolation of a stigmatized category as well as the systematic 
truncation of the life space and life chances of its members. But none of these 
strands of research has taken the trouble to specify what makes a ghetto qua 
social form, which of its features are constitutive and which are derivative, as 
they have, at each epoch, taken for granted and adopted the folk concept extant 
in the society under examination. 
1 First published in Haynes/HutCHison, 2012, p. 1-33.
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This explains that the notion, appearing self-evident, does not figure in most 
dictionaries of social science.2 It is also why, after decades employing the word, 
sociologists remain vague, inconsistent, and conflicted about its core meaning, 
perimeter of empirical pertinence, and theoretical import. The recent “Sym-
posium on the Ghetto” organized by City & Community in the wake of Mario 
Small’s critique of the central theses of my book Urban Outcasts richly doc-
uments the myriad observational anomalies and analytic troubles spawned by 
the unreflective derivation of social-scientific from ordinary constructs.3 These 
troubles are not resolved but redoubled when the composite US imagery of the 
(black) ghetto (after its collapse) gets transported to Western Europe and Latin 
America, and they are trebled when scholars attempt cross-national comparisons 
of patterns of urban marginality and/or ethnoracial inequality based on the na-
tional common sense of their home societies as to the meaning of “the ghetto”.4 
This debate vividly demonstrates that the ghetto is not a contested concept à la 
Gallie5 so much as a confused conception that comes short of the level of analytic 
specificity, coherence, and parsimony minimally required of a scientific notion.
This chapter clears up this confusion by constructing a rigorous sociologi-
cal concept of the ghetto as a spatially based implement of ethnoracial closure. 
After spotlighting the semantic instability and slippage of the notion in Amer-
ican culture and scholarship, I extract the structural and functional similarities 
presented by three canonical instances of the phenomenon: the Jewish ghetto of 
Renaissance Europe, the black American ghetto of the Fordist United States, and 
the reserved districts of the Burakumin in post-Tokugawa Japan. Against thin 
gradational conceptions based on rates (of ethnic dissimilarity, spatial concentra-
tion, poverty, etc.), which prove promiscuous and prone to metaphorical bleeding 
as well as inchoate, I elaborate a thick relational conception of the ghetto as a 
2 Remarkably, “ghetto” receives no entry in the nineteen-volume International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences published in the United States 
just as the country was being shaken to its core by a wave of ghetto riots, cf. siLLs/
merton 1968. Even specialized dictionaries of racial and ethnic studies give the 
notion short shrift: definitions in them are typically terse, limited to the mention 
of ethnic segregation in space and to a descriptive denotation of particular ghettos 
(those of the Jewish and black diasporas).
3 Cf. Haynes/HutCHison, 2008.
4 An extended argument in favor of epistemological rupture as the only viable 
solution to the ‘demarcation problem’ in the comparative sociology of urban 
marginality is WaCquant, 2008(1), p. 7-12, 135-162, 233-235, 272-276. 
5 Cf. GaLLie, 1956.
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sociospatial institution geared to the twin mission of isolating and exploiting a 
dishonored category. So much to say that the ghetto results not from ecological 
dynamics but from the inscription in space of a material and symbolic power 
asymmetry, as revealed by the recurrent role of collective violence in establishing 
as well as challenging ethnoracial confinement. Next, I unscramble the connec-
tions between ghettoization, segregation, and poverty, and I articulate an ide-
al-typical opposition between ghetto and ethnic cluster with which to carry out 
measured comparisons of the fates of various stigmatized populations and places 
in different cities, societies, and epochs. This points to the role of the ghetto as 
organizational shield and cultural crucible for the production of a unified but 
tainted identity that furthers resistance and eventually revolt against seclusion. 
I conclude by proposing that the ghetto is best analogized not with districts of 
dereliction (which confuses ethnoracial seclusion with extraneous issues of class, 
deprivation, and deviance) but with other devices for the forcible containment of 
tainted categories such as the prison, the reservation, and the camp. 
A fuzzy and evolving notion
A brief recapitulation of the strange career of “the ghetto” in American society 
and social science, which has dominated inquiry into the topic both quantitative-
ly and thematically, suffices to illustrate its semantic instability and dependency 
on the whims and worries of urban rulers. For the past century, the range and 
contents of the term have successively expanded and contracted in keeping with 
how political and intellectual elites have viewed the vexed nexus of ethnicity 
and poverty in the city.6 
At first, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the ghetto desig-
nated residential concentrations of European Jews in the Atlantic seaports and 
was clearly distinguished from the “slum” as an area of housing blight and so-
cial pathology.7 The notion dilated during the Progressive era to encompass all 
inner-city districts wherein exotic newcomers gathered, namely, lower-class im-
migrants from the southeastern regions of Europe and African Americans fleeing 
the Jim Crow regime of racial terrorism in the US South. Expressing upper-class 
worries over whether these groups could or should assimilate into the predom-
inant Anglo-Saxon pattern of the country, the notion referred then to the inter-
section between the ethnic neighborhood and the slum, where segregation was 
6 Cf. WarD, 1989.
7 Cf. LuboVe, 1963
Loïc Wacquant
18
believed to combine with physical disrepair and overcrowding to exacerbate 
urban ills such as criminality, family breakdown, and pauperism, and thwart par-
ticipation in national life. This conception was given scientific authority by the 
ecological paradigm of the emerging Chicago school of sociology. In his clas-
sic book The Ghetto, Louis Wirth assimilates to the Jewish ghetto of medieval 
Europe the “Little Sicilies, Little Polands, Chinatowns, and Black Belts in our 
large cities”8, along with the “vice areas” hosting deviant types such as hobos, 
bohemians, and prostitutes. All of them are said to be “natural areas” born of the 
universal desire of different groups to “preserve their peculiar cultural forms” 
and each fulfills a specialized “function” in the broader urban organism.9 This 
is what one may call Wirth’s error: confounding the mechanisms of sociospatial 
seclusion visited upon African Americans and upon European immigrants by 
conflating two urban forms with antinomic architectures and effects, the ghet-
to and the ethnic cluster. This initial error enabled the ecological paradigm to 
thrive even as the urbanization of African Americans blatantly contradicted its 
core propositions.10 It would be repeated cyclically for decades and persistently 
obfuscate the specificity of ghettoization as an exclusive type of enclosure.
The notion contracted rapidly after World War II under the press of the Civil 
Rights movement to signify mainly the compact and congested enclaves to which 
African Americans were forcibly relegated as they migrated into the industrial 
centers of the North. The growth of a “Black Metropolis in the womb of the white” 
wherein Negroes evolved distinct and parallel institutions to compensate for and 
shield themselves from unflinching exclusion by whites11 contrasted sharply with 
the smooth residential dispersal of European Americans of foreign stock. And the 
mounting political mobilization of blacks against continued caste subordination 
made their reserved territory a central site and stake of sociopolitical struggles in 
the city as well as a springboard for collective action against white rule. Writing at 
the acme of the black uprisings of the 1960s, Kenneth Clark made this relationship 
of ethnoracial subordination epicentral to his dissection of the Dark Ghetto and 
its woes: “America has contributed to the concept of the ghetto the restriction of 
persons to a special area and the limiting of their freedom of choice on the basis 
of skin color. The dark ghetto’s invisible walls have been erected by the white 
8 WirtH, 1928, p. 6.
9 A useful analytic survey of the works of the Chicago school on this front is 
Hannerz, 1980; a cutting critique of the biotic naturalism of Park, Burgess and 
Wirth is in LoGan/moLotCH, 1987, chap. 1. 
10 Cf. WaCquant, 1998.
11 Cf. Drake/Cayton, (1945) 1993.
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society, by those who have power.”12 This diagnosis was confirmed by the Kerner 
Commission, a bipartisan task force appointed by President Johnson whose offi-
cial report on the “civil disorders” that rocked the American metropolis famously 
warned that, because of white racial intransigence, America was “moving toward 
two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.”13 
But over the ensuing two decades the dark ghetto collapsed and devolved 
into a barren territory of dread and dissolution due to deindustrialization and 
state policies of welfare reduction and urban retrenchment. As racial domina-
tion grew more diffuse and diffracted through a class prism, the category was 
displaced by the duet formed by the geographic euphemism of “inner city” and 
the neologism of “underclass,” defined as the substratum of ghetto residents 
plagued by acute joblessness, social isolation, and antisocial behaviors.14 By the 
1990s, the neutralization of the “ghetto” in policy-oriented research culminated 
in the outright expurgation of any mention of race and power to redefine it as 
any tract of extreme poverty (”containing over 40 % of residents living under 
the federal poverty line”), irrespective of population and institutional makeup, 
in effect dissolving the ghetto back into the slum and rehabilitating the folk 
conception of the early twentieth century.15 This paradoxical “deracialization” 
12 CLark, 1956, p. 11.
13 kerner Com m ission, 1968, p. 2. This formula was intended as an inverted echo 
of the Supreme Court decision Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) which proclaimed racial 
segregation congruent with the country’s Constitution, provided that the dual 
institutional tracks thus spawned be “separate but equal” (which they never were, 
not surprisingly since the same court studiously omitted to specify any criteria of 
equality or the means to bring it about). This ruling provided the juridical basis 
for the establishment of six decades of legal segregation in the United States, until 
the 1954 decision Brown v. Board of Education found that racial separation by 
itself implies an inegality that violates constitutional principles. It points to the 
pivotal role of the state in the (un)making of the black ghetto and of ethnoracial 
domination more generally.
14 Cf. WiLson, 1987.
15 Cf. JarGoVsky, 1997. At the same time, the ostensibly deracialized conception 
of ‘the ghetto’ as a district of widespread destitution kept the focus squarely on 
the African-American (sub)proletariat by adopting as its operational cut-off point 
the bureaucratic category of a census tract with a 40-percent poverty rate, which 
coincidentally ensured its empirical overlap with the remnants of the historic 
Black Belt. Like the discovery of the ‘underclass’ a decade earlier, this conceptual 
move validated the special worries of state elites about the management of 
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of a notion initially fashioned, and until then deployed, to capture ethnoracial 
partition in the city resulted from the combination of the crumbling of the his-
toric dark ghetto of the industrial era and the correlative political censorship 
of race in policy-oriented research after the ebbing of the Civil Rights move-
ment. This “gutting of the ghetto”16 was then taken one step further by the rash 
proposal to abandon the notion altogether, instead of clarifying it, on grounds 
that it cannot capture the complexity, heterogeneity, and fluidity of “poor black 
neighborhoods” in the United States17 – as if ghettoization were a flat and static 
synonym for impoverishment, occurred only in the United States, and could not 
encompass, or partake of, a fluid and differentiated urban formation.
Meanwhile the term was extended to the study of the distinctive sociocul-
tural patterns elaborated by homosexuals in the cities of advanced societies “in 
response to both stigma and gay liberation”18 after the Stonewall riots. It has 
also made a spectacular return across western Europe in heated scholarly and 
policy debates over the links between postcolonial immigration, postindustrial 
economic restructuring, and spatial dualization as the fear of the “Americaniza-
tion” of the metropolis swept the continent.19 That European social scientists 
took to invoking “the ghetto” to stress the growing potency and specificity of 
ethnoracial division in their countries just when their American colleagues were 
busy extirpating race from the same notion is an irony that seems only to further 
muddle its meaning. Yet one can extract out of these varied literatures common 
threads and recurrent properties to construct a relational concept of the ghetto 
as an instrument of closure and control that clears up most of the confusion sur-
rounding it and turns it into a powerful tool for the social analysis of ethnoracial 
domination and urban inequality. For this it suffices to return to the historical 
inception of the word and of the phenomenon it depicted in Renaissance Venice.
A janus-faced institution of ethnic closure and control
Coined by derivation from the Italian giudecca, borghetto or gietto (or from 
the German gitter or the Talmudic Hebrew get: the etymology is disputed), the 
black marginality in the inner city while eliding the latter’s roots in ethnoracial 
domination and regressive state policies. 
16 WaCquant, 2002.
17 Cf. sm aLL, 2009.
18 LeVine, 1979, p. 31.
19 Cf. musterD et al., 2006; sCHieruP  et al., 2006.
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word “ghetto” initially referred to the forced consignment of Jews to special 
districts by the city’s political and religious authorities. In medieval Europe, 
Jews were commonly allotted quarters wherein they resided, administered their 
own affairs, and followed their customs. Such quarters were granted or sold as a 
privilege to attract them into the towns and principalities for which they fulfilled 
key roles as money-lenders, tax collectors, and long-distance tradesmen. But, 
between the 13th and the 16th century, in the wake of the upheavals caused by the 
Crusades, favor gradually turned into compulsion.20 In 1516 the Senate of Ven-
ice ordered all Jews rounded up into the ghetto nuovo, an abandoned foundry on 
an isolated island enclosed by two high walls whose outer windows and doors 
were sealed while watchmen stood guard on its two bridges and patrolled the 
adjacent canals by boat.21 Jews were henceforth allowed to come out to pursue 
their occupations by day, but they had to wear a distinctive garb that made them 
readily recognizable and return inside the gates before sunset on pain of severe 
punishment. These measures were designed as an alternative to expulsion to en-
able the city-state to reap the economic benefits brought by the presence of Jews 
(including rents, special taxes, and forced levies) while protecting its Chris-
tian residents from contaminating contact with bodies perceived as unclean and 
dangerously sensual, carriers of syphilis and vectors of heresy, in addition to 
bearing the taint of money-making through usury, which the Catholic Church 
equated with prostitution.22 
As this Venetian model spread in cities throughout Europe and around the 
Mediterranean rim,23 territorial fixation and seclusion led, on the one hand, to 
overcrowding, housing deterioration, and impoverishment as well as excess 
morbidity and mortality, and, on the other, to institutional flowering and cultural 
consolidation as urban Jews responded to multiplying civic and occupational 
restrictions by knitting a dense web of group-specific organizations that served 
as so many instruments of collective succor and solidarity, from markets and 
business associations, to charity and mutual aid societies, to places of religious 
worship and scholarship. The Judenstadt of Prague, Europe’s largest ghetto in 
20 Cf. stoW, 1992.
21 Cf. CurieL/CooP erm an, 1990.
22 Cf. sennet, 1994, p. 224.
23 Cf. JoHnson, 1987, p. 235-245. A functional variant arose with the ghetto of Rome, 
which was founded in 1555 on the banks of the Tiber and abolished in 1870. It 
purported to foster the religious conversion and cultural dissolution of Jews, but 
it ended up having the opposite effects and it did not diffuse geographically. Cf. 
stoW, 2001.
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the eighteenth century, even had its own city hall, the Rathaus, emblem of the 
relative autonomy and communal strength of its residents, and its synagogues 
were entrusted not only with the spiritual stewardship but also with the admin-
istrative and judicial oversight of its population. Social life in the Jewish ghetto 
was turned inward and verged “on overorganization”24, so that it reinforced both 
integration within and isolation from without.
One can detect in this inaugural moment the four constituent elements of the 
ghetto, viz., (i) stigma, (ii) constraint, (iii) spatial confinement, and (iv) insti-
tutional parallelism. The ghetto is a social-organizational device that employs 
space to reconcile two antinomic functions: (1) to maximize the material profits 
extracted out of a category deemed defiled and defiling; and to (2) minimize 
intimate contact with its members so as to avert the threat of symbolic corrosion 
and contagion they are believed to carry. If the target population did not serve 
an essential economic function, it could be kept out of the city or expelled from 
it – as Jews had been periodically in medieval history. If that same group was not 
irremediably tainted, it would simply be exploited and allowed to mingle in the 
city in accordance with its position in the division of labor. It is the conflictive 
combination of economic value and symbolic danger that made handling Jews 
problematic and spurred the invention of the ghetto.
These same four building blocks and the same dual rationale of economic 
extraction cum social ostracization governed the genesis, structure, and func-
tioning of the African-American ghetto in the Fordist metropolis during the 
half-century after World War I. Blacks were actively recruited into northern 
cities of the United States cities at the outbreak of World War I because their 
unskilled labor was indispensable to the industries that formed the backbone 
of a factory economy fed by booming military production but starved of hands 
by the interruption of European migration.25 Yet there was no question of them 
mixing and consorting with whites, who regarded them as inherently vile, con-
genitally inferior, and shorn of ethnic honor owing to the stain of slavery.26 As 
blacks moved in from the South in the millions, white hostility increased and 
24 WirtH, 1928.
25 Cf. marks, 1989.
26 The following disquisition on the ‘Negro character’ published in the journal of the 
Hyde Park Property Owners’ Association (cited in sP ea, 1968, p. 220) captures the 
tenor of the view of African Americans held by white Chicagoans at the close of 
the Great War: “There is nothing in the make-up of a Negro, physically or mentally, 
which should induce anyone to welcome him as a neighbor. The best of them are 
insanitary. […] Ruin alone follows their path. They are proud as peacocks, but 
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patterns of discrimination and segregation that had hitherto been informal and 
inconsistent hardened in housing, schooling, and public accommodations and 
were extended to the economy and polity.27 African Americans were forcibly 
funneled into reserved districts that quickly turned homogeneously black as they 
expanded and consolidated. They had no choice but to seek refuge inside the 
bounded perimeter of the Black Belt and to endeavor to develop in it a network 
of separate institutions to procure the basic needs of the castaway community. 
Thus arose a duplicate city anchored by black churches and newspapers, black 
block clubs and lodges, black schools and businesses, and black political and 
civic associations, nested at the core of the white metropolis yet sealed from it 
by an impassable fence built of custom, legal suasion, economic discrimination 
(by realtors, banks, and the state), and violence, as manifested in the beatings, 
fire-bombings, and riots that checked those who dared to stray across the color 
line. 
This forced institutional parallelism predicated on enveloping and inflexible 
spatial seclusion – not extreme poverty, housing blight, cultural difference, or 
mere residential separation – is what has distinguished African Americans from 
every other group in US history, as noted by leading students of the black urban 
experience from W.E.B. Du Bois and E. Franklin Frazier to Drake and Cayton to 
Kenneth Clark and Oliver Cox.28 It also characterizes the trajectory of the Bur-
akumin in the Japanese city after the close of the Tokugawa era.29 As the lineal 
descendants of the eta and hinin, two categories locked out of the fourfold estate 
order of feudal Japan (composed of warriors, peasants, artisans, and merchants), 
the Burakumin were untouchables in the eyes of the Buddhist and Shinto reli-
gions.30 As a result, they suffered centuries of virulent prejudice, discrimination, 
have nothing of the peacock’s beauty. […] Niggers are undesirable neighbors and 
entirely irresponsible and vicious.” 
27 Cf. sP ear, 1968; osofsky, 1971.
28 Cf. WaCquant, 1998.
29 Cf. Hane, 1982.
30 The eta (”filth eternal”) were permanent and hereditary pariahs descended from 
the occupational guilds tainted by the handling of death, blood, leather, and armor. 
The hinin (”nonhuman”) were temporary and nonhereditary pariahs tainted by 
criminal punishment (typically banishment for ten to twenty years). The exact 
origins, composition, and evolving status of the Burakumin are the objects of fierce 
debates in Japanese historiography in relation with contemporary political battles 
and policy alternatives (cf. neary, 2003), and the topic continues to be as sulfurous 
as the category.
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segregation, and violence that kept them cloistered in social and physical space. 
By the nineteenth century, they were legally confined from sundown to sunup 
in out-of-the-way hamlets (buraku) that were omitted from official maps; they 
were obliged to wear a yellow collar and to walk barefoot; they were expected 
to drop on their hands and knees when addressing commoners; and they could 
be killed virtually without sanction. Crucially, the Burakumin were barred from 
entering shrines and temples and they were restricted to wedding solely among 
themselves, based on the belief that the filth of their ancestors was indelible 
and communicated by blood. Although they are phenotypically indistinguish-
able from other Japanese, they can be identified through the marriage registries 
established and diffused during the Meiji era (1868-1912), as well as by their 
patronym and place of provenance or residence. 
The Burakumin were officially emancipated in 1871, but as they moved into 
cities they were funneled against their will into notorious neighborhoods near 
garbage dumps, crematoria, jails, and slaughterhouses, that were widely viewed 
as nests of criminality and immorality. There, they were barred from industrial 
employment and locked in low-paying and dirty jobs, sent to separate schools, 
and compelled to remain largely endogamous,31 effectively leading constrict-
ed lives encased by a network of parallel and inferior institutions. By the late 
1970s, according to the Burakumin Defense League, they were estimated to 
number 3 million, trapped in 6000 buraku districts in some thousand cities 
across the main island, with strong concentrations in the Kyoto region. After a 
full decade of vigorous programs of affirmative action launched in 1969, one-
fifth of the Burakumin were still employed as butchers, shoemakers and in the 
leather trades, and over one-half worked as street sweepers, trash collectors, and 
public works employees. As a result, their rates of poverty, welfare receipt, and 
mortality stood far above the national average.32 
Spread over three continents and five centuries, the Jewish, African-Amer-
ican, and Burakumin cases demonstrate that the ghetto is not, pace Wirth, a 
“natural area” arising via environmental adaptation governed by a biotic logic 
“akin to the competitive cooperation that underlies the plant community”33 The 
mistake of the early Chicago school here consisted in falsely “converting history 
into natural history” and passing ghettoization off as “a manifestation of hu-
man nature” virtually coterminous with “the history of migration”34, when it is a 
31 Cf. DeVos/WaGatsum a, 1966.
32 Cf. sabouret, 1983.
33 WirtH, 1928, p. 284f.
34 ibiD., p. 285.
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highly peculiar form of urbanization warped by asymmetric relations of power 
between ethnoracial groupings: a special form of collective violence concretized 
in urban space. That ghettoization is not an “uncontrolled and undesigned”35 
process, as Robert E. Park asserted in his preface to The Ghetto, became espe-
cially visible after World War II in the United States when the black American 
ghetto was reconstructed from the top down, and its shelf-life extended by an-
other quarter-century, through state policies of public housing, urban renewal, 
and suburban economic development intended to bolster the rigid rigid spatial 
and social separation of blacks from whites.36 It is even more glaring in the 
instance of the “caste cities” built by colonial powers to inscribe in space the 
hierarchical ethnic organization of their overseas possessions, such as Rabat 
under French rule over Morocco and Cape Town after the passage of the Group 
Areas Acts under the apartheid regime of South Africa.37
Recognizing that it is a product and instrument of group power makes it 
possible to appreciate that, in its full-fledged form, the ghetto is a Janus-faced 
institution as it plays opposite roles for the two collectives it binds in a relation 
of asymmetric dependency. For the dominant category, its rationale is to con-
fine and control, which translates into what Max Weber calls the “exclusionary 
closure” of the subordinate category.38 For the latter, however, it is a protective 
and integrative device insofar as it relieves its members from constant contact 
with the dominant and fosters consociation and community-building within the 
constricted sphere of intercourse it creates. Enforced isolation from the outside 
leads to the intensification of social exchange and cultural sharing inside. Ghet-
tos are the product of a mobile and tensionful dialectic of external hostility and 
internal affinity that expresses itself as ambivalence at the level of collective 
consciousness. Thus, although European Jews consistently protested relegation 
35 ibiD., p. viii.
36 Cf. HirsCH, 1983.
37 Cf. abu-LuGHoD, 1980; Western, 1981. Colonial societies form a vast yet largely 
uncharted domain for the comparative study of the dynamics and forms of 
ghettoization for three reasons. First, in their settler variant, they were ‘geographic’ 
social formations, predicated on land spoliation, close control of the circulation 
of goods and people, and the rigid regimentation of space. Second, they were 
founded on sharp, stiff, and salient ethnoracial divisions that were projected onto 
the spatial organization of the city. Lastly, urban forms were major vehicles for 
social engineering and identity crafting in the colony. Cf. for illustrations the 
complementary studies of French dominions by WriGHt, 1991, and ÇeLik, 1997.
38 Cf. Weber, 1922/1978.
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within their outcast districts, they were nonetheless deeply attached to them 
and appreciative of the relative security they afforded and the special forms of 
collective life they supported: Francfort’s ghetto in the eighteenth century was 
“not just the scene of confinement and persecution but a place where Jews were 
entirely, supremely, at home”39 Similarly black Americans took pride in having 
“erected a community in their own image,” even as they resented the fact that 
they had done so under duress, as a result of unyielding white exclusion aimed 
at warding off the specter of “social equality,” that is, sexual mixing.40
“I love Harlem because it belongs to me”
The sentiment of being “home” inside the ghetto, in a protected and protecting 
space, is expressed with verve in the narrative of the daily foibles of Jesse B. 
Semple or Simple, the character created by the poet Langston Hughes to give 
voice to the aspirations of urban black Americans at the mid-century point. Thus 
when he exclaims about Harlem :
“‘It’s so full of Negroes, I feel like I got protection.’ – ‘From what?’ – ‘From 
white folks’, said Simple. I like Harlem because it belongs to me. […] You 
say the houses ain’t mine. Well, the sidewalk is – and don’t you push me off. 
The cops don’t even say, ‘Move on,’ hardly no more. They learned something 
from them Harlem riots41. […] Here I ain’t scared to vote – that’s another 
thing I like about Harlem. […] Folks is friendly in Harlem. I feel like I got 
the world in a jug and the stopper in my hand! So drink a toast to Harlem!”42
Acknowledging the double-sidedness of the ghetto spotlights its role as organi-
zational matrix and symbolic incubator for the production of a “spoiled identity” 
in Erving Goffman’s sense of the term.43 For the ghetto is not only the con-
crete means and materialization of ethnoracial domination through the spatial 
segmentation of the city; it is also a site of intense cultural production and a 
potent collective identity machine in its own right. It helps to incrustate and 
39 Gay, 1992, p. 67.
40 Cf. Drake/Cayton, (1945) 1993, p. 115
41 In 1935 and 1943, the residents of Harlem rose up against racial exclusion made 
unbearable by the economic collapse of the Great Crisis, cf. Greenbert, 1991.
42 HuGHes, 1957, p. 20f.
43 Cf. Goffm ann, 1963.
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elaborate the very division of which it is the expression in two complementary 
and mutually reinforcing ways. First, the ghetto sharpens the boundary between 
the outcast category and the surrounding population by deepening the sociocul-
tural chasm between them: it renders its residents objectively and subjectively 
more dissimilar from other urban dwellers by submitting them to unique condi-
tionings, so that the patterns of cognition and conduct they fashion have every 
chance of being perceived by outsiders as singular, exotic, even “aberrant”,44 
which feeds prejudicial beliefs about them.
Next, the ghetto is a cultural combustion engine that melts divisions amongst 
the confined population and fuels its collective pride even as it entrenches the 
stigma that hovers over it. Spatial and institutional entrapment deflects class dif-
ferences and corrodes cultural distinctions within the relegated ethnoracial cate-
gory. Thus Christian ostracism welded Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews under an 
overarching Jewish identity such that they evolved a common “social type” and 
“state of mind” across the ghettos of Europe.45 Similarly, America’s dark ghetto 
accelerated the sociosymbolic amalgamation of mulattos and Negroes into a 
single unified “race” and turned racial consciousness into a mass phenomenon 
fueling community mobilization against continued caste exclusion.46 
Yet this unified identity cannot but be stamped with ambivalence as it re-
mains tainted by the very fact that ghettoization proclaims what Weber calls the 
“negative evaluation of honor”47 assigned to the group confined. It is therefore 
wont to foster among its members sentiments of self-doubt and self-hatred, dis-
simulation of one’s origin through “passing,” the pernicious derogation of one’s 
kind, and even fantastical identification with the dominant.48 The ghetto is home, 
but it remains an inferior home, built under duress, that exists at the order and 
sufferance of the dominant. Its residents know that, as it were, in their bones.
44 Cf. sennett, 1994, p. 244; WiLson, 1987, p. 7f.
45 Cf. WirtH, 1928, p. 71-88; ibiD., 1956/1964
46 Cf. Drake/Cayton, (1945) 1993, p. 390.
47 Weber, 1922/1978.
48 Cf. CLark, 1965, p. 63-67. The phenomenon of “passing” among the Burakumin is 
an explosive question in the historical sociology and politics of Japan’s “invisible 
race”, cf. neary, 2003. An abiding sense of disgrace born of the internalization 
of stigma is a prevalent theme in the autobiographies of Burakumin activists (e.g., 
Hane, 1982, p- 163-171).
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Disentangling poverty, segregation,  
and ethnic clustering 
Articulating the concept of ghetto as sociospatial mechanism of ethnoracial clo-
sure makes it possible to disentangle the relationship between ghettoization, ur-
ban poverty, and segregation, and thence to clarify the structural and functional 
differences between ghettos and ethnic neighborhoods. I tackle each of these 
questions in turn.
1. Poverty is a derivative and variable characteristic of ghettos: The fact that 
many ghettos have historically been places of endemic and often acute misery 
owing to the paucity of space, the density of settlement, and the economic re-
strictions and statutory maltreatment of their residents does not imply that a 
ghetto is necessarily a place of destitution, nor that it is uniformly deprived. 
Indeed the very opposite is true: ghettos have more often than not been vectors 
of economic amelioration, even as they imposed multifarious restrictions on 
their residents. The Judengasse of Frankfurt, instituted in 1490 and abolished in 
1811, went through periods of prosperity no less than penury, and it contained 
sectors of extraordinary opulence as court Jews helped the city become a vibrant 
center of trade and finance – part of its glamour to this day comes from it being 
the ancestral home of the Rothschild dynasty.49 Being forced to dwell within the 
walled compound of the mellah did not prevent the Jews of Marrakech from 
thriving economically: many of its business leaders were renowned throughout 
Morocco for their wealth.50 Turning to the United States, James Weldon John-
son insisted that the Harlem of the 1930s was “not a slum or a fringe” but the 
“cultural capital”51 of black America, a place where “the Negro’s advantages 
and opportunities are greater than in any other place in the country.” Similarly, 
Chicago’s “Bronzeville” at the mid-twentieth-century point was not only far 
more prosperous than the Southern black communities from which its residents 
had migrated; it harbored the largest and most affluent African-American bour-
geoisie of its era.52 
The ghetto arises through the double assignation of category to territory 
and territory to category, and therefore purports to contain the gamut of class-
es evolved by the confined group. It follows that, to the degree that this group 
49 Cf. WirtH, 1928, chapter 4.
50 Cf. GottreiCH, 2006, p. 102-105.
51 JoHnson, 1930, p. 4.
52 Cf. Drake/CLayton, (1945) 1993.
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experiences socioeconomic dispersion, its reserved district offers extensive av-
enues for economic betterment and upward mobility in its internal social order. 
Indeed, in the case of African Americans, ghettoization, class differentiation, 
and collective enrichment proceeded apace: in addition to allowing the conver-
sion of peasants into industrial workers, the rise and consolidation of the ghetto 
fostered the growth of a black middle class of business owners, professionals, 
politicians, teachers, and preachers servicing a captive clientele of lower-class 
coethnics that the dispersed rural communities of the South could have never 
sustained.53 Whether a ghetto is poor or not, and to what degree, depends on 
the overall economic standing of the category it cloisters, its distribution in the 
division of labor, and on extraneous factors such as demography, ecology, state 
policies, and the shape of the surrounding economy.
Conversely, not all dispossessed and dilapidated urban districts are ghettos 
– and if they are such, it is not by dint of their level of deprivation. Declin-
ing white neighborhoods in the deindustrializing cities of the US Midwest and 
the British Midlands, depressed rural towns of the former East Germany and 
southern Italy, and the disreputable villas miserias of greater Buenos Aires at 
the close of the twentieth century are territories of working-class demotion and 
decomposition, not ethnic containers dedicated to maintaining an outcast group 
in a relationship of seclusive subordination.54 They are not ghettos other than 
in a purely metaphorical sense, no matter how impoverished and how isolat-
ed their residents may be. If extreme rates of concentrated poverty breeding 
social isolation sufficed to make a ghetto, as argued by William Wilson,55 then 
the backcountry of Alabama, Native American reservations, large chunks of the 
former Soviet Union and most Third-World cities would be gargantuan ghettos. 
More curiously still, by that definition neither Venice’s ghetto nuovo nor Chica-
go’s Bronzeville at the peak of their historical development would be ghettos!56 
53 The ghetto of Chicago thus produced the country’s first black national newspaper, 
“The Chicago Defender”, whose owner, Robert S. Abbott, was also the city’s first 
black millionaire, cf. sP ear, 1968, p. 165-167. 
54 Cf. the case of Buenos Aires dissected by auyero, 2000.
55 Cf. WiLson, 1996.
56 Another anomaly generated by the income-based (re)definition of the ghetto is the 
following: the same neighborhood, harboring the same population and institutions, 
and fulfilling the same functions in the metropolitan system, would alternately 
become a ghetto and cease being one with wide variations of its poverty rate 
caused by cyclical fluctuations of the economy. This conception not only leaves out 
the canonical cases of the ghetto: by making ghettoization a derivative property of 
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The favelas of the Brazilian metropolis are often portrayed as segregated 
dens of dereliction and disorganization, overrun by drugs and violence, but upon 
close observation they turn out to be variegated working-class wards with finely 
stratified webs of ties to industry and to the wealthy districts for which they sup-
ply household service labor. They display considerable variety in levels of seg-
regation and situations of collective “socioeconomic vulnerability”.57 As in the 
ranchos of Venezuela and the poblaciones of Chile, families that dwell in these 
squatter settlements span the color continuum and have extensive genealogical 
bonds to higher-income households; they are “not socially and culturally mar-
ginal, but stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system”58. In any case, 
neither their poverty rate nor the mix of functions they fulfill in the metroplis, 
from viable reservoir of labor power to warehouse for the rejects of “regressive 
deindustrialization,” qualifies them as ghettos. The same demonstration applies 
to the ciudad perdida in Mexico, the cantagril in Uruguay, and the pueblo jóven 
in Peru.59 
Given that not all ghettos are poor and not all poor areas are (inside) ghettos, 
one cannot collapse the analysis of ghettoization into the study of slums, impov-
erished estates, and assorted districts of dispossession in the city. This conflation 
is precisely the mistake committed by those European observers who, smitten 
with a vague and emotive vision of the black American ghetto as a territory of 
urban dissolution and social dread – that is, with the barren vestiges of the dark 
ghetto after its implosion at the close of the 1960s – conclude that “ghettoiza-
economic inequality and income distribution, it fails utterly to identify a distinctive 
sociospatial form.
57 Cf. marques/torres, 2005; koWariCk, 2009.
58 PerLm a, 1976, p. 195. Cf. also zaLuar/aLVito, 1998.
59 Cf. WaCquant, 2008(1), p. 7-12. There are at least three major interlinked reasons 
why ghettos did not emerge in Latin American cities – a fact attested by Gilbert, 
cf. GiLbert, 1998; ibiD., 2011. First, the countries with significant dishonored 
populations (descendants of African slaves and native peasants) have evolved 
gradational systems of ethnoracial classification based on phenotype and a host 
of sociocultural variables, as opposed to categorical systems based on descent 
(as define Jews in Europe and blacks in the United States), resulting in fuzzy 
and porous ethnic boundaries. Second, and correlatively, they sport low and 
inconsistent patterns of residential segregation, and solid segregation is a necessary 
stepping stone to ghettoization. Third, Latin American states have spawned 
sharply asymmetric conceptions of citizenship, but they have typically not given 
legal imprimatur to ethnoracial classification and discrimination.
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tion” has struck the lower-class zones of the urban periphery of Europe due 
to rising unemployment, immigrant segregation, and festering delinquency, or, 
worse, because they adopt the fleeting impressions of their residents who think 
of themselves as “ghetto” since this is how depressed and defamed neighbor-
hoods are now publicly labelled in public debate.
“The ghetto” comes to France:  
How “everyday usage” drowns out sociology
Didier Lapeyronnie’s thick book on the alleged coalescence of the “urban ghet-
to” in France announces a study of “segregation, violence and poverty” in that 
country but contains not a shred of data and no analysis on these trends and 
their overlap.60 Instead, it uses the word ghetto as a loose synonym for declining 
lower-class estates branded as such by journalists and by some of their residents 
(who themselves have learned the label from the media). The notion then inex-
plicably devolves into a subjective concept pertaining to lifestyle, self-concep-
tion, and “the shared feeling of having been betrayed” by dominant institutions: 
“The term ghetto belongs to the everyday vocabulary of the banlieue [low-
er-class periphery]. It is used to designate a difficult social or personal situa-
tion, even a psychological situation stamped by disorder, poverty, and some-
times violence. It is not necessarily associated with urban segregation and 
confinement in a territorial sense […]. Many residents can be of the ghetto 
without living in the ghetto. They can live it partially, as a function of mo-
ments and interactions.… By following this everyday usage, we understand 
the ghetto to be a dimension of individual and collective behaviors […]. The 
ghetto is not a situation, it is a category of action in an array of social relations 
[…]. We shall seek to evaluate and to define the ghetto as a function of its 
effects on the self-construction effected by its residents, as a function of the 
capacity of individuals to name themselves and to assert an ‘I’, to establish 
or not a positive relationship to self […]. We shall seek the truth, or rather 
the truths, of the ghetto, in the words and in the reflections of its residents”61 
Characterizing the ghetto as a matter of subjective orientation, “a psycholog-
ical situation stamped by disorder, poverty, and sometimes violence,” is both 
60 Cf. LaP eyronnie, 2007.
61 ibiD., 2010, p. 22-24, 26.
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incoherent and inconsistent with the established conceptual usage of the term. 
By that definition, neither the Jewish ghetto of Venice nor the black ghetto of 
Chicago in their full bloom would be ghettos; any population invoking the idi-
om of the ghetto is eo ipso ghettoized; and consequently the simple remedy to 
ghettoization is for the residents of lower-class districts to change their repre-
sentations of themselves. Not to mention that French citizens residing outside 
the country’s “sensitive neighborhoods” who feel “betrayed” by leading institu-
tions would be surprised to discover that, unbeknownst to them, they “live the 
ghetto.”
Echoing Lapeyronnie (on whose views he relies), the sensationalist book 
by Le Monde journalist Luc Bronner entitled The Law of the Ghetto provides 
a selective account of street delinquency and a long litany of clashes between 
unemployed youths and the police in a few banlieues brashly labelled “ghettos” 
because of the shock value of the term to describe territories of “social, political, 
and economic violence”: “We must dare this term which so frightens the Repub-
lic” to describe “our Gomorra.”62 When the so-called law of the ghetto denotes 
the imprint of low-grade criminality, the flourishing of an informal economy, 
and assorted urban disorders, we know we have reached the point where the 
word has been emptied of any sociological meaning to serve as an ordinary 
categoreme, a term of accusation and alarm, pertaining not to social science but 
public polemic, that serves only to sell books and to fuel the spiral of stigmati-
zation enmeshing the unpoverished districts of the urban periphery. 
2. All ghettos are segregated but not all segregated areas are ghettos: The select 
boroughs of the West of Paris, the exclusive upper-class suburbs of Boston, 
Berne or Berlin, and the “gated communities” that have mushroomed in global 
cities such as Milan, Miami, São Paulo, and Cape Town are monotonous in 
terms of wealth, income, occupation, and very often ethnicity, but they are not 
for all that ghettos. Segregation in them is entirely voluntary and elective, and 
for that very reason it is neither all-inclusive nor perpetual. Fortified enclaves 
of luxury package “security, seclusion, social homogeneity, amenities, and ser-
vices” to enable bourgeois families to escape what they perceive as “the chaos, 
dirt, and danger of the city”63. These islands of privilege serve to enhance, not 
curtail, the life chances and protect the lifestyles of their residents, and they 
radiate a positive aura of distinction,64 not a sense of infamy and dread. In terms 
62 bronner, 2010, p. 249, 23.
63 CaLDeira, 2000, p. 264f.
64 Cf. LoW, 2004.
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of their causal dynamics, structure and function, they are the very antithesis 
of the ghetto. To call them such, as with variations on the expression “gilded 
ghetto,” invites confusion and stretches the semantics of the term to the point of 
meaninglessness.65
This indicates that residential segregation is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for ghettoization. For a ghetto to emerge spatial confinement must first 
be imposed and all-encompassing; then it must be overlayed with a distinct and 
duplicative set of institutions enabling the population thus cloistered to repro-
duce itself within its assigned perimeter. If blacks are the only ethnic category 
to be “hypersegregated” in American society,66 it is because they are the only 
community in that country for which involuntary segregation, assignment to a 
reserved territory, and organizational parallelism have combined to entrap them 
in a separate and inferior social cosmos of their own, which in turn bolstered 
their residential isolation, as well as enforced their extreme marital isolation, 
virtually unique in the world among major ethnic groups.67 
That even forcible segregation at the bottom of the urban order does not 
mechanically produce ghettos is demonstrated by the fate of the declining low-
er-class banlieues of France after the mid-1970s. Although they have been wide-
ly described and disparaged as “ghettos” in public discourse and their inhabi-
tants share a vivid feeling of being cast out in a “penalized space” suffused with 
boredom, anguish, and despair,68 relegation in these depressed concentrations 
of public housing laid fallow at the urban periphery is based first on class, and 
only secondarily on ethnicity, and it is remarkably impermanent. Proof is that 
the residents who move up the class structure typically move out of the neigh-
borhood – so much so the rate of geographic mobility among the households 
of “sensitive neighborhoods” surpasses the national average.69 As a result these 
degraded districts are culturally heterogeneous, typically harboring a mix of na-
tive French families with immigrants from three to six dozen nationalities. And 
their inhabitants suffer not from institutional duplication and enclosure but, on 
65 PinÇon-CHarLot/PinÇon’s, 2007, dissection of the dense web of associations, 
clubs, and councils through which the upper crust of the French bourgeoisie 
bulwarks its secluded spaces (exclusive urban enclaves, parks and castles, beaches 
and gardens) shows that the “ghettos of the gotha” are no ghettos. This catchy 
coinage makes for good marketing copy but muddies the sociological waters.
66 Cf. massey/Denton, 1993
67 Cf. Patterson, 1998.
68 Cf. Pétonnet, 1982.
69 Cf. obserVatoire Des zones urbaines sensibLes, 2005.
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the contrary, from the lack of an ingrown organizational structure capable of 
sustaining them in the absence of gainful employment and adequate public ser-
vices. Like the German Problemquartier, the Dutch “krottenwijk”, and the Brit-
ish “sink estates,” France’s deteriorating banlieues are, sociologically speaking, 
anti-ghettos.70 
The anti-ghettos of Western Europe  
and the Roma exception
If and when an urban district turns into a ghetto, it should display five mutual-
ly reinforcing properties resulting from the reciprocal asssignation of category 
and territory: (1) growing ethnic homogeneity; (2) increased encompassment of 
the target population; (3) rising organizational density; (4) the production and 
adoption of a collective identity; (5) and impermeable boundaries. On all five 
dimensions, the formerly industrial banlieues of France harboring rising shares 
of immigrants have been moving steadily away from the pattern of the ghetto.71 
Over the past 30 years, these defamed districts have become more diverse 
in their ethnic composition; the proportion of all foreigners living in them has 
stagnated or decreased (depending on geographic location and national prov-
enance); and they have lost most of the dense web of organizations that they 
harbored at the bloom of the age of the industrial “Red Belt.” Most striking-
ly, notwithstanding political campaigns periodically denouncing “multicul-
turalism” and the media obsession with “Islamicization,” these districts have 
failed to spawn a collective idiom and vision that would unify their residents on 
grounds of ethnicity, nationality, religion or postcolonial status.72 Lastly, fam-
ilies experiencing upward mobility, whether through education, employment, 
or entrepreneurship, have crossed the boundaries of these districts in droves to 
move up the ladder of neighborhoods and diffuse in metropolitan space. With 
national variations and regional twists, this French pattern of a multilevel drift 
70 Cf. WaCquant, 2008(1).
71 Cf. ibiD., 2008(2).
72 Identification based on territory, often cited as a ground for ethnogenesis among 
lower-class immigrant youths, turns out to be weak: it is defensive, situational and 
labile; it is closely linked to lifecycle and evaporates upon entry into the labor 
market or migration out of the neighborhood, cf. LeP outre, 1997.
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antithetical to ghettoization fits the trajectories of most immigrant “minorities” 
throughout Western Europe.73
The French analysts who, caught in the political mood and fed by swirling 
media rumor, bemoan the morphing of the declining working-class districts of 
the urban periphery into fearsome “immigrant ghettos” wed conceptual con-
fusion and historical amnesia.74 First, they conflate territories of dereliction 
(marked by increased unemployment, the deterioration of the housing stock, and 
the devalorization of their public image) with ethnic segmentation, and they mis-
take mere segregation, produced by the conjoint press of class and ethnonational 
origin, for territorial assignation and institutional parallelism – whose absence 
is then obfuscated by the hazy and sulfurous category of “communautarianism,” 
or by the invocation of the loose journalistic category of “Muslim communities” 
that exists only in the worried minds of outsiders. Next, they conveniently forget 
that ethnically marked populations issued from the former colonies were nota-
bly more segregated spatially and more isolated socially (in terms of social ties, 
marital unions, and institutional participation) in the 1960s and 1970s than they 
are today. A half-century ago, these immigrants lived separated lives tightly en-
cased in the peripheral sectors of the secondary labor market and in the parallel 
institutions of the shanty-towns (bidonvilles) and reserved housing compounds 
of the SONACOTRA, the state agency entrusted with housing workers migrat-
ing from the Maghrib.75 Indeed, in sharp contraposition to the black American 
hyperghetto, it is the growing mixing of native and immigrant populations at 
the bottom of the structure of classes and places, and the correlative closing of 
social distance and disparities between them in the context of the decomposition 
of traditional “working-class territories” that are the source of the xenophobic 
tensions and conflicts that stamp these urban zones.76
If there is one category whose experience deviates sharply from this pattern 
to veer toward ghettoization, it is the Roma of Eastern Europe. This population 
of 3 to 5 million,  dispersed mostly across Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cze-
koslovakia, and the Balkans has long been marginalized in both monoethnic 
rural villages and urban districts combining the four structural components of 
stigma, constraint, spatial enclosure and institutional parallelism. After the col-
lapse of the Soviet empire, the destruction of the safety net and the abrupt social 
polarization wrought by the market economy have reactivated anti-Roma prej-
73 Cf. musterD/kem P en, 2009; PeaCH, 2009; HartoG/zorLu, 2009
74 E.g. muCCHieLLi/Le Goaziou, 2007; LaP eyronnie, 2007.
75 Cf. sayaD/DuPuy, 1995; bernaDot, 1999
76 Cf. WaCquant, 2008(1).
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udice (as a “criminal race”), animosity, and discrimination and territorial fixa-
tion has flared anew as Gypsies sank into unemployment and destitution.77 But 
there are also counter-tendencies: many Romas have passed undetected among 
the non-Gypsy population while others have experienced upward class mobility 
against the backdrop of a fuzzy ethnic hierarchy enforced with variable strin-
gency in the different nations. Overall, class and country prove to be stronger 
determinants of the trajectory of Gypsies than race and space.78 Nonetheless, the 
controversial policy of the Berlusconi government to reinstitute state-run camps 
to corral Gypsies on the outskirts of Italian cities and the heinous campaign 
of destruction of “illegal Rom encampments” launched by President Nicolas 
Sarkozy in France in the summer of 2010 to curry favor with electors of the far 
right are there to remind us that the Roma remain prime candidates for the (re)
activation of sociospatial enclosure even in western Europe.79
3. Ghettos and ethnic neighborhoods sport divergent structures and serve op-
posite functions: Moving beyond a gradational perspective to scrutinize the pe-
culiar patterning of social relations within the ghetto as well as between it and 
the surrounding city throws into sharp relief the differences between the ghetto 
and the ethnic clusters or immigrant neighborhoods such as newcomers to the 
metropolis have formed in countless countries. The foreign “colonies” of inter-
war Chicago that Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Louis Wirth – and after them 
the liberal tradition of assimilationist sociology and historiography80 – mistook 
for so many white “ghettos” were scattered and mobile constellations born of 
cultural affinity and occupational concentration, more so than prejudice and dis-
crimination. Segregation in them was partial and porous, a product of immigrant 
solidarity and ethnic attraction instead of being rigidly imposed by sustained 
outgroup hostility. Consequently residential separation was neither uniformly 
nor rigidly visited upon these groups: in 1930, when the all-black Bronzeville 
harbored 92 % of the city’s African-American population, Chicago’s Little Ire-
77 Cf. GHeorGe, 1991.
78 Cf. LaDányi/szeLényi, 2006.
79 The prototype Rom “village” of Castel Romano outside of Rome, home to some 
800 Gypsies, with its prefabricated huts laid out in a grid and surrounded by a high 
metal fence patrolled round the clock by a special police force, and the subjection 
of its residents to a special census and fingerprinting are strongly redolent of the 
early modern Italian ghetto. Cf. CLouGH marinaro, 2009; CaLam e, 2010: http://
places.designobserver.com, 07.05.2013.
80 Cf. miLLer, 1992.
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land was “an ethnic hodge-podge” of 25 nationalities composed of only one-
third Irish persons and containing a paltry 3  % of the city’s denizens of Irish 
ancestry. The eleven dispersed districts making up Little Italy were 46 % Italian 
and contained just under one-half of Chicagoans of Italian origin. Thus both of 
these clusters were ethnically plural and monolithically white, and both con-
tained a minority of the population supposedly ghettoized in them.81 
This pattern was not unique to Chicago but repeated itself in every major 
industrial center of the Midwest and Northeast of the United States. For in-
stance, the typical Italian immigrant to Philadelphia in 1930 resided amongst 
“14 percent other Italian immigrants, 38 percent Italian stock, 23 percent all 
foreign born persons and 57 percent all foreign stock”82. Except for marginal 
and local peculiarities, there were no white “ethnic” neighborhoods in the Amer-
ican metropolis wherein members of one European community were thoroughly 
isolated from native whites and monopolized space and local institutions to the 
exclusion of urbanites of other national origins.83 What is more, the distinctive 
institutions of European immigrant enclaves were turned outward: they operated 
to facilitate adjustment to the novel environment of the US metropolis. They 
neither replicated the organizations of the country of origin nor perpetuated so-
cial isolation and cultural distinctiveness. And so they typically waned within 
two generations as their users gained access to their American counterparts and 
climbed up the class order and the corresponding ladder of places.84 All of which 
is in sharp contrast with the immutable racial exclusivity and enduring institu-
tional alterity of the Black Belt. This Chicago illustration dramatizes the fact 
that the immigrant neighborhood and the ghetto serve diametrically opposed 
functions: the one is a springboard for assimilation via cultural learning and 
social-cum-spatial mobility, the other a material and symbolic isolation ward 
geared toward dissimilation. The former is best figured by a bridge, the latter 
by a wall.85 
81 Cf. PHiLP ot, 1978, p. 141-145.
82 HersCHberG et al., 1981, p. 200.
83 Cf. Warner/burke, 1969.
84 Cf. neLLi, 1970.
85 Cf. for full documentation of the sharp divergence between the black ghetto and 
the ‘colonies’ formed by European immigrant (Jews from Eastern countries, Poles, 
Italians, and the Irish) in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States 
Lieberson, 1980; boDnar et al., 1982; zunz, 1986, and GerstLe, 2001, esp. chap. 
5. Workers of Belgian, Italian, Polish, and Iberian provenance underwent a very 
similar process of spatial diffusion via class incorporation in the French industrial 
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From shield to sword
It is fruitful, then, to think of ghetto and ethnic cluster as two ideal-typical 
configurations situated at opposite ends of the homological continua of con-
straint and choice, entrapment and self-protection, exclusivity and heterogene-
ity, encompassment and dispersal, inward and outward orientations, rigidity and 
fluidity, along which various populations (themselves differently marked) can 
be pegged or travel over time depending on the intensity with which the forces 
of stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional parallelism impinge 
upon them and coalesce with one another. We can then shift the analysis from 
the ghetto as a topographic object, a static state, to ghettoization as a sociospatial 
dynamic, a multilevel process liable to empirical specification and measurement. 
A population that formed mobile clusters out of cultural affinity and inconsistent 
hostility can find itself subjected to stringent ostracization and territorial fixation 
such that it evolves permanent sites for comprehensive seclusion: such was the 
experience of Jews in early modern Europe and of African Americans in the 
northern metropolis of the United States at the dawn of the Fordist era as they 
shifted from segregation to ghettoization.
Conversely, ghettoization can be attenuated to the point where, through 
gradual erosion of, and disjunction between, its spatial, social, and mental 
boundaries, the ghetto devolves into an elective ethnic concentration operating 
as a springboard for structural integration and/or cultural assimilation into the 
broader social formation. This describes well the trajectory of the Chinatowns of 
the United States from the early to the late twentieth century86 and the status of 
the Cuban immigrant enclave of Miami which fostered integration through bi-
culturalism after the Mariel exodus of 1980.87 It also characterizes the “Kimchee 
Towns” in which Koreans converged in the metropolitan areas of Japan, which 
sport a blend of features making them a hybrid of ghetto and ethnic cluster:88 
they are places of infamy that first arose through enmity and constraint, but over 
city of the first half of the twentieth century in spite of being subjected to virulent 
xenophobia and widespread collective violence during phases of economic turmoil, 
cf. noirieL, 1988. Over the past quarter-century, postcolonial migrants have been 
following a germane trajectory in cities throughout Europe, characterized by 
low to moderate segregation from nationals and stagnant to decreasing spatial 
concentration, cf. musterD, 2005.
86 Cf. zHou, 1994.
87 Cf. Portes/stePiCk, 1993.
88 Cf. DeVos/CHunG, 1981.
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the years their population has become ethnically mixed; residential mingling has 
in turn enabled Koreans to socialize and intermarry with Japanese neighbors as 
well as obtain Japanese citizenship through naturalization. 
This analytic schema allows one to assess the degree to which a given urban 
configuration approximates one or the other pure type and on what dimension(s). 
Thus the so-called gay ghetto is more aptly characterized as a “quasi-ethnic 
community,” since “most gay persons can ‘pass’ and need not be confined to 
interacting with their ‘own kind’”89 and none are forced to reside in the areas 
of visible concentration of gay institutions based on their sexual orientation. 
Indeed, the vast majority of gays do not live in, or even patronize, these dis-
tricts, which are local clusters of commercial establishments and public spaces 
catering to the preferences of gays in matters of consumption and sociabili-
ty. Their degree of closure, mutual orientation, and collective organization are 
highly variable and often contested, both without and within the gay district, as 
illustrated by the case of Le Marais in Paris.90 
The double-sidedness of the ghetto as sword (for the dominant) and shield 
(for the subordinate) implies that, to the degree that its institutional complete-
ness and autonomy are abridged, its protective role is diminished and risks being 
swamped by its exclusionary modality. In situations where its residents cease 
to be of economic value to the controlling group, extraction evaporates and no 
longer balances out ostracization. Ethnoracial encapsulation can then escalate 
to the point where the ghetto morphs into an apparatus merely to warehouse the 
spoiled and supernumerary population, as a staging ground for its expulsion, or 
as a springboard for the ultimate form of ostracization, namely, physical anni-
hilation. 
The first scenario fits the evolution of America’s “Black Metropolis” after 
the peaking of the Civil Rights movement in the mid-1960s. Having lost its 
role as a reservoir of unskilled labor power, the dark ghetto crashed and broke 
down into a dual sociospatial structure composed of (i) the hyperghetto, entrap-
ping the marginal fractions of the black working class in the barren perimeter 
of the historic ghetto; (ii) and the black middle-class satellites that burgeoned 
at the latter’s periphery, in the areas left vacant by white outmigration, where 
the growing African-American bourgeoisie achieved spatial and social distance 
from its lower-class brethren.91 The hyperghetto is a novel sociospatial config-
uration, doubly segregated by race and class, devoid of economic function, and 
89 murray, 1979, p. 169.
90 Cf. sibaLis, 2004.
91 Cf. WaCquant, 2008(1), p. 11, 51f., 117f.
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thus stripped of the communal institutions that used to provide succor to its in-
habitants. These institutions have been replaced by the social control institutions 
of the state (increasingly staffed by the black middle class), and in particular by 
the booming prison and its disciplinary tentacles. As the authorities turned from 
the social welfare to the penal regulation of racialized marginality in the city, 
the hyperghetto became deeply penetrated by and symbiotically linked to the 
hypertrophied carceral system of the United States by a triple relationship of 
structural homology, functional surrogacy, and cultural fusion.92 The second and 
third scenarios, wherein the ghetto devolves into a means of radical ostraciza-
tion, were those implemented by Nazi Germany when it revived the Judenghetto 
between 1939 and 1944, first, to impoverish and concentrate Jews with a view 
toward relocation and later, after mass deportation turned out to be impractical, 
to funnel them toward extermination camps as part of the “final solution”.93 
The unchecked intensification of its exclusionary thrust attendant upon the 
loss of its shielding capacity suggests that the ghetto might be most profitably 
studied not by analogy with urban slums, lower-class districts, and immigrant 
enclaves but alongside the reservation, the camp, and the prison, as belonging 
to a broader genus of institutions for the forced confinement of dispossessed and 
dishonored groups.94 It is not by happenstance that the Bridewell of London 
(1555), the Zuchthaus of Amsterdam (1654), and the Hospital général of Paris 
(1656), designed to instill the discipline of wage work in vagrants, beggars, and 
criminals via incarceration, were invented around the same time as the Jewish 
ghetto. It is not by coincidence that today’s sprawling refugee camps in Sierra 
Leone, Sri Lanka, and the occupied territories of Palestine and the Gaza Strip 
look ever more like a cross between the ghettos of early modern Europe and 
gigantic gulags.95 And that retention camps for unlawful immigrants have mush-
roomed throughout Europe as the European Union moved to treating transna-
tional peregrination from the global South as a matter of material security and 
ethnonational status.96
92 Cf. WaCquant, 2001.
93 Cf. frieDm an, 1980; broWninG, 1986.
94 WaCquant, 2010, sketches an analytic framework that brings together into a single 
model forms of sociospatial seclusion at the top (gated communities, upper-class 
districts) and at the bottom (slum, ethnic cluster, ghetto, prison), as well as urban 
and rural forms (among which figure preserves, reservations, and camps). 
95 Cf. aGier, 2008; rozeLier, 2007.
96 Cf. Le Cour GranDm aison et al., 2007.
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A robust analytic concept of the ghetto as an organizational device for the 
spatial enclosure and control of a stigmatized group offers a way out of the se-
mantic morass and empirical confusion created by the unreflective adoption of 
the shifting folk notions of the same among political and intellectual elites. It al-
lows us, not only to describe, differentiate, and explain the diverse urban forms 
developed by tainted populations as they come into the city without falling into 
the many traps set by the metaphorical and rhetorical usages of “the ghetto.” 
By spotlighting the tangled nexus of space, power and dishonor, it also gives 
us the means to grasp the structural and functional kinship between the ghetto, 
the prison, and the camp just as the state managers of the advanced societies are 
increasingly resorting to borders, walls, and bounded districts as the means to 
define, confine, and control problem categories. 
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The Subalterns Speak Out 
Urban Plebeian Society in  
Late Imperial Russia
iLya V. Gerasim oV
Urban slum areas of today, just as a hundred years ago, house the kind of people 
who largely evade regular documentation of their lives, and very rarely produce 
written accounts of their feelings, desires, and concerns. This should present a 
major difficulty for historians who write about the slum inhabitants of the past, 
and who, unlike contemporary sociologists or anthropologists, cannot produce 
their own data by conducting surveys and interviews. Historians have to rely 
on existing sources, which are authored mostly by the educated middle classes 
whose values and rationality these sources reflected (as well as biases and mis-
conceptions). This fundamental deficiency of ‘authentic’ or at least first-hand 
evidence should pose a major problem for attempts to write histories of the low-
er classes, which makes it all the more surprising that such histories are not only 
numerous but also often written without any concern for the epistemological and 
methodological impasse presented by the task.
This unshattered optimism can be explained by the origins of social history 
in the research of premodern epochs. Historians have long been accustomed to 
studying social groups and entire societies who were illiterate or had an insignif-
icant number of literate members. The revolutionizing effect produced by Me-
dieval Studies in the mid-twentieth century (associated mostly with the Annales 
School), which laid the ground for new social history and the anthropological 
turn in history writing, was based in good part on new approaches to the study of 
the popular masses that had left only scarce written evidence of their lives. ‘The 
silent majority’ and ‘the people without history’ have become legitimate topics 
of study, no less respectable than traditionally celebrated kings, aristocrats, and 
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literati.1 The study of muted groups within the medieval communal-based soci-
ety was continued by historians of the lower (and equally ‘speechless’) classes 
during the industrial age.2 Today, it has become standard to write about all kinds 
of disenfranchised social groups that left no elaborated self-descriptive narra-
tives that reconstruct their distinctive cultures and even their subjectivity. 
Russian history is particularly prominent for this type of scholarship – both 
because of the heavy impact left on the field by Marxism (with its fixation on 
the lower classes), and because of the low literacy rates of the pre-1917 pop-
ulation. Many of the generalizations about prerevolutionary workers’ culture 
and subjectivity have been made on the basis of a single document, which is 
quite outstanding in all senses – the autobiography of one Semen Kanatchi-
kov.3 Those historians who, in their studies, have analyzed a broader number of 
written sources produced by workers still dealt with the ‘conscious workers’ or 
even ‘plebeian intelligentsia’, rather than with the entire social group.4 Peasant 
studies do not have such an authoritative and self-conscious text, which does 
not preclude scholars from making generalizations about the peasants’ inner self 
and collective identity on a grand scale.5 The underworld or just the ‘gray zone’ 
social sphere of a late imperial city can be studied on the basis of several doz-
en newspaper feuilletons written by lower-middle-class journalists.6 Criticism 
of these approaches from within the historical profession usually questions the 
sufficiency of the analyzed evidence for reaching such broad conclusions. The 
discussion is framed in terms of the ‘representativeness of sources’, which can-
not be definitively resolved in most cases: how many examples (case studies, 
written testimonies) are ‘enough’ to substantiate a historian’s claim?7 
The very question of whether those written accounts of mores and deeds 
of the commoners, produced by educated and usually upper-class observers, 
1 Cf. WHite, 1967; WoLf, 1982.
2 Cf. for classic studies of the proletariat and the peasantry tHom Pson, 1968; sHanin, 
1972. 
3 a raDiCaL Worker in tsarist russia, 1986.
4 Cf. steinberG, 1992; iD., 2002, Chapter I.
5 Cf. for one of the most recent examples retisH, 2008. Cf. for criticism of bold 
discursive generalizations and projections in peasant studies Gerasim oV, 2004.
6 For example, in Odessa: syLVester, 2005.
7 This problem has been particularly acute in Microhistory, which substantiates 
broad generalizations by the meticulous analysis of just one or several cases. Cf. 
on the problem of relations between a unique case and the general social norm in 
microhistorical studies eGm onD/mason, 1997, p. 2f. et al; GinzburG, 1993.
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are meaningful at all as a ‘source’ is not recognized, and perhaps will not be 
even understood by many historians. The basic ‘credibility check’ of a primary 
source implies examining whether the author was an eyewitness or had firsthand 
access to reliable information, or personal reasons to distort the picture, and 
also determining the author’s purpose and circumstances of writing down the 
document. The idea that those different groups of the lower social orders might 
be completely misrepresented and misinterpreted even by the most sympathetic 
and scrupulous observers from the ranks of the educated upper classes would 
strike a historian – and particularly a historian of Russia – as groundless. Why 
should testimony by an aristocrat or a cleric of the early Middle Ages be seen 
as a more adequate source on the history of peasants of that epoch than an early 
twentieth-century newspaper feuilleton by a university graduate on the history 
of urban slums of the same period? After all, aristocrats lived in castles separat-
ed by spatial and cultural distance from the village, while newspaper journalists 
could dwell just around the corner from a flophouse. 
The difference between the two examples is the nature of the social organi-
zation and the character of the production of knowledge in the Middle Ages and 
at the turn of the twentieth century. In the former case, both the ‘silent majori-
ty’ and their educated overlords shared a vision of the society as composed of 
half-isolated communes characterized by a universally recognized set of rights, 
obligations, cultural norms, and distinctive economic functions. By contrast, 
Russian society during the late imperial period (as other European societies of 
the time) was characterized by economic dislocations, intensive social mobility, 
and a multiplicity of “cultures in flux.”8 Social identities in this society are mul-
tifaceted and transitional, greatly differing in the ways they are viewed ‘from the 
outside’ (by the legislator or the police) and are experienced ‘from within’. At 
the same time, unlike the medieval literati, the educated elite of the turn of the 
twentieth century belonged to the common public sphere sustained by the cir-
culation of public discourses and engaged in the production of discourses. This 
is a radically new situation in comparison with the premodern world, where the 
closest analogue to a modern public hegemonic discourse was theology, equally 
alienated from the serf and the lord as its subjects, and almost equally embrac-
ing both of them as its objects. The modern hegemonic discourses of nation and 
culture, class and politics structure the ways in which educated members of the 
public sphere perceive the social reality and navigate through it, but they are 
alien and all but irrelevant for those outside the public sphere – which means for 
the absolute majority of the population.
8 Cf. frank/steinberG, 1994.
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According to the rigid criteria upheld by social historians−purists of the 
Habermas model, only 2 or 3 percent of the inhabitants of Russian provincial 
cities (such as Kazan in the Middle Volga region) belonged to the public sphere 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.9 This figure may be viewed as too low, 
and there can be alternative methods for assessing the size of the public sphere. 
It is clear, however, that the majority of the urban inhabitants could not belong 
to any public sphere in principle, for basic technical reasons. To begin with, 
only 51 percent of the population of Kazan was literate in 1897, and the rate of 
literacy was not much higher even ten years later, given the influx of mostly illit-
erate migrants from the countryside.10 Furthermore, the cumulative print run of 
major newspapers in Kazan reached its peak in 1913, with about 25,000 copies 
at a time of about ten titles being published – for a city that had about 158,000 
inhabitants over the age of ten, or 120,000 older than age twenty.11 This means 
that only 16 to 20 percent of adult Kazanians would have had access to news-
papers in principle, which by itself did not make them active participants in the 
public sphere, but was a sine qua non for those who wished to participate in it. It 
can be added that in terms of formal social status, only 10 percent of the urban 
population in Russia did not belong to nonprivileged social groups: peasants or 
petty commoners (meshchane). 
Thus, 2 to 20 percent of the urban population participated or could partici-
pate in the public sphere, having access to public discourses on a regular basis 
and perceiving reality in discursive categories. For them, “textuality has become 
a metaphor for reality in general”12. The rest could be exposed to discourses and 
the world of ideologies and bureaucratic document-based procedures, but they 
were not properly socialized into this world, and did not fully interiorize its 
“geography” and “physics.” At least they did not rely on discourses and textu-
ality in their everyday lives. This majority cannot be identified with a particular 
class, legal estate, occupation, or confession – or any other categories of modern 
social discourse. They are most accurately defined in the vaguest terms as the 
“lower classes” or “plebeian society.” This is exactly the structural situation that 
9 When the public sphere is effectively limited to a tiny layer of urban ‘bourgeoisie’ 
participating in town council elections and formally registered associations of 
bicycle riders or lawn tennis clubs. Cf. Hausm ann, 2002; Häfner, 2004. 
10 Cf. troinitskii, 1904, p. x.
11 Cf. am irkHanoV, 1999, p. 312-320. I have projected the demographic structure of 
the city population as revealed by the 1897 census on the population of Kazan in 
1913. Cf. troinitskii, 1904, p. 10f..
12 Quoted from eLey, 2005, p. 43.
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is central for Subaltern Studies: “The term ‘subaltern’ […] is used […] to refer 
to subjects, working people, the lower classes: the demographic difference”, as 
Ranajit Guha put it in the first volume of Subaltern Studies, “between the total 
[…] population and all those […] described as the ‘elite’”13.
The original “subalterns” as conceptualized within the South Asian Sub-
altern Studies project were subjugated by the alien colonial rule imposed by 
foreigners, who had imposed their own alien cultural norms, social divisions, 
and political regime.14 Today, thirty years later, the condition of subalternity 
is understood more broadly and at the same time more specifically as a state 
of alienation from the modern epistemological regime imposed and sustained 
through hegemonic discourses. Colonial domination has been reconsidered as 
primarily a discursive hegemony, and as such has lost a formal connection to 
the actual occupation or colonization of the country by foreigners. The advent 
of modernity as an elite intellectual and cultural phenomenon could draw a dy-
namic frontier between the elite of the moderns socialized into the nation of the 
common public sphere and the subalterns still living in the nondiscursive world 
of local knowledge, now being conceptualized as “traditions”. This collision 
could take place in any modernizing society. Thus, back in 2008, a prominent 
Ottomanist, the late Donald Quataert suggested that workers and peasants of 
the Anatolian “heartland” of the empire could be productively conceptualized 
as “subalterns” despite “the centrality of the Turkish state in the minds of many 
scholars”15. Recently, Nora Lafi has attempted (if only somewhat cursorily) to 
reframe the urban history of the late Ottoman period in terms of Subaltern Stud-
ies.16 In the context of Russian studies, Alexander Etkind makes the metaphor of 
“internal colonization” (based on a somewhat outdated reading of postcolonial 
theory and subaltern studies) the central theme of the Russian history of the 
post-Petrine period.17
The significance of “subalternity” well exceeds the role of yet another fash-
ionable way of ‘repackaging’ the same old empirical material. It is not a new 
name for the urban poor – it is a recognition of the fundamental difficulty in 
describing a social sphere structured by absolutely different rules and ratio-
nality, and yet closely integrated with the discourse-based modernized part of 
the community. In the words of Princeton historian Gyan Prakash, “we should 
13 PanDey, 2005, p. 411.
14 Cf. GuHa, 1982.
15 quataert, 2008, p. 379.
16 Cf. Lafi, 2011.
17 Cf. etkinD, 2011.
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understand subalternity as an abstraction used in order to identify the intrac-
tability that surfaces inside the dominant system—it signifies that which the 
dominant discourse cannot appropriate completely, an otherness that resists con-
tainment.”18
Inhabitants of urban slums in imperial Russia were not colonized represen-
tatives of a different race from exotic islands: as individuals, they participated in 
the social interactions and hierarchies sanctioned by imperial officialdom as the 
regime of modern knowledge. They were licensed as petty craftsmen and ped-
dlers, employed as manual workers or shop assistants, drafted into the military 
or prosecuted as criminals under the imperial penal code and according to the 
standard juridical procedure. Yet they did not have a common name as a group, 
nor did they have a common subjectivity or a sense of universal solidarity. Or 
at least there was no way to frame and express that commonality discursive-
ly, even if called “subaltern”: “Subalternity cannot be generalized according 
to hegemonic logic.”19 Clarifying this thesis, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak fur-
ther complicates the seemingly unresolvable conundrum of the subalterns as 
the “One-That-Must-Not-Be-Named” social stratum, and hence elusive to the 
point of nonintelligibility: “Subalternity is a position without identity. […] No 
one can say ‘I am a subaltern’ in whatever language. And subaltern studies will 
not reduce itself to the historical recounting of the details of the practice of dis-
enfranchised groups and remain a study of the subaltern. Subalternity is where 
social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a rec-
ognisable basis of action.”20
The very aspiration to grasp the nature of subalterns (even if by means of 
invalid ‘discursive’ instruments) stems from the broadly shared conviction that 
such a community is real, at least as a commonality of lived life experiences. 
We cannot easily grasp this commonality of the ‘plebeian society’ conceptually, 
but we do not question its reality, as we observe it personally or get a sense of 
it in the past from reading between the lines of our primary sources. The most 
indirect, primarily spatial characteristic of this community – ‘slums’ – may work 
as a fairly all-embracing catchword in some instances, particularly today, but the 
concept would be of little help in the case of Russian imperial society, for exam-
ple. In every city there were neighborhoods and whole districts of shacks popu-
lated by the most marginal social types, but they were not the exclusive ghettos: 
people of low socioeconomic status resided all over the city, while certain cat-
18 PrakasH, 2000, p. 287.
19 sPiVak, 2005, p. 475.
20 ibiD., p. 476.  
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egories of the modernized could live in the slums (for example, poor students, 
teachers, or ‘conscious’ factory workers). The fundamental conflict between 
the vitality of the ‘unspeakable’ collectivity and the impossibility of framing 
it through generalizations was famously captured by Spivak in her essay “Can 
the Subaltern Speak?” Commenting on the main idea of this text almost two de-
cades later, Spivak explained: “The focus of subalternity in the essay remained 
the singular woman who attempted to send the reader a message, as if her body 
were a ‘literary’ text.”21
This phrase revealed the disciplinary limitations of the subaltern studies 
approach as influenced by methodologies developed primarily within text-cen-
tered literary studies (which Spivak herself duly acknowledges), and implicitly 
suggested a way out of the seemingly unresolvable predicament of subalternity. 
Indeed, the subaltern seems impenetrable for analysis only from the ‘colonial’ 
perspective of an observer who cannot even conceive of any other mode of 
thinking except those determined by hegemonic discourses, and cannot proceed 
beyond merely registering the existence of some ‘dark matter’ within the so-
cial universe. (Spivak herself admits the role of her social position and cultural 
horizon in setting the limits of her analytical perspective.22) There is, however, 
reality beyond the public sphere structured by hegemonic discourses, and there 
are methods of analysis not constrained by the availability of ‘literary texts’ as 
primary sources. Moreover, the construction of one’s social persona as a repre-
sentation of certain fixed collective identities scaled down to the level of  the 
individual (e.g., ‘a heterosexual middle-aged sales assistant of Orthodox faith 
and monarchist political leaning’) is only one possible way of presenting the in-
teraction of a person with the society. Why do social historians not finally make 
a step from the essentialist structuralism of Newton-age physics to at least the 
state of the mid-twentieth-century mode of scientific thinking that, for example, 
accepts the idea of an electron performing simultaneously as a particle and a 
wave, and never having fixed coordinates but only a different ‘probability of 
finding an electron at a given place’? 
In other words, studying people who existed in the situation preceding the 
formation of modern social groups (nations, classes, subcultures) as some sort 
of ‘elementary particles’ should be different from studying individuals who have 
been formed by and within these groups, and therefore perceive themselves as 
a function of those collectives. Subalterns as members of a seemingly amor-
21 ibiD., p. 478.
22 ”In search of the subaltern I first turned to my own class: the Bengali middle class 
[...]. From French theory that is all I could do.” ibiD., p. 481. 
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phous plebeian society cannot be meaningfully categorized in terms of their 
fixed ‘state’ (be it ethnicity or occupation), but they can be ‘stabilized’ as co-
herent social elements by the study of their life trajectories and the choices they 
make along the way. Subalterns rarely reveal their ‘inner self’ in writing, but 
taking the idea of perceiving one’s body as a ‘literary text’ seriously opens the 
way to finally hearing the subalterns speaking out. To understand this ‘body talk’ 
we need first to decipher a peculiar language of self-description and self-rep-
resentation composed of individual social gestures as ‘words’, interconnected 
sequences of actions as ‘sentences’, and stable social practices as its grammar.
The necessary prerequisite for this task is a truly massive array of sources 
documenting the lives of subalterns, even if, as Gyan Prakash warns, “what his-
torical records present us with are palimpsests of the subaltern, impressions of 
the subversive force exerted by the ‘minor,’ never the force itself”23. This is only 
natural, as there can be no narrative sources consistently depicting subaltern 
society as a ‘thing’, and we are looking into actions that left traces in historical 
records, not into ready interpretations of intentions, much less the subjectivities 
of the subalterns. Actions too can be misinterpreted and misrepresented in the 
sources, but the chances of compensating for these flaws through the simultane-
ous usage of alternative sources and their analysis in a broader historical context 
are incomparably higher than in the case of misinterpretations of someone’s 
thoughts and intentions. And what kinds of actions of the slum inhabitants other 
than vital statistics (of births and deaths) have been best registered? Only one: 
instances of their breaking the law.
Thus criminality (or what was perceived as ‘criminal’ by certain social 
groups, in certain epochs) offers a unique window on social practices as a par-
ticular language of self-expression and self-representation unmediated by tradi-
tional institutions and not concealed by dominant public discourses, including 
those supported by present-day historians and custodians of ‘national purity’. 
This approach may raise legitimate objections: criminality, a deviant behavior 
by definition, seems to be at odds with the very idea of typicality of social prac-
tices (unless we assume that the lower social strata are inherently criminal and 
immoral). 
To this, it is necessary to point out that no other types of social actions can 
be regarded as ‘typical’ in the usual sense when it comes to subalternity, that is, 
when a sampling of actors or actions is viewed as representative of the entire 
23 PrakasH, 2000, p. 294.
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group. As Spivak put it, “The subaltern has no ‘examples’. The exemplary sub-
altern is hegemonised, even if (and not necessarily) in bad faith.”24
Of no less importance is the focus suggested in this essay on the ways peo-
ple responded to certain situations, rather than on the situations themselves as 
communicating a certain preexisting ‘meaning’. It can be a fistfight, church at-
tendance, labor culture, or courting rituals – the question is not which of these 
activities were more ‘typical’ of the subalterns-members of urban plebeian soci-
ety, but what choices they made when faced with such an opportunity. Did they 
reveal any patterns of group solidarity, a coherent moral economy, or rational 
choice under the circumstances?
Last but not least, the very structure of recordkeeping in the epoch and so-
ciety we are talking about made criminal behavior grossly overrepresented in 
documents. The newspapers registered no other episodes of private lives with 
similar breadth and intensity. The richest archival collections were formed by 
the police and various courts, and all focused mostly on instances of breaching 
the law. Nobody cared about documenting the everyday relationships of mer-
chants’ employees of different ethnoconfessional background until somebody 
committed a crime. The ensuing police investigation documented, inter alia, 
invaluable elements of regular social practices: this makes criminality a good 
occasion to discuss much broader and more typical aspects of people’s lives. 
It so happened, that both the authorities and the public were attracted mostly 
by conflicts; we can use this specific interest to our advantage by preserving a 
broader focus and remembering that conflicts (and criminality) formed only a tip 
of the iceberg of complex social interactions we are about to explore. 
Without succumbing to the relativization of the ‘criminal’, my research fo-
cuses on the responses to a misdemeanor, rather than on its inherent ‘intention’. 
A closer look at social conflicts identified as criminal can shed light on the pro-
cess of ascribing meaning to personal confrontations and making sense of cul-
tural and social differences. What becomes ‘the exemplary’ (or ‘typical’) is not 
the people and the situations they got into, but the social practices they demon-
strated in the process of engaging with each other and different situations. To 
reveal and review the variety of possible responses to a wide range of situations 
and encounters, a very substantial survey of registered incidents is required. We 
are speaking about thousands and thousands of cases reported by the police, by 
newspapers, or described in the court records, which should be analyzed quali-
tatively, rather than processed quantitatively as statistical aggregations. 
24 sPiVak, 2005, p. 484.  
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I have pursued exactly this type of research for the past twelve years, which 
resulted in the book titled Ethnic Crime, Imperial City: Practices of Self-Or-
ganization and Paradoxes of Illegality in Late Imperial Russia, 1905-1917. Its 
main protagonist is the elusive and ever-escaping subaltern − urban plebeian 
society − whose distinctive collective profile is reconstructed indirectly through 
the multiple imprints it had left interacting with the ‘textual’ and discourse-based 
modern segment of society. 
Because the Russian empire was vast and extremely heterogeneous, any 
choice of a locality for a case study raises the question of its typicality: does it 
reflect the realities of Siberia (western on eastern?), the situation in the Caucasus 
(Northern Caucasus or Transcaucasia?), or in the Western Borderlands (in Po-
land or in Belarus?), and so on? The fundamental fragmentedness of the impe-
rial social sphere, unmediated by universal (and hegemonic) public discourses, 
has made the problem of representativeness of examples selected for analysis 
particularly acute and unresolvable in principle through accumulating any statis-
tically significant number of examples. It is impossible to meaningfully process 
data from hundreds of loci from all over the vast Russian empire in qualitative 
analysis (as quantification already implies a certain politics of grouping and 
agglomeration of facts and actors). As a practical solution to this conundrum, 
I explore the situation on the ground in four different locations, two pairs of 
imperial cities that both resemble each other and highlight mutual differences: 
Kazan (today the capital of the national Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian 
Federation), Nizhny Novgorod (the most ‘ethnically Russian’ city in the Middle 
Volga region), Odessa (the Black Sea port in Southern Ukraine), and Vilna (to-
day, Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania). This sampling is as random as it is care-
fully assorted: obviously, representing only a small fraction of all of the empire’s 
urban centers, these cities have much in common but also are very different. 
Odessa (in Ukraine) and Vilna (today Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania) were 
located in the pale of Jewish settlement in the Russian empire, the territory 
where Jews were allowed to reside without special permission (at least, in urban 
areas). Jews constituted over 30 percent of their inhabitants. No other ethnic 
group had a bigger share in Vilna, where Poles and East Slavs (Russians, Be-
larusians, Ukrainians) had approximately the same share. In Odessa, Jews were 
the largest ethnic minority, while Russians and Ukrainians (often poorly dif-
ferentiated statistically) constituted a majority. Both Vilna and Odessa became 
Russian imperial cities in the late 18th century, as a result of Russia’s imperial 
expansion southward and westward, but Vilna had had a long prehistory as an 
important political and cultural center of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
while Odessa was founded virtually from scratch as a colonial outpost. Poles 
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and Jews claimed Vilna as their ancestral town, and the rising Lithuanian nation-
alist movement challenged them, despite a mere 2 percent of ethnic Lithuanians 
among the city population. In Odessa, neither ‘Great Russians’ coming from 
the empire’s internal provinces, nor Ukrainian migrants, nor Jews fleeing from 
the overpopulated shtetls in the Pale, nor Moldavians coming from neighboring 
Bessarabia could claim this territory as their ‘ancestral’ land; all newcomers 
were compelled to adjust to the new terrain, new climate, and new socioeco-
nomic environment.25
Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan were two provincial centers in the Middle 
Volga region, as much the imperial ‘heartland’ as could be imagined. Still, the 
specificity of the Russian imperial situation was characterized by the absence 
of any ethnic or cultural homogeneous ‘center’: almost 40 percent of Kazan 
province’s population were Tatars. In Nizhegorod province, about 10 percent 
were non-Russians, while over 6 percent of ethnic Russians belonged to various 
sects of Old Believers – a very significant factor of social and cultural differenti-
ation, particularly in pre-1905 imperial Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan represented two types of Russianness. 
The former was as ‘ethnically Russian’ as was possible in the Russian empire 
(slightly yielding only to Moscow with its 95 percent of native Russian speakers 
in 1897). The latter was a key imperial administrative and cultural center, and 
in this respect was perceived as the backbone of the Russian state and society 
(despite its 25 percent non-Russian and non-Christian population).26
25 minCzeLes, 2000; staLiunas, 2006; Weeks, 2006. Cf. for a general survey of 
Vilnius history (with only cursory treatment of the imperial period) brieDis, 2009. 
Cf. for Vilnius as a palimpsest-like agglomeration of sites of memory sCHuLze 
WesseL et al., 2010. A classic, if somewhat outdated already history of Odessa 
is HerLiHy, 1986. Cf. for the early twentieth century history of Odessa from the 
vantage point of radical politics WeinberG, 1993, and for a history of the “local 
community” of the educated middle class Hausm ann, 1998. Since the 1990s, 
scholars show much more interest not in the history of the city itself but in the 
‘Odessa myth’: syLVester, 2005; tanny, 2011.  
26 Probably because of the restrictions barring foreigners from visiting these cities 
before 1991, Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod missed the wave of writing histories 
of Russian imperial urban centers in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. The studies 
appearing now usually ignore the immediate pre-1917 decade, or focus on specific 
aspects of urban history (e.g., the history of landscape, of religious groups, etc.). 
The noticeable exception is presented by the monograph by küntzeL, 2001. Still, 
even this book is structured as a collection of sketches dedicated to various strata 
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The similarities and differences between the two pairs of towns, as well as 
within these pairs, allow us to identify stable elements and important variations 
within the patterns of ethnically marked conflicts and cooperation in Russian 
imperial society. The comparative perspective of the study also offers a clue for 
in-depth interpretations of certain social phenomena, beyond various organicist 
explanations. For example, the preponderance of Jews in Vilna prostitution, the 
reputation of Tatars as prone to deadly violence in Kazan, the persistence of 
Russian ultranationalist (“black hundreds”) organizations – are either explained 
by some ‘innate’ qualities of those ethnic groups, or most often, are ignored 
by historians and national activists alike. The comparative perspective on four 
urban centers relativizes the uniqueness of many ethnically marked practices, 
and also offers alternative explanations by social context and specific historical 
circumstances.
The very category of ethnicity, just as all other markers of difference (con-
fession, legal estate, occupation, regional identification, or gender) are used here 
not as self-referential entities, but as concepts that must be treated differently 
depending on their usage as categories of practice or categories of analysis. We 
cannot do without them: just as the educated elite of the modernized society 
of the past, we rely on analytically produced generalizations to make sense of 
reality, but this does not imply that we have to perceive our generalizations as 
normative reconstruction of the past “as it actually happened” (wie es eigentlich 
gewesen). Reconstructing subalterns from the imprints left by their activities, 
we become engaged in the complex work of translating subalterns’ social ac-
and loci of the Nizhegorod society and presented in isolation from each other: a 
chapter on the monasteries, another on the Nizhegorod Fair, the next deals with the 
Sormovo industries, and so on. To this day, the most comprehensive narrative of the 
history of Nizhny Novgorod at the turn of the twentieth century, written in Russian, 
belongs to Dmitrii Smirnov (1891-1990), see sm irnoV 2007. Cf. for a useful survey 
in English DeHaan: http://www.opentextnn.ru/space/nn/?id=542, 07.05.2013. 
Despite its primary focus on an earlier (pre-1905) period, the comprehensive survey 
of the “Nizhegorod civilization” by Catherine Evtuhov offers useful background 
information on the city of Nizhny Novgorod as well. Cf. eVtuHoV, 2011. Kazan 
was luckier in getting scholars’ attention, but comprehensive urban studies of 
Kazan are also rare. A detailed structuralist social history of Kazan during the 
late imperial period can be found in Häfner, 2004. Cf. for a pioneering attempt 
at studying the history of everyday life in Kazan in the longue durée VisHLenkoVa 
et al., 2008. Cf. for a more conventional narrative of urban history VisHLenkoVa 
et al., 2007.
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tions – through the categories used by the records-keepers of the past – into 
an analytically construed model. This process can be called the “paleontology 
of knowledge,” as we have to reconstruct from scattered evidence a species 
profoundly alien to our world, forsaken and forgotten, that cannot even be the-
oretically revived in its original form here (as subalternists energetically insist). 
Therefore, our reconstruction cannot pretend to be a realistic replica of the orig-
inal, but rather is an approximated model demonstrating our own understanding 
of how individual fragments and known parameters of the ‘prehistoric’ social 
body could be meaningfully combined together. 
In practical terms this metaphor means that primary sources use all kinds 
of attributes in describing protagonists of various actions: self-descriptive and 
formally upheld by bureaucratic procedures, scientific categories and literary 
clichés. In our translation job we treat them all as categories of practice, that is, 
as markers of difference that made sense only for a particular cultural context 
and under specific circumstances. ‘A Tatar’ or ‘a Jew’ frequent in documents 
produced in all four locations of my study, but these terms are absolutely mean-
ingless and hollow by themselves, outside the specific pocket of local knowl-
edge and the exact circumstances of every usage of the term – and every incident 
that provoked its usage. For instance, when in January 1908 the police solved 
the case of a recent “expropriation” attack by revolutionaries on the office of 
the Kazan city forester, they prepared to arrest the leader, known by the Rus-
sian alias “Aleksey.” Aleksey turned out to be the Tatar Aligulla Bililiatdinov, a 
26 year old worker wearing “Russian” dress.27 The local nationalist newspaper 
expressed less indignation about the actual “revolutionary robbery” than about 
the “imposter,” whom the paper depicted in Orientalist terms as a typical Tatar 
criminal: tall, dark-skinned, gloomy, Mongoloid-looking, and “of Muhammad’s 
faith”28. Curiously, before the arrest, the three attackers had been described by 
five witnesses (who saw them at close range and talked to them) as “representa-
tives of the [Russian] intelligentsia” “judging by the color of their faces and their 
speech”29. There was no mention of the typical Mongoloid facial characteristics 
of the leader, or the primitive mores of his two accomplices, who turned out to 
be twenty-year-old simple Russian workers.30 This example can tell us much 
about the limits of applicability of even such ‘objective’ categories of practice 
as Russians and Tatars, or intelligenty and workers. The question is not whether 
27 Cf. kazanskii teLeGraf, No. 4452, 01.01.1908, p. 3.
28 ibiD., No. 4453, 03.01.1908, p. 3.
29 VoLzHskii Listok, No. 564, 22.12.1907, p. 3.
30 Cf. ibiD., No. 653, 17.04.1908, p. 3.
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the witnesses or authors of newspaper reports wrongly understood the concept 
of ethnicity or class, but how they used the available repertoire of categorizing 
differences to mark out situational and structural divides in a particular case.
From hundreds of similar cases we can compose a more or less detailed map 
of such divides and group solidarities that may coincide or not coincide with 
categories of difference employed in the sources. This is a dynamic map, like 
satellite weather images: group boundaries shift in time, and local knowledge 
circulates through migrations and partial access of the subalterns to the mass 
media. How should we perform the next step of our ‘paleontological’ recon-
struction and translate the assembled catalogue of qualities and features into a 
coherent model of the plebeian society of subalterns living inside and outside 
urban slums? Unfortunately, we can rely only on the same concepts of ethnicity, 
confession, occupation, and so on, only this time we should work with them as 
categories of analysis: analytically elaborated, with explicitly defined conno-
tations and parameters of applicability. The task is to explain, how that society 
worked, not what it looked like as a totality. None of the analytical categories we 
use can cope with the task individually, but there is no need to invent elaborated 
hybrid mega-models. Instead of “strategic essentialism” of self-fashioning by 
national and other modernized groups,31 and the “realism of the group” as prac-
ticed by nation-centered social sciences,32 the new imperial history takes as its 
departure point the principle of “strategic relativism” of the imperial situation: 
the impossibility of unquestionable belonging to only one particular social hier-
archy or group.33 Thus, the only accurate way to outline a social persona in this 
situation of the absence of absolute hegemony of any ‘hegemonic discourses’ (at 
least over the plebeian society of subalterns) is to reconstruct it as a composite 
and multifaceted one.
This is not exactly the hybridity so much celebrated in postcolonial studies, 
which is envisioned in accordance with what Ernest Gellner called “Modigli-
ani’s map,” when multicolored blocks of different sizes and shapes (but with 
clear boundaries and internally homogeneous) form a giant mosaic of cultur-
al (and social) diversity. These blocks are located on the same plane and are 
grouped according to clear departments.34 In the department of “peoples,” this 
diversity is represented in the case of the Russian Empire by “Jews,” “Ukraini-
ans,” “Tatars,” and “Russians”; in the department of “social structure,” it fea-
31 Cf. sPiVak, 1987, p. 205.
32 Cf. brubaker, 1994, p. 3-14.
33 Cf. Gerasim oV et al., 2009, p. 20.
34 Cf. GeLLner, 1984, p. 139f.
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tures “nobles,” “peasants,” “petty commoners,” and so on. As it becomes in-
creasingly clear from modern historical and anthropological studies, “poverty,” 
“Russianness,” “slums,” and “youth” do not belong to four different and sepa-
rate ‘planes of diversity’ (thus forming isolated spaces of social differentiation 
and hybridization), but combine to produce universal composite social identi-
ties. These hybrid identities formed in different times from different components 
with different characteristics are the main protagonists of new imperial history 
as pursued in my study. 
Looking from this vantage point, the task of reconstructing the composite 
social sphere of the plebeian society appears to be very different from assem-
bling a priori assigned blocks (class/confession/gender/nationality, etc.) in a cer-
tain way. Rather, we have to envision this society as differentiated into groups 
that are distinguished only when (or every time) certain criteria of otherness 
become relevant in the context of a specific situation, when these criteria are 
actually used for marking groupness. In the first case, the matrix of differences 
is imposed by the researcher, and is more or less sensitive to the nuances of the 
past, from the outside. In the second case, differences are recognized as such 
and registered only if they are actually manifested in practice, in a specific sit-
uation. Ideally, these differences should be described in the analytical language 
of contemporary social sciences and interpreted within the framework of a con-
temporary theoretical model, but it is equally important to avoid anachronistic 
ascriptions of today’s criteria of groupness to motivations of the actions of peo-
ple in the past. 
The best illustration of the dynamic nature of sociocultural hybridity and 
relativism of criteria of groupness (both as a category of analysis and a category 
of practice) can be found in the strange case of a fraudulent check cashed by 
a stranger in August 1906 at the Kazan Merchant Bank. Someone withdrew 
the handsome sum of 8200 rubles (equivalent to three annual salaries of an 
upper-middle-class civil servant or professional) from the bank account of the 
wealthy Tatar merchant Akhmet Khusainov (1835-1906).35 The police failed to 
crack this case, which resembles an Agatha Christie mystery: in the seemingly 
patriarchal firm, every employee close to the head of the business was under 
suspicion.36 Ethnicity played a prominent part in the logic of the investigation, 
but proved futile in the end. The missing sum was discovered by a Jewish law-
35 Akhmet was the eldest of the three Khusainov brothers, a successful entrepreneur 
worth several million rubles by the time of his death. Cf. sHaiDuLLina, 2010.
36 Cf. nationaL arCHiVe of tHe rePubLiC of tatarstan (NART), f. 79, op. 1, vol. 
2, del. 805.
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yer, Alexander Bat, who was auditing the firm’s finances in March 1907, after 
the death of its head. Two of the late merchant’s Tatar assistants (or rather confi-
dants), who had vague duties, were in charge of keeping the checkbook and the 
personal seal of Akhmet Khusainov, but these respected gentlemen were beyond 
the suspicions of Mr. Bat. He suggested that the clerk Mukhamet-Valei Saida-
shev (also a Tatar) had the opportunity to steal a check when he was summoned 
to the main office: on his meager salary of 35 rubles a month, in the fall of 1906, 
Saidashev made a few expensive purchases, and then moved to Semipalatinsk 
(in present-day Kazakhstan).37 
The director of the Kazan Merchant Bank, the ethnic Russian Boris Sapozh-
nikov, defending the bank’s reputation, suggested that the check had been ac-
cepted because it was authentic: what else could explain how for more than half 
a year nobody had noticed the misappropriation of such a considerable sum? 
Sapozhnikov declared that after so long a time neither he nor his employees 
would recognize the person who had cashed the check but suggested that he was 
dressed like a Russian, had a “French beard,” and did not look “like a Tatar”38. 
The only person fitting this description was Mukhamed Davletshin, one of the 
confidants of the merchant Khusainov, looking after the checkbook. As it turned 
out, on his small salary of 50 rubles a month, Davletshin had the means to pay 
for his wife to live in a spa in Groznyi, and in the fall of 1906 he loaned more 
than 1000 rubles to another employee. Davletshin spoke Russian without an 
accent and lived with his Russian lover in Kazan in a predominantly Russian 
neighborhood.39 Naturally, Davletshin denied all accusations (he claimed that he 
had won the money gambling) and pointed out that while the Russian signature 
on the check in question was quite typical of Khusainov’s, the second, Tatar 
signature was very different and had been done by someone unable to write in 
Tatar (i.e., in Arabic script). There was a Russian capable of doing the forgery – 
the accountant Kliucharev, who for some reason did not request statements from 
the bank for six months, which was a direct violation of his duties and resulted 
in the overly late discovery of the missing money.40 The investigation reached a 
dead end after interrogations of a dozen people had uncovered no decisive ev-
idence to put forward official charges. The very date of the crime received two 
interpretations: August 11, 1906, was Friday, the Muslim holiday. Some saw this 
as proof that the perpetrator belonged to the Tatar “circle” around Khusainov, 
37 ibiD., ll. 1-2.
38 ibiD., ll. 14-16 ob.
39 ibiD., ll. 34-37, 39.
40 ibiD., l. 39 ob.
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who had cunningly arranged a perfect alibi for himself.41 Others perceived it 
as revealing a “Russian trail” of evidence. The real problem was the meaning-
lessness of ethnic markers as self-explanatory codes of social practice: what 
kinds of patriarchal relations end up in a fraudulent financial scheme? What 
does someone’s “Tatarness” mean if a person has a Russian lover, gambles, and 
probably steals from his brethren? How can a Russian steal if the checkbook 
and the seal are kept by two Tatar confidants of the boss? It is quite possible that 
the entire affair was a collective enterprise, requiring the cooperation of both 
Russians and Tatars.
The “Khusainov affair” proves that analytically constructed social identities 
(and even those consciously interiorized by historical actors) are fairly indepen-
dent from actions and individual choices. This disconnection between the static 
social persona and dynamic behavior is characteristic of the “subaltern” and 
nondiscursive plebeian society.
In the situation of composite and fluid social identities, the only stable ele-
ment appears to be not any fixed ‘proportion of hybridity’ but the general trend 
of actions and life choices. Thus, scholars debate the degree of integration and 
emancipation of Jews in Odessa at the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
the exact meaning of Jewishness. Leaving the question of the essence or the 
correct definition of Jewishness aside, I suggest focusing instead on what possi-
ble difference the alleged Jewishness made in the actions of people, and under 
what circumstances. My study of Odessa revealed the involvement of Jews in 
criminal violence and murders on a massive scale, contrary to the old and re-
cent myths about Jews being prone to ‘peaceful’ white-collar crimes. Jewish 
gangsters murdered scores of people in cold blood, but what is really important 
is not the brutality of Jewish thugs, but their choice of victims. In over a thou-
sand cases that I have reviewed, not a single Gentile was murdered by Jews in 
Odessa.42 In light of the studies on ethnic gangsters in the United States,43 this 
fact can be interpreted as an indicator of important mental mapping. Despite 
the outstanding record of Odessa Jews as pioneers of emancipation and inte-
gration into the larger society,44 it appears that they did not cross one important 
psychological boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as can be seen in the extreme 
(and thus even more important) case of choosing victims ‘of our own kind’. 
There was one telling exception to this rule, though: Jews who were members 
41 ibiD., l. 2.
42 Cf. Gerasim oV, 2010. 
43 Cf. CoHen, 1999; roCkaWay, 1993. 
44 Cf. ziPP erstein, 1985.
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of revolutionary anarchist gangs killed Gentiles, when attacking under the cov-
er of revolutionary slogans. Quitting the sphere of the subaltern isolation from 
hegemonic discourses and acting on behalf of the future common revolutionary 
nation, they overcame the invisible and probably unconscious barrier of their 
self-alienation. However deviant and violent, these social practices allow us to 
trace the dynamic intergroup boundaries and see their dependence on mental 
mapping and ideological contexts.
Social practices were the universal language binding the urban plebeian 
society together, substituting for the virtually unavailable discourses. Nobody 
briefed a recent migrant about the rules of behavior in town: he or she picked 
up this nonverbalized wisdom by literally rubbing shoulders with more experi-
enced peers, by getting punched for every mistake, and negotiating a new ar-
rangement through close physical contact, including violence. The nonverbal 
and very ‘bodily’ foundation of social practices eventually created a developed 
metalanguage of self-expression and self-representation of individuals and so-
cial groups – we just need to learn how to read this language. On the basis 
of thousands of documented cases I identify several key strategies, or social 
practices that helped to communicate meaning within the plebeian society, and 
structure it, sustaining social order in the unstable and unruly milieu of recent 
migrants to the city slums. 
One practice can be identified as “the middle ground” − to use the concept 
elaborated by Richard White in his classic study of the intercultural communi-
cation and conflict in the North American Great Lakes region.45 As he put it: 
“The middle ground is the place in between: in between cultures, peoples, 
and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages. […] People try to 
persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what they 
perceive to be the values and the practices of those others. They often misin-
terpret and distort both the values and the practices of those they deal with, 
but from these misunderstandings arise new meanings and through them new 
practices – the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground.”46
Thus understood, the middle ground is not literally a particular “place” or a 
“process” (unlike frontier), but rather a state of relationships and dialogue of ac-
tors attempting to bridge the deep cultural gap and social divide. We can see this 
practice at work in all four of the principal locations of my study and particu-
45 Cf. WHite, 1991.
46 ibiD., p. x.
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larly in Kazan, where neither Russian, Orthodox Christian population, nor Tatar 
Muslim community had means and guts to impose their own norms and values 
on the other. Hence they had to negotiate and seek a compromise, creating a new 
common reality of “creative misunderstanding”.
Another practice can be called “patriarchality” (in the sense of both archa-
ism and male domination). The social practice of patriarchality did not imply 
that social relations and motivations of people employing this practice were ac-
tually “patriarchal”: naive, archaic, irrational, and completely male-controlled. 
Rather, it was a sustained attempt to keep the isolation of the subaltern society 
from penetration of the modern public sphere of public discourses. This was 
particularly important in Vilna, where this integration implied mobilization into 
one of the competing powerful nationalist projects (Polish, Jewish, Russian, or 
Lithuanian), with potentially devastating consequences for the urban commu-
nity. These consequences were fully realized in the 1930s and 1940s, with the 
dismantling of pseudo-archaic patriarchality and subalternity. 
The social practice of patriarchality employed in Late Imperial Russia sus-
tained parochialism that did not allow for generalizing and institutionalizing 
the categories of belonging (to a national community) and otherness (of aliens). 
It also sanctified authority defined in nonnational categories of seniority, male 
domination, and formal office-holding. Up to a certain point, this practice was 
capable of accommodating elements of urban modernity that equally down-
played the importance of nationality – be it the union movement or commerce. 
Balancing between these two often-overlapping cognitive modes in the social 
practice of patriarchality, Russian late imperial society managed to accommo-
date the challenges of modernity surprisingly well, at the cost of a relatively low 
level of mobilization of intergroup confrontation.
The persistence of violence in the urban plebeian society allows us to treat it 
as the third fundamental, albeit morally and legally intolerable, social practice 
in its own right. As such, violence is anything but ‘senseless’, as has been shown 
by the modern anthropology of violence.47 Violence served as a marker of be-
longing to a common social space and, more rarely, as a stigma of otherness. 
Even in the latter case, this was not about the indication of ultimate alienation, 
but, so to speak, of ‘a second-choice voting’. It may sound paradoxical, but vi-
olence can communicate even friendliness, albeit only in a most awkward way, 
as the following episode shows. In September 1908, in the Bolshoi Fontan sea-
front neighborhood of Odessa, a Jew, Nutovich, met his Ukrainian neighbor, the 
shopkeeper Stetsenko, on the street. Because of their prehistory of heated argu-
47 Cf. bLok, 2001. 
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ments, this time Stetsenko picked up a stone and smashed Nutovich in the face 
with it. Formally (and actually) this was a hate crime, but it was also something 
more: a gentile shopkeeper used the last argument to induce his Jewish neighbor 
to become his customer, not to ban him from his shop, as can be assumed from 
a general outline of the incident.48
In the subaltern plebeian society, violence as a social practice was multifac-
eted, playing the important common role of a communicative medium. As such, 
it was excessively “expressive,” spoken in the body language of injuries, rape, 
and mutilations, but it was the only alternative to the verbalized communication 
based on borrowed discourses with built-in explanatory schemes. It was mostly 
an extreme way to express one’s individual position, and as such is invaluable 
for a study of social arrangements beyond the normative groupings into ethnic-
ities, confessions, legal estates, or classes. The language of violence tells the 
story of intensive contacts and spontaneously emerging power fields of social 
solidarity and confrontation across the conventional map of social composition. 
The social practice of violence did not have the constructive potential of the 
middle ground or even of patriarchality, the latter being more about sustaining 
the status quo and stability of a heterogeneous social milieu. On the other hand, 
rarely employed in the course of politicization of ethnicity as collective action 
with a single uniform target and goals, in late imperial plebeian society, vio-
lence did not fully unleash its destructive force capable of splitting communities 
or mobilizing one group against another. This would change once the former 
subaltern society became integrated into the political nation by imposing a nor-
mative discourse, or rather an ideological canon. Then, habitual tolerance to 
violence and the low threshold for its unleashing brought about truly gruesome 
consequences.
The subalterns from Russian plebeian society were capable of rationally pro-
cessing information and making informed decisions, only they did it by using 
different cognitive mechanisms, and different concepts of rationality. This is an 
important lesson that the Russian imperial situation can teach scholars think-
ing about subalternity: whenever a suspicion arises that someone in the society 
“cannot speak” (in any sense of the word), it is a sure indicator that the observer 
cannot listen. The vast majority of those, who did not succeed in mastering even 
the basics of the elite discursive sphere (or perhaps did not want to), could be 
perceived as ‘dumb’ – but only by those, who identify themselves with the elite 
stratum of the educated society. Paradoxically, in the absence of any universal 
public sphere, the diverse social milieu of the subaltern plebeian society was 
48 Cf. zVerskoe izbienie, 1908, p. 2f.
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fairly coherent and predictable to migrants from different localities, representing 
different ethnoconfessional groups, regions, or subcultures. What they all had in 
common as the universally recognizable basic element of the ‘primary modeling 
system’ was their body (both physical and social) and its functions. As a medi-
um, the emerging ‘secondary modeling system’ of the plebeian society used not 
words, but semiotically meaningful social practices.
The Bolshevik revolution removed the entire layer of the elitist (mid-
dle-class) ‘patrician society’ with its hegemonic discourses, just as some activ-
ists of subaltern studies would recommend as a solution against isolationism of 
subalternity. This move, however, did not make the former plebeian society less 
autistic or more interventionist in its dealing with public discourses (suffice it to 
reread the prose of Mikhail Zoshchenko or studies of amateur correspondents 
of Soviet newspapers). Thus, the Russian case defies the rigidly structuralist or 
post-stucturalist reading of the subaltern: it is not a caste, and not a stigma, and 
the ‘space of difference’ that subalterns inhabit cannot be imagined as complete-
ly isolated and unreadable to Others. Subalternity is rather a social condition 
and epistemological stance that can be changed or exchanged for a different one.
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“… not intended for the Rich”  
Public Places as Points of Identification  
for the Urban Poor – St. Petersburg (1850-1914)
Hans-CHristian Petersen
“Very many people of Petrograd have heard that somewhere in their city there is 
a place called ‘Vasia’s Village’. But do many of them know its location and its 
functions?”1 This rhetorical question is put at the beginning of a series of arti-
cles published in the “Little Gazette” (Malen’kaia Gazeta) in 1915, which dealt 
with one of the biggest slums of the Russian capital St. Petersburg which was 
renamed Petrograd at the beginning of World War I.2 The author of these reports 
took the ignorance of the population he had noticed as an impetus to write in 
great detail about the co-existence of roughly 5000 inhabitants of “Vasia’s Vil-
lage”. As is typical of ‘uncovering stories’ at that time (and even often of today) 
he added to his report numerous drastic details, introduced specific characters 
and, in order to verify the authenticity of his descriptions, he put words into their 
mouths for the dialogues which included their slang expressions. Like in West 
and Central European major cities, gruesome and obscene tales about the ‘dark’ 
sides of the city had become a worthwhile undertaking in Petrograd. They were 
a part of slumming3 which included the ‘discovery’, marketing and presentation 
of the ‘poor’ to the ‘better’ part of the population for their amusement.
1 iasHkoV, 03.01.1915, p. 3.
2 ibiD., 03.-04., 06. and 08.01.1915.
3 This expression was first used in Victorian England. Cf. koVen, 2006; sCHWarz et 
al., 2007; LinDner, 2004. Hubertus Jahn has retraced this process of ‘discovering’ 
the urban poor for St. Petersburg: JaHn, 2010. The following work on the still valid 
relevance of slumming is now at hand: frenzeL et al., 2012. 
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In view of these circumstances it is obvious to analyse such a report first of 
all as a part of a discourse and to ask in the sense of postcolonial studies what we 
can learn from the text about the mental map of its author and the society. It was 
part of a process which presented images of the urban poor as the ‘others’, the 
‘dark’ and the ‘strange’ and where the remaining inhabitants of the city assured 
themselves that they led better, ‘brighter’ lives. There is no doubt that such an 
approach is important, but does it cover everything? This question will be dis-
cussed in the following text. Is it true that we cannot gain any knowledge about 
the ‘poor’ from the reports about them? Is it only possible to write about poverty 
in Russian history as an object of “social imagination”4, public welfare or con-
trol, as “beggars and the poor had no historical voices of their own until the end 
of the 19th century” and that we can only rely on “descriptions from outside”? 
Or do such sources – besides their discursive aspect – also provide information 
about those who, as in case of the report on “Vasia’s Village”, had unintention-
ally become objects of journalistic curiosity? In other words, to which extent is 
it possible for us to look behind the facade of urban poverty?
This question shall now be discussed by looking at two types of sources that 
present a totally different degree of ‘authenticity’ at first glance: on one hand 
we have the above-mentioned series of articles on “Vasia’s Village” as an ex-
ample of reports in connection with slumming and on the other we have several 
petitions submitted by traders from Petersburg’s Haymarket, kept in the files of 
the tsarist Ministry of the Interior. The key aspect will be the question whether 
we will be able to gain information about the importance these locations had 
for the urban poor. Can they be regarded as points of identification which were 
important to them and which they regarded as their ‘own’? In addition to a dis-
cussion on the epistemic possibilities and limitations of both types of sources it 
is thus my intention to challenge the still dominating narrative that the habitats 
of the urban lower class were solely places of dull backwardness characterised 
by cramped quarters and a narrowness of mind. This description does not take 
into account what this ‘narrow world’ meant for its inhabitants. The view from 
outside ignores the perspective from the inside. The following exposition will 
focus on this.
Let me first explain some terms. Places like “Vasia’s Village” or “Vi-
azemskaia Lavra” adjacent to Petersburg’s Haymarket will be called slums – 
here defined as places of urban blight and utmost poverty. In doing so, I will fol-
low Loïc Wacquants’ differentiation between “slum” and “ghetto”. He defines 
the “ghetto” “as a spatially based implement of ethnoracial closure” and points 
4 This and the two following quotations were taken from JaHn, 2010, p. 16.
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out “that not all ghettos are poor and not all poor areas are (inside) ghettos.”5 
Such a differentiation solves the problem defined by Ilya Gerasimov. He said 
that the idea of an exclusive and socially homogeneous neighbourhood does not 
comply with the reality of Russian imperial society as “people of low socioeco-
nomic status resided all over the city, while certain categories of the modernized 
could live in the slums (for example, poor students, teachers, or ‘conscious’ 
factory workers).”6 This is undoubtedly true, especially in case of a city like 
St. Petersburg with its low degree of sociospatial segregation in comparison 
with other major cities.7 Rich and poor were found close together in the town 
on the Neva River. However, you could also find more prosperous and poorer 
districts as well as clearly defined areas which were already at that time called 
trushchoby (impoverished areas, slums) by their contemporaries. Works such 
as the voluminous writings “Petersburg Slums (Peterburgskie trushchoby) by 
Vsevolod Krestovskii8, “World of Slums” (Mir trushchobnyi) by Aleksei Svir-
skii9 or “New Petersburg Slums” (Novye Peterburgskie trushchoby) by Iurii 
Angarov and M. Semenov’10 made this term popular and marketed it as well, 
referring at the same time, however, to real existing places which were surely 
appropriately characterized by the term trushchoba (slum).
I.  “Mud hole” and “anthill”?  
 “Vasia’s village”
“Vasia’s Village” was situated between lines 17 and 18 on Vasil’evskii Island at 
the location of a former waste dump. Being the largest of the islands in the Neva 
Delta, Vasil’evskii Island was originally chosen as the centre of the new capital 
by Peter I after the foundation of St. Petersburg, before the site around the Admi-
ralty was later favoured as the place for the city centre.11 Correspondingly, many 
5 Cf. the contribution by Loïc Wacquant in this book. 
6 Cf. the contribution by Ilia V. Gerasimov in this book.
7 A comparative perspective is offered by Petersen.
8 This work has first been published as a series since 1864 in the journal 
“Otechestvennye zapiski”. At the same time it was repeatedly published as a 
monograph, most recently a few years ago: krestoVskii, 2011.
9 sVirskii, 1898.
10 anGaroVi/sem enoV’, 1909-1910
11 Cf. sem enCoV, 2007, on the building history of St. Petersburg. kusber, 2009, can 
be recommended as a recent introduction to the history of St. Petersburg
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central buildings were erected on the East Bank of Vasil’evskii Island, among 
others the Arts House, the Twelve Collegia as well as the Academy of Sciences. 
The geometric design of the network of canals and streets demonstrated the rul-
er’s ideas of rationalization and order.12 The side of a street was called a line so 
that lines 16 and 17 as well as lines 18 and 19 made up one street each. “Vasia’s 
Village” was situated in House No. 18 on line 17, only few houses away from 
the main boulevard of the island, the Bol’shoi Prospect.13 Until the 20th century, 
the Bol’shoi Prospect was the border between that part of Vasil’evskii Island 
where streets which started at the prestigious bank of the Neva were lined on 
both sides by multi-storied stone houses and the markedly bigger part of the 
island on the other side of the prospect, which had no buildings at all or was the 
site of flat wooden buildings.14 Accordingly, “Vasia’s Village” consisted of sev-
eral wooden houses, but was at the same time only a stone’s throw away from 
the ‘better-off’ residential areas of Vasil’evskii Island. This is a typical example 
for the close proximity of rich and poor in the Russian capital. The well-known 
meteorologist Mikhail Tikachev, member of the Academy of Sciences, lived in 
House No. 20 for some time, directly adjacent to the slum. At the same time, 
lines 17 and 18 did not only belong to “Vasia’s Village”, but were also the loca-
tion of orphanages and institutions for the poor.15 
In the second half of the 19th century, several big industrial plants were 
erected on Vasil’evskii Island. This changed the social structure of the district. 
Dwellings for workers were built in the vicinity of the factories. Living condi-
tions were similarly cramped and precarious as in other parts of the metropolis 
on the Neva River.16 The island experienced a “densification process”17. Hitherto 
open areas or areas which had been used as vegetable gardens were turned into 
12 Cf. nikitenko/soboL’, 2008, for a recent encyclopaedic account of the history of 
Vasil’evskii Island (first edition: ibiD., Vasileostrovskii raion. Enciklopediia ulic 
Sankt-Peterburga, St. Petersburg 1999). Cf. PiroGoV, 1996, for a survey from 
Soviet times.
13 Cf. nikitenko/soboL’, 2008, p. 423 and 432, as well as the map of the Vasil’evskii 
Island, including the house numbers: PLany P oLiCeiskikH CHastei GoroDa s.-
PeterburGa s P okazaniem  Dom oV, VkHoDiasCikH V sostaVe uLiC i PrisVoennykH 
im  nom erom , 1902.
14 Cf. nikitenko/soboL’, 2008, p. 16 and 413.
15 Cf. ibiD., p. 423; enCikLoP eDia bLaGotVoriteL’nosti. Sankt-Peterburg: http://
encblago.lfond.spb.ru/search.do?objectType=2805596371, 07.05.2013.
16 Cf. PiroGoV, 1996, p. 30-32.
17 Cf. nikitenko/soboL’, 2008, p. 18.
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building sites, and it is really not at all surprising that one of the biggest slums 
of the city developed in the wake of these changes. However, when looking at 
respective descriptions of the history of Vasil’evskii Island, “Vasia’s Village” is 
either not mentioned at all or we find just a very cursory account.18 This can be 
explained on one hand by the fact that this settlement was not in the centre of Pe-
tersburg contrary to the Haymarket and, on the other that it was largely unknown 
as we have seen from the citation at the beginning of this text. To write about it 
was in no way as profitable as the tales about the notorious “Viazemskaia lavra”, 
the slum situated between Haymarket and Fontanka which were turned into lit-
erature in the works of Dostoevskii and Krestovskii. On the other hand, the fact 
that the image that should be conveyed for Vasil’evskii Island did not include 
the existence of a slum explains why “Vasia’s Village” was largely neglected 
in the stories about urban districts: Under Soviet rule the poorest of the poor, 
the “lumpenproletariat” as they were derogatory termed already by Marx and 
Engels, did not fit into the teleological narrative about the class of ‘conscious’ 
workers eager for a revolution.19 In post-Soviet Russia we see rather a concen-
tration of high-culture and representative aspects of history, neither of which 
meshes with a closer look at a slum and its inhabitants.20
Now, what can we learn from the series of articles published on “Vasia’s Vil-
lage” in “Malen’kaia gazeta? According to the descriptions, the inhabitants were 
uncouth in their speech, were extremely prone to violence, addicted to alcohol 
and very good at surviving without ‘honest work’. Garbage was simply thrown 
out of the windows and rows of toilettes without any doors were placed outside 
so that their users were in no way protected from the looks of neighbours (vo 
18 The latter is only true for the encyclopaedia by nikitenko/soboL’, 2008.
19 In addition to the work by Pirogov this narrative can also be found in: nikitenko/
soboL’, 1981. In spite of its proximity to the Bol’shoi prospect “Vasia’s Village” is 
not mentioned.
20 This is also shown by the popular scientific account of buzinoV, 2006. In respect 
of the different narratives a comparative reading of the entries dealing with 
Vasil’evskii Island in the following encyclopedias is instructive: sankt-PeterburG 
– PetroGraD – LeninGraD. 1992; enCikLoP eDia sankt-PeterburGa: http://
encspb.ru/object/2803998688?lc=ru, 07.05.2013. Vasya’s Village” is mentioned 
in neither of them, just as little as in the multi-volume encyclopedia which was 
published to mark the 300-anniversary of the city: Tri veka Sankt-Peterburga, 
2005-2011. In contrast, for the “Viazemskaia lavra”can be found a single entry, 
supplementary to the already detailed article on the Haymarket: teresHCHik, 
2005, p. 667f.
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vsei ‘nature’21), but had the opportunity of having long conversations during that 
time. By no means did the author say that all inhabitants were unwilling to work 
and corrupt. In addition to people like the “soothsayer”22, who had gained a rela-
tively satisfactory fortune by making obscure prophesies and who lived in three 
numbers of the “village”, we read here about the “honest worker”23, who came to 
this settlement while looking for cheap living quarters or the “old single man”24 
who lived on alms. They were introduced as “humiliated people”25, as victims 
just like the children who had names like “wolf” and whose fate “depended 
totally on the street”26 (ulica derzhit detei v polnoi svoei vlasti). However, this 
differentiation between ‘corrupt’ and ‘innocent’ inhabitants served as a typical 
stylistic device for reports about the slums in order to evoke both revulsion and 
compassion and to satisfy the (assumed) lust of people for the spectacular.27 The 
introduction of specific literary characters was meant to help readers to identify 
them again. In this respect it was above all “Krestovskiis’ “Petersburg Slums” 
which exerted an influence on the style of others.28
These passages were above all of a literary nature and can hardly be used as 
a historical source for the inner life of a slum. Are there – apart from this nar-
rative level – descriptions which tell us about the actual geography of “Vasia’s 
Village”? When we return to the beginning of the report, we find - together with 
the information about the location of lines 17 and 18 - markedly more details 
about the history of the settlement in comparison with the little information we 
find at other places. The encyclopaedia of Galina Nikitenko and Vitalii Sobol’ 
states that “Vasia’s Village” was founded on a large free space by a business-
man from the peasant population named Egor Vasil’ev. It was his aim to let 
dwellings of this settlement named after him at low prices.29 We find the same 
information in the “Malen’kaia gazeta”. However, in addition we learn that Ego 
Vasil’ev came to St. Petersburg as an adolescent, made a living from collecting 
garbage for many years and through this was finally able to buy a piece of land 
21 iasHkoV, 04.01.1915, p. 3.
22 This and the following quotation from ibiD., 08.01.1915, p. 3.
23 ibiD., 06.01.1915, p. 3.
24 ibiD., 07.01.1915, p. 3.
25 ibiD.
26 This and the following quotation from ibiD.
27 Cf. for the perception of the street as a place of ‚the crowd‘ and of immorality 
steinberG, 2011 (especially chapter two).
28 Cf. JaHn, 2010, p. 123-128.
29 Cf. nikitenko/soboL’, 2008, p. 423.
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on Vasil’evskii Island.30 Here he founded his own waste dump, and when he had 
collected a sufficient number of materials he built a first house on his estate with 
the assistance of some mates and the carpenter Klimentii. However, this house 
fell prey to the wind. He erected a second building which remained and was 
soon enlarged by further annexes. The first lodgers arrived whom Egor Vasil’ev 
allowed to stay upon payment of 5 copper kopeks per day. When the series of 
articles in the “Malen’kaia gazeta” was published in 1915, the settlement had 
grown to 247 flats with 5,000 inhabitants.31 According to the author, their names 
would fill “three books with a weight of several tons”32, and he met people who 
had already lived there for 20 years.
On one hand, this means that “Vasia’s Village” had existed at least since 
the mid-1890s33, hence since the time when the permanently notorious “hous-
ing problem” (kvartirnyi vopros/zhilishchnyi vopros) of St. Petersburg had in-
creased even further.34 There is no clear indication whether there is a correlation 
between the rise in prices of living space and the emergence of slums in the case 
of “Vasia’s” Village as well as the other slums of St. Petersburg. Some facts in 
the newspaper report let us assume, however, that there is such a connection. 
Under the heading “inhabitants” (zhil’cy) we find the above-mentioned “honest 
worker”35, but also quite a number of persons who could not afford another 
dwelling due to their low income, among others “the retired city clerk with 7,40 
a month”36 and the “widow with many children” who earned 30 kopeks per day 
for gluing cigarette packets together. According to the newspaper report they all 
lived in the slum because it offered “cheap flats and rooms”.
The growth of “Vasia’s Village” to more than several thousand inhabitants 
and the long stay of part of them make us wonder, however, whether there were 
more motives than the material necessity that made the people stay in spite of the 
undoubtedly minimal comfort the settlement offered. An answer to this cannot 
be found easily in this newspaper report owing to the author’s scornful and con-
descending tone when, for example, telling us about the foundation of the set-
30 Cf. iasHkoV, 03.01.1915, p. 3.
31 Cf. ibiD., 06.01.1915, p. 3.
32 ibiD.
33 This corresponds roughly to the date stated in the encyclopaedia by Nikitenko and 
Sobol’. It says there that Egor Vasil’ev founded the “village” at the beginning of the 
20th century. Cf. nikitenko;soboL’, 2008, p. 423.
34 Cf. Petersen; sukHorukoVa, 2002; sViatLoVskii, 2012.
35 Cf. iasHkoV, 08.01.1915, p. 3.
36 This and the following two quotations from ibiD., 04.01.1915, p. 3.
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tlement by Egor Vasil’ev that he “looked for his fortune right there where every 
person born under a lucky star would look – among garbage.”37 Nevertheless, it 
becomes visible to some degree ‘behind’ this complacent attitude what “Vasia’s 
Village” meant for its inhabitants in addition to being their refuge. Thus, the 
development of the slum can be interpreted also quite differently: As a ‘wild’ 
adoption of a hitherto unused area beyond the control from the government and 
with structures of its own. When we read in the newspaper report: “Above all 
I want to draw the attention of the reader to the lines in these buildings. What 
kind of lines are they? They could only be drawn by the highly talented heel 
of Egor Vasil’evs: One of the corners of a building is directed towards the on-
looker, the other to the Caucasus Mountains […]”38 – then this demonstrates 
the author’s aloofness in these surroundings. In spite of his assumed ‘crossing 
the lines’ and the supposed authenticity of his reports, he still remained a slum 
tourist who missed the straight lines so characteristic for the rest of Vasil’evskii 
Island.39 At the same time it is shown that “Vasia’s Village” lived by different, 
namely its own rules as we can learn from the following passage: “To enter a 
flat in ‘Vasia’s Village’ is not as easy as is usually the case when we enter other 
buildings. Before you are able to enter, you have to look for the flat for roughly 
half a day, as annexes, staircases and numbers of flats are legion. Each of their 
inhabitants knows only his main entrance hole through which he creeps every 
day; he knows only the number of his own flat to which he is driven by the dark-
ness of night and the cold. Even the guards in the yards of ‘Vasia’s Village’ get 
lost in this impenetrable mud hole [v ėtom neprokhodimom omute]. When asked 
about the flats, they only wave their hand indifferently: ‘Don’t know…, climb 
the staircases, somewhere you will find it, but we have no idea […].”40
What the reporter saw as a chaotic “impenetrable mud-hole”, was for the 
inhabitants of “Vasia’s Village” a place with which they could identify in so far 
as they marked it as ‘their own’. The house numbers which were mentioned in 
the above passages were installed by the owner Egor Vasil’ev and were not only 
used for numbering purposes, but included some guidelines as follows: “Flat no. 
XY. 7 cubic Sazhen air. Not more than seven lodgers. Lodging is not permitted 
37 iasHkoV, 03.01.1915, p. 3.
38 ibiD., 04.01.1915, p. 3.
39 A brilliant description of this fear of the ‘wilderness’ of Vasil’evskii Island can be 
found in the character of the Tsarist bureaucrat Apollon Apollonovich in beLyi, 
2004. 
40 iasHkoV, 04.01.1915, p. 3.
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in the corridors and in the kitchen.”41 In correspondence with the tenor in the 
newspaper report, these instructions had in fact lost touch with reality – people 
lived in every corner of a room and in every dingy cellar in “Vasia’s Village” just 
like in many other places of Petersburg. However, in addition to this they put 
inscriptions above the doors at the entrances which, for example, read “Fyod-
ka-Ovchuch, thief”.42 Such labels are certainly no reason to romanticize people’s 
relationships in retrospect (I will deal with this later on); in the sense of the 
questions asked by this investigation they express the intentional overwriting of 
the original spatial order of a place, irrespective of moral assessment. Here we 
even find a certain amount of self-mockery.
The identification of the inhabitants with ‘their village’ was shown most 
prominently on the walls of the settlement. They were covered with numerous 
of their writings and drawings. One of the wall paintings showed the owner, 
Egor Vasil’ev as he approached on the back “of his cropped male dog with his 
fist raised and smoke coming out of his mouth while he called out: ‘Have your 
dough ready, damned inhabitants of Vasia’s Village (Gotov’te gamzu, okaiannye 
vasinoderevency).”43
This graffiti is in two respects proof of an ongoing process of identification 
with that area, which is regarded as one’s own possession threatened by the 
owner. On one hand, such marks on the wall are expressions of a process of 
adopting the respective space. It corresponds with Richard Sennett’s definition 
of graffiti being “a writing of the underclass” – an openly shown sign of their 
presence: ‘We exist, and we are everywhere. Moreover, you others are nothing; 
we write all over you.’”44
On the other hand, the fact that they called themselves “damned inhabitants 
of Vasia’s Village” tells us about their relationship to this place as well as to each 
other. The notion Vasinoderevency refutes the assumption stated in the news-
paper report that the inhabitants of the ‘village’ do not care for each other but 
are merely interested in their own “dingy dwelling”. Instead, the people had 
evidently found a joint identity just like it was reported from other places of 
poverty in Petersburg.45
41 ibiD. 
42 ibiD.
43 ibiD. “Gamza” is an underworld slang expression and stands for “money, wallet”. 
Cf. snaPskaia, 2000, p. 121; GraCHeV, 2003, p. 187.
44 sennett, 1990, p. 207.
45 Aleksei Svirskii writes that the inhabitants of the slum called each other “slum 
brothers” (truscobnye bratii) and used the ironic nickname “slum yacht club” 
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This conclusion does not imply a retrospective romanticism of life in “Va-
sia’s Village. Like other places of society in general and of urban underclass 
in particular, the slum on Vasil’evskii Island was penetrated by various power 
structures and inequalities. The wall painting described above is evidence of one 
of these confrontations – the opposition between owner and lodgers. The joint 
identity of the inhabitants described as vasinoderevency originated not least 
from the joint feeling of “we” against “him”. At the same time, this “we” did not 
exist in the sense of an egalitarian co-existence, although the newspaper report 
conveys the idea of such an idyll in some instances, e.g. when we read about 
the numerous ‘characters’ found in the ‘village’ as follows: “Everything finds its 
place in the anthill of ‘Vasia’s Village’. It accommodates everybody, nobody is 
left outside.”46 The picture of an “anthill” is certainly true in so far as the slum 
was a place of refuge for those on the margins of society who were rejected at 
other places. However, we also find numerous examples in the newspaper report 
which show how strongly gender hierarchies moulded the structure of the social 
space “Vasia’s Village”. As an example may serve the omnipresent violence 
practised on the streets of the ‘village’ by men and juvenile gangs which caused 
women to keep away from these places in the evenings and at night.47 These 
inequalities made the ‘anthill’ a contested area. 
II. “… for poor people”: 
 The Haymarket seen from  
 the viewpoint of ‘itinerant peddlers’
A find from the archive will serve as a second source of information for a look 
behind the facade of urban slum areas. It comprises three petitions submitted by 
traders of the Petersburg Haymarket to the Minister of the Interior as well as to 
(truscobnyi iakhtklub) for the night asylum on Izmail Field located between 
Fontanka and Obvodnyi Canal, cf. sVirskii, 1898. As another example can serve 
the “Viazemskaia lavra”, in which lived among others the so-called “Viazemskie’s 
cadets” (Viazemskie kadety), cf. skoroDum oV, 1866.
46 iasHkoV, 06.01.1915, p. 3.
47 ibiD. A fundamental treatise of this topic is to be found in neuberGer, 1993. Cf. 
also the contribution by Mark Steinberg in this book.
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the Tsar personally in the mid-1860s. They are kept in the files of the finance 
department of the Tsarist Ministry of the Interior.48
The Haymarket, strictly speaking the Hay Square (Sennaia ploshchad’), was 
a place which was originally located on the outskirts of the city where farmers 
from the vicinity of St. Petersburg were allowed to sell hay and firewood at 
certain times.49 When the city expanded, it was no longer situated on the pe-
riphery, but had finally moved to the centre of the capital by the 19th century, 
only a few minutes’ walk away from the grand boulevard of St. Petersburg, 
the Nevskii prospect. Moreover, its functions changed from being a temporary 
trading place for specific goods to becoming the permanent marketplace with a 
markedly broader range of products where mainly the poor population of Peters-
burg bought their basic food.
In the second half of the 19th century the Haymarket became the epitome of 
the ‘other’, unknown and dangerous St. Petersburg in the minds of the inhabi-
tants of the Russian capital. On one hand, this was to be attributed to increasing 
marketing efforts in connection with slumming, which was already mentioned 
above. Literary works even created the character of a typical lodger of the Hay-
market (Sennovskii obitatel’).50 On the other hand there was some reason for 
these projections and anxieties. The Sennaia as well as its market presented 
sanitation problems affecting – beyond its own boundaries – adjacent districts as 
well as the entire city. Already in its first year the “sanitary commission” which 
was set up by the municipal duma after the severe cholera outbreak in 1867 ar-
ranged for an inspection of the Haymarket. It reported alarming hygienic condi-
tions. The ground of the place was covered by a thick layer of garbage, food left-
overs and other debris from the market.51 Moreover, there were several slums in 
the vicinity of the Haymarket, among others the above-mentioned “Viazemskaia 
48 russian state HistoriCaL arCHiVe/rossiiskii GosuDarstVennyi istoriCHeskii 
arkHiV (rGia), f. 1287, op. 29, del. 1600.
49 A survey of the varying history of this place which is probably the most prominent 
square of St. Petersburg besides the Palace Square is presented by iurkoVa, 2011. 
Further titles are JaHn, 1996, as well as bauer.
50 Cf. tseitLin, 1998, p. 3, as well as on the development of the myth “Haymarket” as 
a whole JaHn, 2010, p. 113-128.
51 o DeiateL’nosti GoroDskoi sanitarnoi kom issii, 1868, p. 48f. When the medical 
doctors of the sanitary commission examined the place in the middle of March this 
layer was still mixed with snow and ice. Severe problems arose at the end of the 
freezing season. Cf. the report of the German travel writer koHL, Vol. 1, p. 200f.
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lavra” now housing up to 20,000 people.52 In the eyes of the authorities the name 
“Haymarket” was associated with a constant potential threat to public order – 
at the latest since the time when it became the stage for the so-called “cholera 
revolt” (kholernyi bunt) in 1831 in the wake of the first cholera epidemic. This 
was the first people’s revolt in the history of the city.53  
This combination of real and imagined threats led to various efforts of the 
government to impose regulations on this ‘wild’ place. After the erection of a 
central police station (Hauptwache) in 1820, it was above all the project to build 
permanent market halls instead of the hitherto open place which had been on the 
agenda for more than 20 years.54 There were three opposing parties: The first 
was represented by the Governor or Gradonachal’nik of St. Petersburg, Count 
Nikolay Levashov. He wanted the Haymarket to become a representative mar-
ketplace appropriate for the image of the Russian capital. He promoted projects 
which intended to turn the entire Haymarket into one big covered marketplace. 
As such schemes were expensive and did not fit into the budget of the duma, 
Levashov advocated payment by private persons who should, at the same time, 
be in charge of the Haymarket. This means that it was the governor’s aim to pri-
vatize the Haymarket which had so far been in possession of the municipality.55
Just as the Governor, the municipal duma was also in favour of a solid cov-
ered market. Last but not least, its interest was of a concrete economic nature. 
Income from the rents of market stalls amounted to up to 50,000 roubles a year. 
However, unlike Levashov, the majority of delegates of the duma emphasized 
the importance of the Haymarket as a market for the ‘common people’. It was 
said that the nature of this location was to be preserved. That was why the 
re-construction should be “as simple as possible”56 including roofing for only 
half of the market, whereas the other half should be used for the traditional sales 
by peasants directly from their carriages (vozy) also in the future.
52 In addition to the above-mentioned literature cf. CHaritonoVa, 1996. Cf. for a 
contemporary report by a commission founded by the city council on the interior of 
the “Viazemskaia lavra” o sanitarnykH m erakH P o Dom u kniaza Viazem skaGo, 
1883, p. 872-885.
53 Cf. the report of an officer on duty on this event fon-Der-kHoVen, 1885, as well as 
the account by koHL, Vol. 1, p. 194-196.
54 Cf. besides iurkoVa, 2011, also VeksLer, 2008. A detailed analysis of this re-
organization of the Haymarket is in preparation.
55 Cf. amongst others: ob ustroistVe na sennoi PLosHCHaDi rynoCHnaGo zDaniia 
DLia ProizVoDiasHCHeisia tam  torGoVLia, 1865, p. 450-464.
56 ob ustroistVe sennoi PLosHCHaDi, 1866, p. 401.
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A third opinion was held by the municipal sanitary commission and the 
Chief Police Officer of Petersburg. The chairman of the sanitary commission, 
Petr Zhukovskii, emphasised repeatedly that the Haymarket was above all a 
source of epidemics which should be demolished altogether and reconstructed 
from scratch. In addition, the nature of the market would have changed fun-
damentally. Today the queues in front of the food concourse (obzhornyi riad) 
would scarcely consist of workers, but instead of many “useless people”57 from 
surrounding houses. This argument was supported by the Chief Police Officer in 
a similar way. He felt that the continued existence of the market was dangerous 
from the point of view of the police as it would attract a large number of crimi-
nals and prostitutes in addition to the buyers. This “enormous number of danger-
ous people of our society”58 would find ideal conditions at the Haymarket where 
they could hide and gather in the adjacent houses. This development could only 
be stopped by a “complete cleanup of the place” and the removal of the market 
to the outskirts of the city. 
The debate on the reconstruction of the Haymarket went on for well over 20 
years before it resulted in the construction of four large metal pavilions which 
opened in 1886. After this there was no room for the traditional sales of peasants 
from their carriages which were originally deemed important by the duma. Trade 
was now conducted at fixed and equally large stalls in the market halls.59 Hence 
the transformation of the Haymarket was an example of the city’s endeavours 
to organize public space in a ‘better way’, i.e. to regulate it. During this time, 
numerous reconstruction projects were carried out on the markets of Petersburg 
among which the Haymarket was merely the most prominent example.60
The three petitions, which shall now be looked at in detail, are part of this 
controversial constellation. They were filed by traders who offered their goods 
on the Haymarket and who had come into conflict with the new regulations. The 
petitions belong to the very few statements we have from inhabitants and traders 
of the Haymarket. As much as has been written about this place, a history of the 
57 ob ustroistVe krytaGo rynka na sennoi PLosHCHaDi, 1870, p. 142.
58 This and the following quotation were taken from the letter of Chief Police Officer 
of St. Petersburg to the Ministry of the Interior 29.06.1869, rGia, f. 1287, op. 40, 
del. 310, l. 114.
59 Insights into the interior of the market halls can be found in zasosoV/Pyzin, 1999, 
p. 110-112; bakHtiaroV, 1994, p. 138-148.
60 A comparative treatise of this process is still missing. A first survey is presented by 
ProCai, 2005.
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Haymarket ‘from below’ is still missing. We get an idea from these petitions 
how these regulations of public space were perceived by the people concerned.
When we look at the epistemic value of these sources, the petitions seem to 
show a markedly higher degree of ‘authenticity’ than the reports published in the 
“Malen’kaia gazeta”. In fact, the categorical difference is – as may be readily 
concluded – that here we have the voices of the ‘common people’ themselves 
and not an account by a third person wanting to sell a ‘story’. In this context 
Keith Snell, the author of fundamental studies on the self-conception of the En-
glish poor, defines letters and petitions as “alongside oral history […] the most 
authentic sources for ‘history from below’ and historical questions of identity 
among the poor”61 we have. 
On the other hand, we have narrative conventions observed by such sources. 
Russian history has known petitions since the Middle Ages which means that 
they follow a certain tradition as regards contents and formal layout.62 Hence, 
this leads to the conclusion that an overoptimistic interpretation of these sources 
as ‘authentic’ may be questionable.63 First of all, it has to be considered who 
wrote the petitions, the undersigned himself or the undersigned parties them-
selves or rather a scribe? This was not unusual in view of the widely spread 
illiteracy of the urban poor. In addition we have to ask how the wording of the 
petitions which we see on paper was actually composed. Who took part and how 
big was the contribution of a possible scribe in the final text? And, last but not 
least, it has to be considered that petitions were a performative act which served 
to let one’s request appear in the most favourable light in order to convince the 
addressee who, as a rule, was in a much higher position. Are they really the ut-
terances of the poor ‘themselves’? To find an answer to this question, let us look 
at the petitions of the traders and consider at the same time whether they offer 
information about the Haymarket as a place of ‘their own’.
As to the formal characteristics of the petitions it can be stated that all three 
were written down between February 1865 and June 1866. In February 1865 as 
61 sneLL, 2012, p. 2.
62 In this connection, I refer to the paper submitted by Hubertus Jahn on the occasion of 
the conference “Poverty in Modern Europe. Micro-perspectives on the Formation 
of the Welfare State in the 19th and 20th Centuries” at the German Historical 
Institute in London in May 2012: Voices from the Lower Depths: Russian Poor 
in Their Own Words, presenting an analysis of petitions for the time from the 17th 
to the 20th centuries. A publication of the contributions to this conference is under 
way.
63 Cf. on the following also kinG, 2008, p. 252f.
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well as in May 1866 they were addressed to the Ministry of the Interior. On June 
6, 1866 they were addressed to the Tsar himself. In each case the handwritings 
do not correspond to the signatures of the applicants so that it may be assumed 
that the petitions were written down by scribes. How the final wording came 
about cannot be said for lack of further sources for these petitions. It is possible 
that the applicant narrated the case to the scribe. In all three cases about 90 % 
of the signatures were those of peasants as well as of petty commoners (mesh-
chane) in a few cases. While the petitions of February 1865 as well of June 1866 
bore signatures of about 100 names, they numbered only 15 on the petition of 
May 1866. Obviously as many signatures as possible were collected for the last 
petition which was the only one addressed to the Tsar himself. It can be noticed 
that some of the people who had already signed the petition of February 1865 
put their signature under this document as well. It may hence be concluded that 
these people knew each other or were at least in touch so that contacts could be 
established quickly. Moreover, they must have had similar interests. This leads 
us to the question of the contents of the petitions.
A central concern of the petition of February 1865 was the right to sell meat 
at the Haymarket also during the summer, a right that was threatened from the 
viewpoint of the undersigned parties. The two petitions of the following year 
asked for the permission to continue the sale of goods along the edges of the 
Haymarket close to public and private buildings. The origin of both requests 
was very similar, which explains the existence of overlapping signatures: They 
were ‘itinerant peddlers’ (torgovcy v raznos) without any permanent place who 
expressed their concern and fought a treatment considered unfair in their opin-
ion. The composition of the signatories of the petition shows that they were for 
the most part peasants who sold their goods directly from their carriages (vozy) 
contrary to those stationary traders who had permanent stalls (lavka). 
Correspondingly, the petitions are very similar in respect of set-up and ar-
gumentation.64 Each of them was caused by actions of the commercial police to 
enforce resolutions of the municipal duma: on one hand, the prohibition of meat 
sales by ‘itinerant peddlers’ at the Haymarket between April and November and 
on the other a decree forbidding sales of ‘itinerant peddlers’ close to public and 
private buildings. The decrees passed by the duma in connection with meat sales 
were preceded by requests of stationary traders asking the commercial police 
64 In addition, the two petitions of May and June 1866 show partly identical passages. 
However, this is not surprising as their concerns were the same and they were 
written down within a short period of time.
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to take steps against the competition from ‘itinerant peddlers’.65 The petitions 
opposed these measures by arguing in two ways: by referring to the law and by 
emphasising that the Haymarket was a traditional place of the ‘common people’. 
As to the legal aspect of this dispute, it has to be said that it was the duma’s 
principal right to enact trade regulations at the Haymarket as this place was 
part of the municipal property. However, its resolutions could be overturned 
by the Ministry of the Interior. In the case of meat sales by ‘itinerant peddlers’ 
during the summer months the legal position was undisputed: Since 1842 sales 
of fresh meat had only been allowed at the Haymarket during the summer at 
permanent stalls where it was possible to keep goods cool.66 The general ban 
on trade in the vicinity of public and private buildings was more controversial 
in some respects. It was not without reason that the signatories of the petition 
argued that the decree passed by the duma was above all directed at sales con-
ducted in front of houses adjacent to the Haymarket or in their courtyards. These 
houses were not part of the property of the duma, but belonged to individual 
owners. Correspondingly, the signatories emphasized that such a ban would vio-
late the “right to private ownership”67 (prava chastnoj sobstvennosti). However, 
this point was not undisputed. In the end it was a matter of political decisions. 
Already at former instances the duma had passed decrees entitling it to decide 
about the allocation of trading places. However, these resolutions were met by 
opposition from private house-owners as well as the Ministry of the Interior. In 
1842, the latter had decreed that peasants coming from the urban hinterland had 
the principal right to sell their products at the city’s trading places.68 However, in 
1854 the Ministry made it clear that private persons were not entitled to allocate 
65 Cf. Proshenie krest‘ian, torguiuvshchikh miasom na Sennoi ploshchadi, 
09.02.1865, rGia, f. 1287, op. 29, del. 1600, l. 21. The complaint is also mentioned 
in o VosProsHCHenii torGoVLia m iasom  na sennoi PLosHCHaDi, a takzHe 
m eLoCHnaGo torGa s P ostoiannykH m est okoLo CHastnykH i kazennykH 
zDanii, 1867, p. 373.
66 Cf. o VosProsHCHenii torGoVLia m iasom  na sennoi PLosHCHaDi, a takzHe 
m eLoCHnaGo torGa s P ostoiannykH m est okoLo CHastnykH i kazennykH 
zDanii, 1867, p. 373.
67 Proshenie s Peterburgskikh torgovcev v raznos, 21.05.1866, rGia, f. 1287, op. 29, 
del. 1600, l. 28.
68 The respective decree of the Ministry of the Interior of November 29, 1842 was 
published in: ob otVoDe m esta DLia bazarnoi VozoVoi torGoVLi i ob izDanii 
obiazateL’naGo P ostanoVLeniia o P oriaDke torGoVLi z VozoV V s.-PeterburGe, 
1885, p. 315. This included fish and meat, however, only as frozen goods.
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trading places by passing a new resolution. This would impair municipal financ-
es.69 Because of this rather unclear legal situation the sales by peddlers without a 
permanent stall were ultimately tolerated around public and private houses, until 
the commercial police tried to stop them in 1864. Last but not least it was the 
decree of 1842, which the signatories used as a reference when applying directly 
to the Ministry of the Interior.
However, the passages of the petitions referring to the nature of the Haymar-
ket as a place of the ‘common people’ are of a greater relevance to the context in 
this essay than the legal aspects of the dispute. One of the arguments pointed out 
by the undersigned parties was that the “wellbeing of the people”70 (narodnoe 
blagosostoianie) would be jeopardized if extensive restrictions were imposed 
on ‘itinerant trade’. So far “a large proportion of the capital’s poor population 
who shopped at the Haymarket” had bought fresh meat from them which was 
of equal quality as that offered at the stalls, but their prices were much lower. If 
their sales were stopped, permanent traders could fix prices “arbitrarily”71. This 
would lead to the establishment of a “monopoly”72 which would above all affect 
the poor population of Petersburg.
At the same time the undersigned parties argued that there existed a kind 
of customary right. They pointed out that they would conduct their sales in the 
same way as had been practised already “for a long time”73. They would ask 
for nothing more but the right to return to their customary places at which they 
had conducted their sales “up to today”74 (ponyne). Consequently they rejected 
the allegation of the duma that they had usurped these places “unauthorized”75 
69 Cf. o VosProsHCHenii torGoVLia m iasom  na sennoi PLosHCHaDi, a takzHe 
m eLoCHnaGo torGa s P ostoiannykH m est okoLo CHastnykH i kazennykH 
zDanii, 1867, p. 373. A possible economic damage refers to the fact that itinerant 
peddlers had to buy a tin token from the municipal authorities at 2 roubles and 86 
kopeks.
70 This and the following quotation: Proshenie krest‘ian, torguiuvshchikh miasom na 
Sennoi ploshchadi, 09.02.1865, rGia, f. 1287, op. 29, del. 1600, l. 22.
71 ibiD., l. 21 ob.
72 ibiD., l. 22.
73 Proshenie s Peterburgskikh torgovcev v raznos, 21.05.1866, rGia, f. 1287, op. 29, 
del. 1600, l. 27.
74 Proshenie, 06.06.1866, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 29, del. 1600, l. 32.
75 o VosProsHCHenii torGoVLia m iasom  na sennoi PLosHCHaDi, a takzHe 
m eLoCHnaGo torGa s P ostoiannykH m est okoLo CHastnykH i kazennykH 
zDanii, 1867, p. 374.
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(samovol’no): “We cannot accept the seizure of our places by the duma as it does 
not own them and therefore has no right to allocate them.”76 Instead, they would 
have obtained the places “in accordance with an agreement with the house-own-
ers in the same way as practised by the duma”. If, however, the house-owners 
would not have the right to do so “we will accept the trading places also from 
the duma and […] and pay the customary fee.” In any case, stop the “unsubstan-
tiated prosecution” by the police that “has driven so many of us into poverty”.
The background for these arguments was the traditional sale of goods by 
peasants who came to town.77 This situation could still be seen at the Haymarket 
at the time of the formulation of the petitions in so far as the place had been 
divided into two halves since the beginning of the 19th century: on one side, 
the open “green” area where products were sold directly from the carriages of 
incoming traders (during the wintertime timber and hay, in the summer agricul-
tural produce such as vegetables, cabbage and milk)78, on the other half the sale 
of mainly meat, fish, fruit and vegetables at permanent stalls. The undersigned 
parties of the petitions quoted as a precedent that they had sold their meat prod-
ucts directly in the “green area” until the interference of the commercial police. 
The permanent traders at this place would have taken no offence up to then.
Whether these arguments were sound, was disputed in the duma. Supporters 
of a general “clean-up” of the total Haymarket, such as the above-mentioned 
Petr Zhukovskii or the delegate Ivan Glazunow, denied the existence of such a 
customary law. They pointed out that the majority of traders had stopped being 
farmers long ago and that they acted as intermediaries. Through this the market 
had fundamentally changed its nature and no longer followed the tradition of the 
former trading place on the outskirts of the city.79 They considered open sales 
76 This and the following quotations up to the end of the paragraph Proshenie, 
06.06.1866, rGia, f. 1287, op. 29, del. 1600, l. 31 ob-32 ob.
77 Cf. the comprehensive account by bauer. During the winter, the sale was carried 
out from sledges, cf. koHL, Vol. 1, p. 198.
78 Cf. on the range of products offered the report of the commission for public 
interests and necessities of January 28, 1868, in: izVestiia sankt-PeterburGskoi 
GoroDskoi obsHCHei Dum y, 1868, No. 2, p. 75; istoriCHeskie truDy aLeksanDra 
tom iLina, 1854, p. 66-69; koHL, Vol. 1, p. 196f. 
79 An example of this argument can be found in the contribution by Glazunov in 
the debate in the duma of February 15, 1868, in: izVestiia sankt-PeterburGskoi 
GoroDskoi obsHCHei Dum y, 1868, No. 5, p. 226-243.
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as well as the adjacent food concourse a “disgrace”80 (bezobrazie) which had to 
be abolished. This was vigorously denied by other delegates. Aleksandr Iakov-
lev emphasized that besides the repeatedly appearing images of the Haymarket 
there were also traders who were no criminals. Moreover, the constant demon-
ization of intermediaries who were said to have destroied the ‘original’ bazaar 
would not at all be convincing in view of the growth of the Haymarket as well 
as the entire city: “The answer could be that indeed every merchant could be re-
garded as an intermediary. He buys goods first hand and sells them immediately 
afterwards. I cannot see that this is condemnable or unethical.”81 He went on 
saying that the social function of the Haymarket and its ‘itinerant peddlers” had 
to be taken into consideration as well and that the Haymarket is the only “market 
of the people”82 (narodnyi rynok) in St. Petersburg. He continued: What would it 
mean to close down such an institution as the ‘food concourse’ which was called 
“kitchen of the nobility” (dvorianskaia kuchnia) by the man in the street: “It is 
said that among others you will find people eating there who do not deserve any 
attention according to an expression used by the sanitary commission: among 
others homeless people, thieves, fraudsters, illegal persons without any docu-
ments [bezpasportnye]; this may be true, but they still have to eat. They will not 
go to the permanent food stalls for fear that their passports be checked.”83 
Eventually the majority of the delegates of the duma adopted Iakovlev’s 
point of view and voted in favour of continuing open sales as well as keeping the 
‘food concourse’.84 As regards the three petitions, it had already been decided 
beforehand that the sale of meat in tents would be allowed for a year under the 
same sanitary conditions as those applying to permanent sale stalls.85 As regards 
trading in front of private and public buildings the duma made it clear that the 
right of the house-owner would end at the facade of the house and that every-
body offering his goods could only do so by asking permission of the duma and 
80 Amongst others the expression used by the governor-general in a letter to the head 
office for traffic infrastructure and public buildings of August 16, 1855: rGia, f. 
218, op. 3, del. 1288, l. 3.
81 izVestiia sankt-PeterburGskoi GoroDskoi obsHCHei Dum y, 1868, No. 5, p. 233.
82 ibiD., p. 235.
83 ibiD., p. 240.
84 Cf. ibiD., p. 241-243.
85 Cf. the protocol of the debate in the duma of July 7, 1867, in: izVestiia sankt-
PeterburGskoi GoroDskoi obsHCHei Dum y, 1867, No. 16, p. 856.
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by paying a corresponding fee. Basically, it was endeavoured to keep trading to 
locations of the city which were intended for this purpose.86
Thereby a preliminary arrangement was found for the Haymarket before the 
inauguration of the four market halls stopped any open trading whatsoever on 
the market – at least officially. However, the matter of ‘itinerant peddlers’ was 
still a topic. This is not only true for the vicinity of the Haymarket where ped-
dlers moved to other places such as the Obuchovskii Square on the Fontanka. 87 
Also at other places the municipal authorities did not manage to stop this type 
of trading. In the same year when the halls at the Haymarket were inaugurated, 
the gradonachal’nik of Petersburg felt impelled to issue a regulation in which he 
complained that open trading was still conducted at “certain places”88. He con-
tinued his appeal to observe the respective decrees of the duma, but this did not 
bring about any significant changes. Even at the beginning of the 20th century 
the ‘itinerant peddlers’ were still the object of controversial discussions about 
the farmer’s market (Sytnyi rynok)89 located at the Petersburg side as well as in 
connection with the project to establish a central market at the Vyborg side.90
This shows that the petitions discussed in this paper do not represent iso-
lated cases. The topic concerned the entire the city. At the core of the matter 
we find the question as to who had the right to organize day-to-day activities at 
places like the Haymarket. Or to be more precise: Who owned the markets of 
the city?91 Irrespective of the conclusive answer to this question, the above-men-
tioned passages make it clear that the ‘common people’ regarded places such as 
the Haymarket as places of their own where they had conducted trading for a 
long time. Of course, reverting to the argument of the “wellbeing of the people” 
was also part of their discursive strategy, which intended to present the problem 
as a matter of general interest. As stated by Steven King, petitions were in fact 
“multi-functional documents, combining reportage, fact, posturing, rhetoric and 
circumstance”.92 But, King goes on, the narrative and strategic formation of such 
86 ibiD.
87 Cf. zasosoV/Pyzin, 1999, p. 112.
88 Decree of the gradonachal’nik as well as of the police of August 1886, in: izVestiia 
sankt-PeterburGskoi GoroDskoi obsHCHei Dum y, 1886, No. 35, p. 663.
89 Cf. the report of the municipality of May 23, 1904, in: izVestiia sankt-
PeterburGskoi GoroDskoi obsHCHei Dum y, 1904, No. 13, p. 1205-1214. Just like 
30 years ago the basis for this was again the complaint of the stationary traders.
90 Cf. rGia, f. 1293, op. 137, del. 91.
91 Cf. for the concept of a “Right to the City” LefèbVre, 1968.
92 kinG, 2008, p. 253.
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sources does not mean that we cannot see them as part of an agency that tried to 
exert an influence on real existing processes.93 This is also true for the examples 
analysed in this paper. By submitting a petition, the signatories articulated their 
claim to the Haymarket and tried at the same time to make their position public. 
The fact that they themselves did not write them does not mean that they do not 
reflect the interests of the subjects. The reference to the Haymarket as a place of 
the poor did not only fulfil a rhetorical function but was also part of their self-po-
sitioning in contrast to the places of the rich. This is demonstrated by another 
petition mentioned in the book by Zoia Iurkova which also dealt with retail trad-
ing: “It is a well-known fact […] that the duma harasses the poor people (bednyi 
narod) and keeps on supporting the rich, but the Haymarket was not intended 
for the rich, but for rural, for poor people and today they are not even provided 
with a slice of bread.”94 The self-positioning of the poor people was attached to 
certain locations in the city – in this case to Petersburg’s Haymarket.
III.  Summary
Let us revert to the question asked at the beginning of this article. In how far 
is it possible to look behind the facade of urban poverty? An interpretation of 
both types of sources which were discussed as examples is faced with many dif-
ficulties when we try to answer this question. This is also true for the allegedly 
‘more authentic’ petitions which are indeed also “multi-functional documents”. 
On other hand, however, differences should not be completely equalized. Both 
for the acting persons of that time as well as for our interpretation of today it was 
and is certainly not irrelevant whether you could support a petition by signing it 
yourself or whether you were able to refrain from putting your name under this 
paper. The inhabitants of “Vasia’s Village” did not have such an opportunity of 
authorising a text which we find as a source in the archives today.
As difficult as newspaper reports such as those published in the “Malen’kaia 
gazeta” may be, they are frequently and also in this case nearly the only reports 
on the inner life of a slum like “Vasia’s Village”. The method suggested by this 
article was an approach to the world of the urban poor by looking at concrete 
places. Beyond stylistic devices, both types of sources provide us with infor-
mation about places which were important to their inhabitants and which they 
regarded as ‘their own’. In this way, it may be possible to confine an investiga-
93 Ibid., p. 271. In respect of petitions, this view is also shared by Jahn (cf. note 62).
94 iurkoVa, 2011, p. 89.
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tion not just to an analysis from the outside, but to outline perspectives from the 
inside as well and to demonstrate the importance attached to such places by their 
inhabitants in spite of their social marginalization. 
At the same time such an approach by means of places makes it possible to 
show internal heterogeneities and inequalities. The analysis has revealed the 
existence of inner power structures between owner and inhabitants, men and 
women as well as between ‘itinerant’ and stationary traders. Not only does this 
fact prevent a subsequent well-meaning romanticization of the everyday life of 
the urban poor but above all it allows us to have an amplified and differentiated 
look at the ‘Russian poor” which were in fact more than the “black people” 
(chernyi narod) as they are usually called in Russian. In contrast to such gen-
eralising opinions the examples outlined in this investigation present the poor 
inhabitants of the city as people who were actively engaged in dealing with the 
precarious conditions they faced.    
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Blood in the Air  
Everyday Violence in the Experience  
of the Petersburg Poor, 1905-1917
mark D. steinberG
The object of force is to impose a certain 
social order in which the minority governs, 
while violence tends to the destruction of 
that order. 
(Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 
1908)
In 1913, a popular newspaper columnist in the Russian capital observed with 
dismay that “newspapers are printed on white paper, but, really, in our times its 
pages seem covered with blood”1. Many commentators shared this view, often 
emphasizing the point with dramatic metaphors. Both typical and often repeated 
was a phrase that the physician and public health activist Dmitrii Zhbankov 
often used in talks, reports, and newspaper columns: a “traumatic epidemic of 
blood and violence” was raging in everyday city life, especially in the capital 
city St. Petersburg.2 For newspapers, it was “everyday” violence that was the 
main concern. Certainly, there was a great deal of political violence in the years 
between 1905 and 1914 – ranging from government repression to revolutionary 
terrorism, not to mention the wars and revolutions that bookend these years.3 
But this story has a different focus, at least ostensibly: more local, more ubiq-
uitous, and more troubling in both its everydayness and its seeming absence of 
1 skitaLets, 1913(2), p. 3. 
2 He used this phrase in many of his writings, for example, zHbankoV, 1910(1), p. 2.
3 Cf., for example, HoLquist, 2003, p. 627–652.  
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purpose. Such everyday violence included bloody “epidemics” of street knif-
ings, robberies with weapons, rape, bar-room fights ending in bloodshed, and 
suicide.4 These stories unfolded mainly in the neighborhoods and lives of the 
city’s poor.
Like all stories, these were told as embodying larger meaning. Perhaps pre-
cisely because they were so disturbing, they became powerful signs to interpret 
and to interpret with, especially about the “spirit of the age” and the meaning 
of “these times” (both frequent phrases in these discussions). These were city 
stories – present throughout the empire but most widespread, and worrisome, 
in the imperial capital, St. Petersburg. Cities are often viewed as symbols in 
European cultures, not least because they are the biggest and most enduring 
creations of human society. St. Petersburg has been a symbol, from the time of 
its foundation on newly conquered land, of Russia’s forceful turn away from its 
past and toward the modernity of the West. Stories of ubiquitous and growing 
city violence ran counter to the civilizing march of modern progress. So, too, did 
other ubiquitous stories of urban degeneration and moral disorder, to which the 
epidemic of violence was often linked, especially the sexual “bacchanalia” (a 
metaphor of debauchery used, in turn, to speak of a “bacchanalia”5 of violence) 
and suicide. Together, these stories were interpreted as signs of a “monstrously 
ugly” “spirit of evil”6 in the air, the presence of “something fatal”7 in contem-
porary life, some deep and ubiquitous “sickness”8. And the interpreting did not 
stop there. Numerous commentators read this evidence, especially the stories 
that “covered” the newspapers with so much “blood,” as defining the experience 
of modernity as heavily marked by “tragedy,” “catastrophe,” and “trauma,” pro-
ducing dark feelings ranging from “melancholy” to “despondency”.9  
The question is, can we do more to understand urban violence in Russia 
than describe how these stories were narrated and interpreted by contemporar-
ies? Can we understand the actual experience of violence, especially from the 
perspective of the perpetrators themselves? We know the difficulties. That it is 
impossible to disentangle the experiences and meanings of the most excluded 
from the narrating language of those with the power to most shape public dis-
4 Cf. among the few historians who have emphasized this everyday violence, 
especially morrissey, 2006; steinberG, 2011; mCreynoLDs, 2012.  
5 For example, skitaLets, 1913(2), p. 3.
6 VaDim , 1913, p. 3.
7 PoDPisCHik zHurnaLa zHizn’ DLia VsekH, 1913, p. 1289f.
8 az., 1908, p. 4. 
9 Cf. steinberG, 2011.
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course and thus the very vocabulary of available interpretation. That we have 
little access to unmediated experience in the past, for the only evidence of expe-
rience we have is so imbricated with language and culture and desire that it is (as 
the historian Joan Scott famously argued) “always already an interpretation”10. 
In other words, to adapt a famous question, “can the knife-wielding subaltern 
speak” outside the construction of their voice by others?
One solution is suggested by the recent “descriptive turn” among literary 
scholars who have warned against overriding and overwriting past texts with 
our own voices, whether through critical readings shaped by the “arrogance” of 
heavy theory or forcing everything into the box of “context”:  what is needed, 
they argue, is more “intimacy” with texts, readings that are more “susceptible” 
and “attentive,” reading more “with the grain” than “against” it.11 For historians, 
this is a welcome methodological critique: we love to revel in the archive, to 
wander through past texts listening for past lives. And a particularly good text 
for this is the daily press. I will travel a way down this path myself, with news-
papers as my main source. But I also find this path to be too seductive. To un-
derstand the past, we also need to escape its interpreting grip and view the past 
from outside its own perspectives. Attentively, yes, with receptivity to possibili-
ties. But also with critical questions and suspicions. In other words, through the 
voices of theory – in this case, theories of violence and theories of emotion – not 
constrained by the mediation of interpreting contemporaries. 
In thinking about newspapers and other periodicals as evidence of “experi-
ence,” I find suggestive Walter Benjamin’s remark in 1939, in his attempt to ex-
plain his own effort to make sense of city stories in the Arcades Project, that “to 
seize the essence of history, it suffices to compare Herodotus and the morning 
newspaper”12. One way to understand this is to view the newspaper as Erleb-
nis-history, using the distinction, explored by Benjamin among others, between 
the two German words for “experience,” Erlebnis and Erfahrung. The newspa-
per points toward the immediate, particular, personal, and discontinuous – in 
other words, it is grounded in “life” (Leben), it is “lived experience.” This stands 
in apparent contrast to a history that is narratively integrated, whole, continuous, 
shared, and directional – the “journey” at the etymological heart of Erfahrung.13 
The problem, and necessity, is how to bring into dialogue the daily news and 
10 sCott, 1991, p. 797. Cf. also Jay, 2005. 
11 Cf. feLski, 2011, p. 573-91; best anD marCus, 2009, p. 1-21; LoVe, 2010, p. 
371-391. 
12 benJam in (1939), 1999, p. 14.
13 Cf. especially Jay, 2005. 
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the long narration, the discontinuous present of experience and the coherent 
experience of living in meaningful time. This requires a perspective from both 
inside and outside the local and the particular. This shifting dialogue between 
perspectives – between the rawness of described violence, interpretations by 
contemporaries, and a critical reading of both – is my aim in this paper, hoping 
to open up the possibility of deeper interpretation.
Describing violence
We begin with these stories in their first narrating drafts – echoing the popular 
self-description of American journalists as writing “the first draft of history.” 
A great many stories of urban public life in Russia between 1905 and 1917 did 
indeed cover the pages of newspapers with “blood.” News reports of accidents, 
ranging from fires to workplace deaths (both of which earned the headline of 
“epidemics”) were an almost daily accompaniment of urban life and a reminder 
of its precarity. Especially disturbing were accidental deaths of unsupervised 
children (mostly working-class children, of course), which, according to a re-
porter for the mass-circulation paper Peterburgskii listok (Petersburg Sheet) in 
1913, had “in recent years become an epidemic phenomenon in the capital.” On 
a single day in May of that year, for example, he counted unsupervised children 
drowning in a canal, toppling off an apartment balcony, falling under the wheels 
of a cart, being run over by an automobile, and being crushed by a tram.14 
But by far the greatest dangers to life came from the deliberate actions of 
other people, often strangers. Most common were stabbings in the course of 
a robbery, mostly on the street and especially in rougher neighborhoods. The 
narratives were simple and similar: a perpetrator, individually or with a group, 
approached a victim and demanded money, becoming violent when rebuffed. 
Much of this violence, though, lacked the purposefulness of robbery. Newspa-
pers reported numerous stories like that of the man at a café who quarreled for 
no clear reason with other customers and then stabbed several;15 or the brawl in a 
bar that started with an argument among strangers after a professional wrestling 
match and ended in a knife fight;16 or the man who chased down and repeated-
ly stabbed a woman who ignored his “degrading suggestions”17 as she walked 
14 Cf. PeterburGskii Listok, 27.05.1913, p. 4.
15 troinoe ubiistVo, in: Peterburgskij listok, 14.01.1913, p. 3. 
16 Cf. PeterburGskii Listok, 20.04.1909, p. 4; 09.05.1910, p. 5; 27.05.1913, p. 4.
17 ibiD., 13.01.1910, p. 5.
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along a street. As a rule, both perpetrators and victims were young males. Low-
er-class men were more likely to carry knifes and to rob and quarrel violently. 
Women, we shall see, were more likely to kill themselves – or be victims of 
male violence, including sexual violence. Hans-Christian Petersen, in his chap-
ter in this volume, identifies a subculture of male violence in the city’s poorer 
neighborhoods. Indeed, these stories implied a violent masculinity that was a 
troubling story about both gender and class.
Beside violent attacks by strangers, public violence among friends seemed 
also to have become epidemic, often erupting at the slightest provocation, es-
pecially when alcohol loosened self-restraint (heavy drinking, of course, was 
viewed as a characteristically male). When weapons were at hand, and they 
often were, these fights could be lethal. Many men, it seems, carried concealed 
knives when out in public (although one could beat a man to death with fists 
and boots as well). The papers were full of accounts of degenerating arguments, 
often in bars or on the street, frequently over “trifles,” often presumed insults, 
ending in spilled blood and sometimes death.18 To give one example out of hun-
dreds, a couple of working-class friends were sitting around drinking vodka 
when one decided he needed to go home to get some sleep before work the next 
morning; angry, his drinking buddy shouted “I will show you how to treat a 
friend”19 and stabbed him in the side. Not all violence was so public, of course. 
But even the most private violence, notably domestic violence, was regularly 
turned into a public spectacle by the newspapers.20 
Sexual violence was yet another “epidemic.” The papers regularly reported 
women and girls raped (and then sometimes killed) by men, usually strangers, in 
dark streets or squares in the poorer parts of town.21 This “bacchanalia” of sexual 
violence was said to have never before reached “such a colossal extent”22, nor 
taken such exceedingly “disgusting and beastly forms.”23 Today, we recognize 
18 Cf. Gazeta-koP eika, 02.07.1908, p. 3; PeterburGskii Listok, 09.04.1909, p. 6; 
04.02.1910, p. 5; 10.02.1910, p. 5; 08.08.1910, p. 7; skitaLets, 1913(1), p. 3.
19 Gazeta-koP eika, 26.06.1908, p. 2.
20 Cf. for example, zHestokoe istiazanie rebenka, 1910, p. 6; noVoe Vrem ia, 
06.07.1909, p. 2.
21 Gazeta-koP eika, 22.07.1908, p. 2; 07.03.1909, p. 3; 09.08.1908, p. 2f.; 28.09.1908, p. 
2; 24.03.1909, p. 5; 27.06.1910, p. 4; 21.08.1911, p. 4; 31.07.1913, p. 3; PeterburGskii 
Listok, 09.08.1910, p. 3; 04.01.1913, p. 4; 25.01.1913, p. 4; skitaLets, 1910, p. 3. Cf. 
also oberLänDer, 2011.
22 D., 1909, p. 3.
23 zHbankoV, 1910(2), p. 69.
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that all rape is violence. But at the time it seemed a sign of something new that, 
as Dr. Zhbankov wrote, “normal rape,” which he believed reflected unrestrained 
sexual desire, was being replaced by “pathological” rape, which was nothing but 
“cold”24 violence. 
In reporting these “epidemics,” the newspapers made a point of describing 
the precise location of incidents: mapping violence into a social and moral map 
of the city that distinguished certain urban spaces as dangerous and sick. The 
map of “bloody Petersburg,” as it was called, covered most of the industrial 
outskirts (in Russian, okrainy, a term also used for the borderlands of the em-
pire). Neighborhoods like Okhta, on the right bank of the Neva to the east of the 
city center, or the industrial district known as “Beyond the Nevskii Gate” (za 
Nevskoi zastavoi), along the left bank of the Neva below the Obvodnyi canal 
(the gate was already long gone, but its memory recalled that this district was 
outside the entrance to the city proper), or parts of the “Petersburg Side” across 
the Neva to the north of the city center were described as so rough as to seem 
to be located in a different time and place morally and culturally. Typically (not 
only in Russia, of course), class otherness was translated into moral and even 
racial otherness. Okhta, for example, was described as a “Petersburg Mexico 
or Peru,” where the primary occupation for young people is “fist-fighting and 
bloodletting”25. A report on Donskoi Street, a particularly rough alley on Vasile-
vskii Island, observed that “mores there are such that you don’t know whether 
you are in Petersburg or Babylon or among some North African savages”26. 
The map of “bloody Petersburg” also included social spaces closer to the 
center and less visibly marked as “other” by the physical boundaries of river 
or canal – especially the district known as “Ligovka” surrounding Ligovskaia 
Street, which ran from the main Nikolaevskii railroad station at Nevskii Pros-
pect across the Obvodnyi canal (generally considered the boundary of the central 
city) into the southern margins of the city. This notoriously rough neighborhood, 
especially Ligovskaia Street itself, was the subject of regular and frequent press 
reports about both grizzly crimes and colorful characters (though often of a de-
bauched and criminal sort). Even at high noon, one reporter observed, the peo-
ple in this district, both men and women, seem to have stepped right out of the 
stories of Maxim Gorky, for this was a sort of “Petersburg lower depths” filled 
with down-and-out “former people” (both phrases Gorky made famous).27 The 
24 ibiD., p. 88f.
25 okHtenskie ‘rebiata’, 1908, p. 5.
26 zerkaLo stoLitsy, 1914, p. 3.
27 Cf. V. T., 1909, p. 3.
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lowest depth of Ligovka was the neighborhood known by its old name Iamskaia 
sloboda (Coachmen’s settlement), around the intersection of Ligovskaia Street 
and Chubarov Alley (close to the railroad tracks and the canal), a district known 
for its heavy concentration of brothels and criminal “dens”28. At night and well 
into the morning, journalists reported, it was impossible to walk on Ligovskaia 
Street near the Obvodnyi canal without risk of robbery and violence.29
Children were said to have been dehumanized by everyday life in poor dis-
tricts – a life described in an editorial in Peterburgskii listok in 1910 as “chaotic 
disorder and ruin, abnormal family and social relationships, rising destitution, 
alcoholism, and degeneration [vyrozhdenie – a common term]”30. Because chil-
dren in such neighborhoods, it was said, “grew up on the street,” they were 
deformed by the street. “The street” was a keyword laden with as many inter-
pretations as “the city.” As a material and social space of public interaction, 
and as definably urban, the street was often a metaphor and symbol of the most 
worrisome aspects of human society and personality, including desire, sponta-
neity, disorder, danger, and violence.31 It also often denoted spaces closest to the 
lives of the poor. Children and the street were viewed as a lethal combination.32 
Typical was the 1909 report about a twelve-year-old boy who fatally stabbed his 
mother with a kitchen knife when she refused to let him go play in the streets. 
“Who is to blame?” the reporter asked. He answered his own question: “the 
street” itself to which the boy was so passionately attracted and which had ru-
ined him.33 
The “hooligan” had a special place in these stories of the street and violence, 
for hooligans seemed to embody the sense that life among the urban poor was 
more and more a story of pathological excess. Joan Neuberger, in her import-
ant study of hooliganism in St. Petersburg, showed how this term was applied 
widely to all sorts of aggressive and transgressive behaviors in public spaces, 
ranging from stabbings in back streets to mocking harassment of respectable 
citizens in the center of the city (such as unscrewing park benches and laughing 
28 sLeDoPyt, 1914, p. 4.
29 Cf. massoVye buiistVa kHuLiGanoV, 1905, p. 4.
30 Detskii suD, 1910, p, 1. Cf. also LiubosH, 1910, p. 2; kHoLm skii, 1914, p. 4; 
from m et, 1914, p. 696-700.
31 Cf. for example benJam in, 1928 and ÇeLik, et al., 1994.
32 Cf. for example, noVikoV, 1914, p. 526-532.
33 Cf. Gazeta-koP eika, 02.01.1909, p. 3.
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when someone fell, or pulling ribbons from women’s hair).34 Most hooligan 
acts, though, were violent.
As a form of violence, hooliganism was defined by the excess of its trans-
gression:  not just violating the bodies of others (with a knife, for example), 
but transgressing the presumed boundaries of reason itself. The press was full 
of stories like that of the young “hooligan” who demanded money for a beer 
from a nineteen-year-old man he came across and then stabbed the youth four 
times in the stomach when he refused,35 or the story of a man stabbed in the 
neck and chest when he refused a demand for fourteen kopecks to buy vodka.36 
Worst of all were the hooligan knifers who, it was reported, skipped the prelimi-
nary demands and just attacked.37 As an editorial in 1910 in the mass-circulation 
newspaper Gazeta-kopeika (Kopeck-gazette) concluded, “the hooligan knife 
[…] slashes and cuts without any reasons at all”38. And even when attacks had 
an ostensible purpose, especially money or sex, these goals seemed secondary. 
Reports emphasized the connection of hooliganism to the neighborhoods 
and lives of the poor. The typical hooligan was described as young man from 
the slums. The newspapers linked hooliganism to the “dark Petersburg” of the 
urban underclass,39 the lumpenproletariat of the homeless and unemployed,40 
“tramps [bosiaki], residents of flophouses, prostitutes [known often to associate 
with hooligans, who sometimes acted as pimps], and others of the Maxim Gorky 
type”41. The police agreed, organizing huge raids (800 people were rounded up 
in a raid in 1910, for example) on the places such types were believed to hole up: 
cheap teahouses and taverns, public parks on the city outskirts, and river barges, 
which housed a special lower-class subculture of its own.42 No less important, 
hooligans were seen to embody the presumed connection between poverty and 
moral degeneracy. As an editorial in Peterburgskii listok in 1910 put it, poor 
34 Cf. neuberGer, 1993.
35 Cf. PeterburGskii Listok, 10.05.1913, p. 4. Cf. also PeterburGskii Listok, 
03.04.1909, p. 1.
36 Cf. zHizn’ za 14 koP eek, 1912, p. 3.
37 Cf. for example, om ut zHizni: kHuLiGany, 1908, p. 3; PoDViGi uLiCHnykH 
GrabiteLei, 1910, p. 3.
38 Gazeta-koP eika, 06.10.1910, p. 1.
39 Cf. PeterburGskii Listok, 12.05.1910, p. 4.
40 Cf. ibiD., 05.05.1907, p. 4.
41 uLiCHnaia sektantskaia m issiia, 1908, p. 2.
42 Cf. GranDioznaia obLaVa na kHuLiGanoV i bezDom nikoV, 1910, p. 2.  
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children were driven toward hooliganism by “destitution, alcoholism, and de-
generation [vyrozhdenie]”43. 
Violence against self was treated as part of the same story. The press record-
ed the almost daily toll of suicides – many of which occurred in public places, 
especially cafes, taverns, and streets – during the suicide “epidemic” in Peters-
burg between 1906 and the war.44 Official statistics on the reasons for suicide 
placed poverty at or near the top; if it yielded pride of place, it was to drunken-
ness, also linked to lower-class life.45 Newspaper reports were often headlined 
“Due to Hunger”46. So common were these histories that the popular columnist 
Skitalets (”the wanderer”), writing in Gazeta-kopeika, observed that stories of 
“despairing” unemployed men committing suicide were so “ordinary” that they 
were often ignored by newspapers and readers looking for something more in-
teresting and dramatic.47 The essayist Vasilii Rozanov similarly concluded that 
the public found little of interest in suicides from poverty – or perhaps, we may 
elaborate, had grown morally numb to its traumatic ubiquity – for “of poor peo-
ple there are always so many”48. 
Of particular interest to readers was the “epidemic” of suicide among pros-
titutes,49 where stories of desperate poverty (the reason most often given for 
why women “fell” into prostitution) combined with experiences of subordina-
tion, humiliation, and physical abuse.50 The archetypal report described prosti-
tutes committing suicide together, perhaps in “some stifling and stagnant tavern 
amidst rowdiness and drunken intoxication,” toasting their escape from life with 
glasses of poisonous vinegar essence.51 That women were more likely to kill 
themselves, or be victims, than to assault others, reminds us of the intertwining 
of narratives of gender along with class in these histories of everyday violence.
43 Detskii suD, 1910, p. 1.
44 Cf. for other discussions of suicide in Russia in these years, morrissey, 1995, p. 
201-217; ibiD., 2006, chaps. 10-11; PaP erno, 1997, p. 94-104, 109f., 121f., 158f.; 
PinnoW, 2010, p. 25-42.  
45 Cf. PreDVariteL’nyi sVoD statistiCHeskikH DannykH P o G. s-PeterburGu za 
1909 GoD, p. 39. 
46 For example, iz-za GoLoDa, 1909, p. 4; cf. also zHbankoV, 1910(1), p. 29.
47 Gazeta-koP eika, 18.08.1910, p. 3.
48 rozanoV, 1911, p. 50f.
49 Cf. obyVateL’, 1909, p. 2; zHbankoV, 1910(2), p. 63; GorDon, 1910, p. 1f.
50 Cf. ne VynesLi P ozora, 1909, p. 4. Cf. also V. T., 1909, p. 3; PeterburGskii Listok, 
17.01.1913, p. 14; om ut zHizni, 1908, p. 3.
51 nem iroViCH-DanCHenko, 1910, p. 581-583. Cf. also bernstein, 1995, p. 78.
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Interpreting violence
There is a naked reality to these stories: government statistics documented ex-
ceptionally high rates of violence and suicide in the Russian capital in these 
years.52 However, as can already be seen, the factual reporting of such “inci-
dents” was never far removed from interpreting them, starting with the view 
that they were part of a common phenomenon. A key interpreting theme was 
“excess.” There was quantitative excess, emphasized by the metaphors used to 
frame and unite these different stories into one: a “bountiful harvest of death”53, 
a “bacchanalia”54 of death, an “atmosphere of death”55, an environment where 
“pools of blood are on the floor, [and] the walls ooze pus”56. Most troubling, 
though, was the qualitative excess. The stabbing of a stranger “for 14 kopecks” 
was emblematic. And this was not only a view of such people as definable 
“others” threatening the norms of “civilized” public life from without (as Joan 
Neuberger argued about hooligans, who exemplified these behaviors57) but also 
something worse:  a symptom of an ailing social body, of a sick self.58 
“Sickness” was a master metaphor for contemporaries. One of its worst 
symptoms was said to be the loss of value of life itself.  Newspapers regular-
ly headlined reports of violence with phrases like “life today is cheap,” “life 
has lost value!”59 people today are “valued cheaper than trash”60. The hooligan 
seemed to embody this spirit to dark perfection. The hooligan philosophy of life 
was “everything existing on this earth is rot [tlia] and people are shits [gnidy—
literally, lice eggs]”61. The debased value for life, a Gazeta-kopeika columnist 
concluded, was the dark heart of “our terrible times”62, and made killing (and 
self-killing) easy. 
52 Cf. N., 1909, p. 544-547.
53 N. V., 1908, p. 1.
54 skitaLets, 1913(2), p. 3.
55 arnoVa, 1911, p. 476.
56 enGeL’GarDt, 1908, p. 1.
57 Cf. neuberGer, 1993.
58 Cf. steinberG, 2011.
59 DukH banko [The Ghost of Banquo], 1907, p. 1; Gazeta-koP eika, 19.10.1909, p. 3; 
nem iroViCH-DanCHenko, 1910, p. 581-590; fiLenkin, 1911, p. 3.
60 skitaLets, 1911, p. 5. 
61 sVirskii, 1914, p. 253, 258-269. On Svirskii, cf. mCreynoLDs, 1991, p. 151f.
62 PoDoL’skii, 1909, p. 3.
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But why? Some writers blamed the government for nurturing this atmo-
sphere: the aftershocks of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 and especially of 
widespread repression, including a great number of executions, following the 
1905 revolution. “Days without a death sentence and execution have been the 
exception” over the past year, a journalist noted at the end of 1909, and so “hu-
man life has lost value”63. Other writers blamed the revolutionary movement, 
especially terrorist attacks on officials, which proliferated in these post-revolu-
tionary years. In the wake of the execution of Prime Minister Petr Stolypin in 
September 1911, a liberal journalist offered a characteristic lament: “We are to 
blame, all of us, even the air we breathe and the thoughts and feelings we expe-
rience. For six years already we have been sowing seeds of violence, betrayal, 
and murder, and have been killing with knife, bullet, and bomb, and with soaped 
noose.”64 
But most writers, when looking for reasons and causes, blamed the modern 
city. If “these times” were sick, most journalists seemed to feel, the city was, as 
it were, the “epidemiological pump.” Statistics were available to confirm this: 
as a chronicler of Petersburg crime summarized the numbers, “the more urban, 
the more crime […] including the most terrible bloody acts”65. Explanations 
varied. Conservatives blamed modern secular individualism for eroding tradi-
tional values, especially respect for others and love of the good.66 Liberals and 
socialists blamed the harsh conditions of social life (and, though they could not 
say this too loudly, the lack of political and civil rights and freedoms, which ag-
gravated social hardships). But almost everyone agreed, in one way or another, 
that modern city life – indeed, modern progress itself, for which the city stood 
both socially and symbolically – had a paradoxical effect, especially on the lives 
of the poor:  it made people into “savages,” “beasts,” and “animals” capable 
of the most “cruel” and “brutal” crimes – terms often used in newspaper crime 
reports.67 Commentators wrote again and again of the harmful “atmosphere” of 
modern social life, especially in big cities and especially for those whose social 
lives were the most precarious.68 To quote typical phrases from the press: the 
63 bLank, 1909, p. 1f.
64 tan, 1911, p. 60f.
65 aboriGen, 1914, p. 43.
66 Cf. bronzoV, 1912, p. 4-9.
67 Cf. trofim oV, 1909, p. 3; zVerskoe ubiistVo, 1909, p. 3; Posse, 1909, p. 83-
85; noVitskii, 1909, p. 1; LiuDi-zVery, 1909, p. 3; Dikie nraVy, 1908, p. 3; 
enGeL’GarDt, 1910, p. 3.
68 Cf. arnoVa, 1911, p. 482. 
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modern big city was a murderous “trap”69, a devouring “stone monster”70, a fatal 
“mirage”71. The fact that so many new arrivals to the capital – from small towns 
or the countryside – took their own lives was a symbol easy to interpret with.72
So, to recall Walter Benjamin’s remark, we can see the work of “Herodo-
tus” already in the “morning newspaper,” if “Herodotus” means a constructed 
narrative history of experience that explains and gives coherent meaning to the 
fragmentary and contradictory evidence of lived experience. These interpreting 
stories suggested solutions as well: for some, a revival of morality or religion; 
for others, social and political reform, perhaps revolution. Many worried, how-
ever, that there might be “no exit” (another frequent phrase in the press) from 
what one journalist gloomily called “the long, black, stinking corridor” of the 
present, its atmosphere “saturated with the exhalations of putrefying corpses”73. 
Theorizing violence 
Can we do more to interpret this evidence?  Can we see beyond a “suscep-
tible” and “attentive” reading “with the grain,” beyond contemporaries’ own 
interpretations of their own lives? Most difficult, can we know anything of the 
experiences and motives, the subjectivities, of the subjects who enacted this vi-
olence? We have often been warned, especially by postcolonial theorists, of the 
danger of assuming transparency in voices from the past, of failing to recognize 
the inaccessibility and untranslatability of the discourses of others, of trusting 
our own constructions of (and desires for) the subaltern voice, of nostalgically 
recovering what seems lost – the danger of the “intellectual masquerading as 
the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for they themselves,” as 
Gayatri Spivak wrote when suggesting that our knowledge that the “subaltern 
cannot speak” can serve as both a critical warning against epistemic violence 
and a path toward some understanding of social realities and experiences.74 This 
warning must extend to local knowledge:  contemporary interpreters, such as 
69 GriDina, 1913, p. 3.
70 sHCHiGaLeeV, 1912, p, 5.
71 GriDina, 1910, p. 3. Cf. also ibiD., 1911, p. 3.
72 Cf., for example, zHertVa obsHCHestVennoGo raVnoDusHiia, 1908, p. 4; iz-za 
GoLoDa, 1909, p. 4; V. T., 1909, p. 3.
73 enGeL’GarDt, 1908, p. 1.
74 Cf. sPiVak, 1988, though I am using her insights and arguments somewhat 
differently than she intended.
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we find in the press, are not necessarily closer to social realities and experiences 
than our own interpretations from afar.
A point of entry into this problem is the place that seemed to contemporaries 
most resistant to interpretation: irrational violence for violence’s sake, with no 
other end or purpose.75 When contemporary interpreters did find meaning in 
this, we have seen, it was to see symptoms of moral and spiritual illness. Perhaps 
less parochial voices can help us see further than they could, or were willing to, 
and open up a field of alternative interpretation. 
Consider, for example, the perspective of the psychiatrist and radical philos-
opher Frantz Fanon in his 1961 book Les Damnés de la Terre (The Wretched 
of the Earth). His arguments were not merely theoretical, of course. They grew 
from his work among colonized North Africans, whose violence, he concluded, 
was a response to the material conditions and psychological effects of colo-
nialism. Fanon described the world of colonialism – in terms, I think, that have 
uncanny suitability to the world of entrenched but fearful Russian autocracy and 
rapidly developing capitalism – as a “hostile, oppressive and aggressive world,” 
a world of “daily humiliations” and periodic repressive violence, that was simul-
taneously a “hell” from which the colonized dreamed of escape and a “paradise 
within arm’s reach guarded by ferocious watchdogs”76. In such an environment, 
“the muscles of the colonized are always tensed” and “the colonized’s affec-
tivity is kept on edge, like a running sore flinching from a caustic agent.” This 
produced what Fanon called “atmospheric violence”: a violence “rippling under 
the skin,” a tense “rage” ready to burst out in “periodic eruptions” of “bloody 
fighting” among themselves, including “the most brutal aggressiveness” and the 
most “impulsive violence.” “It is not uncommon,” Fanon wrote, “to see the col-
onized subject draw his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive look from an-
other colonized subject.”77 Other theorists of violence, examining other settings, 
have offered a similar perspective. Walter Benjamin, for example, in the wake 
of the terrible losses and brutalities of the Great War, described an “everyday” 
violence, where “man is impelled by anger” to the “outbursts of a violence that 
are not related as a means to a preconceived end” but are an expression of the 
conditions of “existence”78, indeed, of experience.
Key to understanding this everyday, existential, atmospheric violence is 
what may be termed “blocked agency.” Hannah Arendt, for example, though 
75 Cf., for example, iVanoV, 1914, p. 48.
76 fanon (1961), 2004, p. 16, 219.
77 ibiD., p. 16-19, 31.
78 benJam in, 1921, p. 248.
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hostile to Fanon’s justification of the violence of resistance (and especially Jean-
Paul Sartre’s advocacy of Fanon’s arguments), nonetheless recognized that such 
violence emerges from conditions of modern “progress” that suppress freedom 
and creativity. As she wrote in her 1969 essay “On Violence,” “the present glori-
fication of violence is caused by severe frustration of the faculty of action in the 
modern world,” such that “riots in the ghettos” make “people feel they are acting 
together in a way they rarely can”79. More recently, James Scott similarly de-
scribed a “latent sense of violence” produced when systems of domination block 
action and agency, when the “routine harvest of insults and injury to human dig-
nity” cannot be answered with “reciprocal aggression,” for these systems have 
the power to frustrate and deny the “natural impulse to rage, insult, anger, and 
the violence that such feelings prompt”80. 
It is important to emphasize the notion of self that is seen to drive the human 
desire for agency and become frustrated by its obstruction: a particular concep-
tion of human personhood as possessing natural human dignity and thus innate 
sensitivity to insult and humiliation and to constrictions of will. In Russia as in 
Europe, this notion has had a long and persistent history. An early and influential 
view of this is G. W. F. Hegel’s notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung). Hegel 
defined “recognition” of “self,” of “personhood,” of “being,” of “will,” of one’s 
“existence” as an individual, as essential human needs. Failure to be “recog-
nized,” “negation” of one’s “self-expressive will,” produces crime and violence, 
which can be understood to be an effort to “reinstate” one’s “will to power,” 
“to count for something, to be recognized”81. In Russia, arguments about harm 
to the natural “human personality” (the Russian keyword is lichnost’) caused 
by social conditions that degrade and injure the self were strongly developed 
among the nineteenth-century intelligentsia and became ubiquitous in public 
discourse, including in the daily press, by the start of the twentieth century.82 
The idea that frustrated human agency can fuel violent rage has recently 
been developed by Slavoj Žižek (also a psychoanalyst and radical philosopher) 
in his 2008 book Violence. More than his predecessors, though, Žižek confronts 
head-on the epistemological and hermeneutic resistance of much violence to 
79 arenDt, 1969, p. 83 (the final quotation is Arendt quoting an essay by Herbert 
Gans on “ghetto rebellions”).
80 sCott, 1992, p. 37-39.
81 HeGeL, 1805-1806, part II (”actual spirit”), section A (”recognition”), esp. section 
iii (”crime and punishment”).
82 Cf. discussion and sources in steinberG, 2002, chap. 2; and steinberG, 2011, p. 
151-153.
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our desire and effort to read a meaningful message. He gives the example of the 
2005 riots in the poor and immigrant banlieues of Paris: “what is most difficult 
to accept is precisely the riots’ meaninglessness,” that they are less “a form of 
protest” than “an impulsive movement into action which can’t be translated into 
speech or thought.” This meaninglessness, he argues, “bears witness” both to the 
“impotence of the perpetrators” and to their “inability to locate the experience 
of their situation within a meaningful whole.” Such violence resists translation 
into familiar narratives, whether the backwardness of class and racial others or 
the heroic resistance of the oppressed. And yet, Žižek does see interpretable 
signs and even a type of politics in these acts. He sees violence as an effort to ac-
quire denied “presence,” to make oneself “visible,” “to create a problem” – even 
while “neither offering a solution nor constituting a movement for providing a 
solution.” In other words, these acts are a “sign” not a “meaning,” a “means” not 
an “end”83. Or, as Arendt put it, drawing on Benjamin, violence is an “interrup-
tion” of processes in human history that otherwise seem “automatic,” predict-
able, and unyielding.84 
Recent work by theorists of affect and emotions reinforce such arguments. 
To be sure, most attention in recent scholarship on the relationship between vi-
olence and emotions has focused on collective and explicitly political violence, 
such as the role of emotions in stimulating nationalist and ethnic violence, or, 
closer to our case, the ways collective experiences of loss, moral hurt, resent-
ment, and anger have fueled moral claims that produce defiant and retributional 
violence.85 Some studies, however, notably the work of Sara Ahmed and Sianne 
Ngai, suggest an everyday and individual politics of emotion, especially in how 
people deal with social “pain,” “injury,” and “wounds.” Key here is what Ngai 
calls a “state of obstructed agency,” which means not only social and political 
oppression restricting collective action, but a deep incommensurability between 
the hurt and any available solution: what practical action, for example, is strong 
enough to undo the injuries of class subordination, poverty, or racism (the effects 
of symbolic violence, in Pierre Bourdieu’s important term)? These conditions 
can stimulate vehement emotions, often embodied in violence, which become a 
“sign,” a way to “speak out.” Such violence tends toward excess and attachment 
to what Ngai calls “ugly feelings,” such as envy, anxiety, paranoia, irritation, 
and disgust. But these vehement and sometimes violent emotions also contain 
“critical potential.” Not as simple or adequate resistance, much less mechanisms 
83 ŽiŽek, 2008, esp. p. 76f., 179, 185, 200-202.
84 Cf. arenDt, 1969, p. 30.
85 Cf. steinberG/soboL, 2011.
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of change, nor even as adequate catharsis, but as strong signs of disenchantment, 
disaffection, and refusal.86 
Returning to the evidence of the Russian press, these arguments resonate 
with the epidemics of excessive, “irrational,” “meaningless” violence without 
“end” or “reason” beyond the act itself, exemplified by what one journalist de-
scribed as the “hooligan” stance of being “the enemy of each and everyone”87. 
As this suggests, some contemporaries saw the hints of the political in this. The 
hooligan, a persona that had come to embody irrational and excessive violence 
among the poor, wanted to “outrage/offend/defile society” (nadrugat’sia nad ob-
shchestvom), and if material damage could be added to this “moral harm,” all the 
better. The hooligan acted “as if to avenge himself on society for something”88. 
More radical writers elaborated on this “as if” and “for something.” In 1913, the 
worker writer Aleksei Gastev argued that “today in Russia people label as ‘hoo-
ligans’ anyone who does not perform ‘cultured,’ which is to say lackey, duties 
for the large and small parasite masters”89. Violence against the self could also 
be read as a sign of refusal, as a way to bear witness with one’s own life to (and 
literally interrupt) the tragic conflict in modern life between heightened desires 
and “empty” “reality,” as the regular Gazeta-kopeika columnist, Ol’ga Gridina, 
wrote in an essay titled “Death Answers”90. Some went further and described the 
suicide epidemic as “a mass bloody protest against life as it is”91. 
To translate this history through interpreting languages of other times, situa-
tions, and perspectives, we can argue that the “epidemic” of everyday violence 
among the urban poor in Russia – and here we can agree with contemporary 
commentators who treated robberies at knife point, barroom brawls, suicide, 
and domestic violence as a single phenomenon – reflected a psychological “af-
fectivity” and “muscular tension” always on “edge,” a vague “rage” and “latent” 
violence that could “erupt” at the slightest provocation. At its heart were “pain,” 
“wounds,” and “injuries” that denied dignity and recognition, made more pain-
ful by structures of domination that blocked action and agency. This violence 
contained “critical potential” by “bearing witness” to political “impotence,” 
making oneself “visible” and “present” in the face of exclusion and marginaliza-
86 Cf. aHm eD, 2004, esp. p. 33-34, 169, 193-194; nGai, 2005, esp. p. 1-29, 161, 188.
87 iVanoV, 1914, p. 47-50.
88 ibiD.
89 zorin, 1913, p. 1457.
90 GriDina, 1910, p. 3. Cf. also nem iroViCH-DanCHenko, 1910, p. 584.
91 abram oViCH, 1911, p. 113. Cf. also zHertVa obsHCHestVennoGo raVnoDusHiia, 
1908, p. 4. 
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tion, “speaking out,” “interrupting,” and “creating a problem.” True, it “served 
no means” or end. So perhaps it is too strong to speak of resistance. But we can 
speak of “vehement” “disaffection” and “rage” as a political “sign,” as a form 
of refusal, even a form of “revenge” for so much wreckage. Differentiating be-
tween rational and irrational in these acts, as contemporaries did, helps little to 
understand them.
But how far should we go in viewing these acts as political? Can we find 
here the possibility, in Fanon’s terms, of translating atmospheric violence into 
revolutionary “violence in motion,” a violence that “cleanses,” changes, and 
liberates?92 Or, what Georges Sorel, writing at the same time as this Russian sto-
ry, described as a violence that resists civilization’s barbarity and authoritative 
force, that is ultimately a violence of life, will, creativity, and virtue?93 Or what 
Benjamin called the “divine violence” that can destroy the violence of power 
and “deliver justice” “for the sake of the living”94? Or what Jean-Paul Sartre, in 
his preface to Fanon’s book, called the “violence, like Achilles’ spear, [that] can 
heal the wounds it has inflicted?”95 
We may desire such transfiguration, for there is hope and the appealing 
promise of redemption in it. But this optimism, and the encouraging voices of 
authoritative theorists, may be more seductive than real. Fanon himself recog-
nized how “melancholy” and “suicidal” everyday violence among the oppressed 
tended to be: that the regular “release” of tension and rage by drawing one’s 
knife against another colonized person at the slightest vexation was ultimately 
“collective self-destruction […] a death wish in the face of danger, a suicidal 
conduct that enforces the colonist’s existence and domination, and reassures him 
that such men are not rational”96. Perhaps Russian journalists were right to see 
melancholy, hopelessness, and the “loss of taste for life.”
If we look ahead to 1917, we see an explicit translation of everyday social 
violence into directed political violence. But the affinity between what Fanon 
called self-destructive atmospheric violence and transgressive “violence in mo-
tion” means that the boundaries between them are porous and unstable. Per-
haps because the wounds went so deep, the purposefulness of revolution could 
not remove the undirected rage that helped fuel this upheaval. “Excess,” again, 
was a telling sign. Witnesses to the February Revolution (which was relatively 
92 Cf. fanon, 1961 (2004), e.g. p. 51.
93 Cf. soreL, 1908 (1950).  
94 benJam in, 1921, p. 248-250.
95 sartre, Jean-PauL, preface to fanon, 1961 (2004), p. lxii.
96 fanon, 1961 (2004), p. 17f.
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bloodless compared to the October Revolution and the Civil War that followed) 
described with dismay the epidemic of street violence that continually crossed 
the boundaries of reason: people in the streets shooting obsessively into the air 
or into the windows of apartment buildings, smashing store windows, looting 
(especially wine stores – a crime not without some instrumental purpose), and, 
at the extreme, stomping on the lifeless bodies of murdered policemen and of-
ficers. The Petrograd Soviet characteristically condemned all this as “hooligan-
ism.” Echoing the same older tradition of interpretation, Maxim Gorky (then 
editor and columnist of a new independent left-wing newspaper in the capital) 
insisted that this was not revolutionary violence at all, but “Asiatic savagery”97. 
In the months following, organized revolutionaries would repeatedly say the 
same about the epidemic of crowd violence against perceived enemies of the 
revolution: as one soldier-socialist declared after witnessing the brutal murder 
in the street of a dozen officers who had been arrested after the Kornilov muti-
ny, “this is a disgrace and a shame” and “no one will achieve anything doing it 
this way”98. In other words, violence “under the skin” did not always change its 
nature when put in political motion. This was a “wound” that “would not heal” 
(borrowing the classic metaphor of decadence), a violence that could not bring 
change or redemption, or even consolation, a violence that was no more than a 
symbolic reminder of injury and rage. 
Still, there was politics in this, though an “ugly” politics of ugly feelings and 
ugly actions. The same may be said of the “traumatic epidemic” of everyday 
“blood and violence” that the Petersburg press so fulsomely documented in the 
prerevolutionary years – a politics, yes, but ugly, unable to console, bringing no 
redemption. At best, this was a politics of disruption and interruption, of being a 
problem, of presence, of speaking out with physical signs. From a perspective of 
explicit and conventional politics, this was all terribly inadequate – inadequate 
for resisting injury and harm, inadequate for producing change. In a way, this 
violence was too symbolic. Nor did it help that it was shaped by a distorting 
culture of violent masculinity. Perhaps tragically, these emotions, vocabular-
ies, and actions introduced an ugly politics into the revolution, a time when 
political and social change actually did become possible. One could argue, and 
contemporaries certainly did, that this was proof of the trauma and sickness of 
prerevolutionary society. But one could also argue that even the ugliest popular 
violence during and especially after 1917 was still political: a dark agency for 
the unorganized people of Russia’s “lower depths,” a way of being present in the 
97 Cited in steinberG, 2001, p. 63f.  
98 DeLo naroDa, No. 147, 06.09.1917, p. 2.
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face new postrevolutionary obstructions to plebeian agency, a way of baring and 
witnessing wounds being inflicted this time by “Soviet” and “socialist” forms of 
political domination and modernizing “progress.”
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Outcast Vienna 1900   
The Politics of Transgression
WoLfGanG maDertHaner
I
The Vienna of 1900 has been mythologized in recent decades. It has become a 
historical signet, a highly successful trademark recognized around the world. Its 
posthumous success has been promoted by masterpieces of historiography such 
as Carl E. Schorske’s Fin de Siècle Vienna1 as well as by a series of spectacular 
exhibitions at the Vienna Künstlerhaus, the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, 
and the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Nikolaus Sombart, in one exam-
ple among many, has attributed to the Vienna of 1900 paradigmatic significance 
for the twentieth century as a whole.2 According to Sombart, central problems 
of modernity were articulated here more precisely and radically than elsewhere; 
they were perceived and conceptualized in a more intelligent and original way 
as they took on the form and the attitude of cultural innovations such as Arnold 
Schönberg’s anti-music, Karl Kraus’s linguistic criticism, Arthur Schnitzler’s 
fictional psychology, Wittgenstein’s dismantling of metaphysics, Ernst Mach’s 
empirical criticism, and Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis.
Vienna 1900 was indeed a peculiar and somehow solitary conglomerate of 
some of the most divergent yet mutually dependent social, political, and cul-
tural developments of the time. While a liberal bourgeoisie was favoring the 
monarchy, democratic movements were afflicted with a traditional bureaucracy, 
populism was associated with Catholicism, and the Late Enlightenment was oc-
cupied with the conditions of the human soul and the basic psychological con-
ditions of the individual. In the heart of the city, the Hofburg, the aging emperor 
1 Cf. sCHorske, 1981.
2 Cf. som bart, 1987, p. 52-54.
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Franz Joseph sought desperately to uphold his autocratic regime as well as the 
myth of the old German Reich. On the gorgeous newly constructed Ringstraße 
Boulevard an economically powerful bourgeoisie showcased the success of a 
late-coming capitalism in the form of magnificent, historicist architecture. In 
the lower-middle-class districts, a petite bourgeoisie suspicious of modernity 
mourned the loss of the “Old Vienna” that had epitomized pre-modern content-
ment and clarity. In the industrial suburbs which encompassed the inner districts 
like an iron ring of workers’ quarters, serious housing misery, social squalor, 
mass immigration, and potential political upheavals gathered.
Vienna’s symbolic body was distorted in many ways.  It was socially seg-
regated and yet contradictorily homogenized by the aesthetic standards and fa-
cades of the Ringstraße that dominated the outer appearance of the tenement 
blocks even in the proletarian outskirts. While the nobility had long passed the 
zenith of their political power, its cultural heritage dominated the fantasies and 
longings of a bourgeoisie still striving for social recognition. The liberal and 
predominantly Jewish bourgeoisie, which only recently had acquired political 
power, was almost immediately challenged (and finally defeated) by an an-
ti-Semitic, lower-middle-class populism that proved able to combine cultural 
reaction and municipal modernity. At the same time, an egalitarian utopianism, 
promoted by progressive Jewish upper-class intellectuals, was unfolding among 
the masses of suburban proletarians as a reaction to the unfulfilled humanitarian 
promises of liberalism. In the city’s coffeehouses and salons, writers, artists, 
and scientists searched for a common denominator to all these contradictions 
and seemed to detect it in psychoanalysis, psychophysics, expressionism, and 
an aesthetically sophisticated nervousness.3
The Vienna of 1900 was at once a laboratory of the Apocalypse and the birth-
place of epoch-making modern trends and achievements. It was the place of the 
last of the Habsburgs as well as that of the young Adolf Hitler, and of Theodor 
Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism. It was the place of the patriarchal major 
Karl Lueger, who shaped modern anti-Semitism into a political mass movement, 
and it was the place of one of the founding fathers of democratic socialism, the 
Jewish poor man’s doctor, psychologist and social reformer Victor Adler. It was 
the first metropolis in which organized anti-Semitism was able to seize power 
and it was to become, after the municipal franchise had been democratized, the 
first city with over one million inhabitants under a social-democratic adminis-
tration. In Robert Musil’s words, Vienna 1900 resembled a boiling blister of 
3 Cf. maDertHaner/musner, 1999(2).
Outcast Vienna 1900
123
initiations and emergences, one gigantic beat and the eternal dissonance and 
determent of all rhythms against each other: 
“No one knew exactly what was in the making; nobody could have said 
whether it was to be a new art, a new humanity, a new morality, or perhaps 
a reshuffling of society. [...] There were those who loved the overman and 
those who loved the underman; there were health cults and sun cults and the 
cults of consumptive maidens; there was enthusiasm for the hero worshipers 
and for the believers in the Common Man; people were devout and skeptical, 
naturalistic and mannered, robust and morbid; they dreamed of old tree-lined 
avenues in palace parks, autumnal gardens, glassy ponds, gems, hashish, 
disease, and demonism, but also of prairies, immense horizons, forges and 
rolling mills, naked wrestlers, slave uprisings, early man, and the smashing of 
society.  These were certainly opposing and widely varying cries, but uttered 
in the same breath.”4 
II 
Since the 1980s, a specific practice of cultural analysis and discourse on the 
Vienna Modern has been established. This practice was exclusively concerned 
with the culture of the elites, and was dominated by a discussion of the artistic 
and intellectual avant-gardes – projecting an embellished image of Vienna 1900 
as an icon of an innovative multiculturalism. The extreme disparities between 
the social classes and the spatial and cultural segregation that resulted, as well 
as the nascent anti-Semitism and populist mass politics, are mentioned, if at all, 
only marginally. This romanticized picture, by focusing on singularities instead 
of processes, thus obscures an understanding of that long-term logic that led 
from fin-de-siècle Vienna with the posthumously admired creativity of its as-
similated Jewish community to the brutal persecution of Jews during the Nazi 
dictatorship.
Instead of making Carl Schorske’s perspective ever more dynamic, fin de 
siècle was ontologically conceptualized as the sum of its intellectual and artistic 
achievements, and was thus stylized into a kind of precious treasury of high 
culture. The life-worldly cultures of the suburbs, the worlds of the immigrants, 
proletarians, and urban pariahs, were persistently ignored in high modern Vien-
nese literature. If the suburbs were mentioned at all they came to be, according 
4 musiL, 1995, p. 53.
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to respective ideological dispositions, either places of divergence and disorder, 
misery, and immorality, or a terrain of utopian prospect, the forthcoming social 
basis of interwar Red Vienna.5  
On the other hand, the suburbs and outskirts had always been present as a 
central trope of a popular discourse about the essence of Viennese nature. They 
had been present in traditional popular songs (Wienerlied) and above all in an 
oral canon of legends and myths. There were rumors about extensive and vio-
lent hunger revolts, about a dissipated, lustful joie de vivre even under the most 
miserable living conditions, about frightening and simultaneously idolized juve-
nile gangs, about grand gangsters or small-time crooks posing as social rebels, 
supported without reservation by their local neighborhoods. There are numerous 
reports of the legendary lower class soirees of the washer-girls, the so-called 
ʻfreakers’ ballsʻ (Lumpenbälle), notorious orgiastic feasts at run-down pubs and 
low dives. And we are told about self-contained territories of insubordination, 
which were not to be disciplined by any political and social regime whatsoever.
To decipher and decode these popular myths or, to be more precise, to deci-
pher their marginalization by contemporary as well as retrospective elitist cul-
tural discourses, turns out to be an intriguing perspective. This becomes even 
more fascinating if we take into account one specific feature of Vienna’s urban 
form; poverty and social squalor is, and always has been, hidden behind a facade 
of impressive beauty that suggests a homogenous urban body inspired by the 
classical architectural standards of the Ringstraße. Judged by their outer ap-
pearance, the proletarian tenement blocks of the suburbs were (and are) indeed 
magnificent buildings, in some cases hardly second to the famous palaces along 
the Ringstraße. Thus they did not constitute an obvious contrast to the center, 
but rather obscured a characteristic double-folded social and spatial segregation. 
The Vienna topography unfolded along a concentric pattern by which inner and 
outer suburbs were clustered around the center according to their respective 
social status. The actual demarcations were not defined as clearly by architec-
tural or aesthetic differences, but by the social signification of urban territories. 
Cultural practices, as much as material urban forms, served to locate different 
social classes and determine the divergent perceptions and appropriations of 
the urban terrain as well as the extent of communication or separation between 
these classes.
Against this background it seems promising to focus on the outskirts of Vi-
enna 1900.  The ‘Other’ of suburban culture manifests itself in the popular land-
5 Cf. maDertHaner/musner, 1999(1); Horak et al., 2000; Horak et al. 2001; 
maDertHaner/musner, 2008.
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scapes of pleasure (such as the Prater or the Neulerchenfeld), in beer gardens, 
saloons, and other sites of indulgence. It becomes manifest in the urban no-
man’s-land of small crime, gangs, and prostitution – a no-man’s-land that does 
not only signify social and cultural deviance, but is indeed part of a more com-
prehensive life-worldly spectrum of suburbia. This spectrum combines misera-
ble living conditions with strategies of material and ideal survival, industrial and 
disciplined work with punctual, short-lived dropouts, and rebelliously veiled 
criminality with politically articulated insubordination. The tensions inscribed 
in the town body between high and popular culture, hegemony and social dif-
ference, mass identity prescribed, and the disobedience of these very masses, 
are key for developing an understanding for the modern metropolis. To decipher 
these concepts means attempting to read the metropolis as a social text.
III
In approaching the literary artifacts of high Viennese modernism as a starting 
point for such a reading, it soon becomes clear that the misery and scantiness 
of proletarian, suburban life is neither noticed nor reflected upon, very much in 
contrast to the literary production in comparable modern metropolises. In this 
respect Arthur Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle can be taken as a paradigm. The pro-
tagonist undertakes a nightly, mysterious trip to a noble villa situated on the out-
skirts of the city, where members of the nobility meet in masks for erotic trysts.6 
The track of his coach leads along the Alserstrasse next to the center and heads 
for an elegant villa at the edge of the forest.  Between these lies a terra incogni-
ta: the proletarian quarter of Ottakring. Schnitzler comments on Ottakring with 
only one laconic sentence: “They drove along the Alserstrasse, then underneath 
a viaduct towards the suburbs and on through badly-lit small side-lanes.”7  
We can detect from Schnitzler’s fictions of the urban – and this is the case 
with an overwhelming majority of his contemporary writers – an urban segrega-
tion of territories intimate and territories forbidden. The mental maps underly-
ing those fictions seem to have constituted an imaginaire of the urban that was 
not only characteristic for the authors but for middle-class patterns of perception 
as a whole. The other Vienna of the poor and downgraded proletarians, day 
laborers, servants, and outcasts was obviously beyond that perception and re-
6 Stanley Kubrik, by the way, transferred this framework into the New York of the 
late twentieth century for his last movie Eyes Wide Shut.
7 sCHnitzLer, 1992, p. 39.
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moved from the world it created. Notions oriented along the standards of courtly 
and bourgeois culture definitively excluded the suburbs from city life, constru-
ing them merely as places best avoided: places of crime, indecency, deviance, 
and unpredictability. It was left to the new genre of urban reportage by figures 
such as Emil Kläger8 or Max Winter9 to take the minutes of outcast Vienna, thus 
introducing it to public awareness.
In those records, or in the literary artifacts of writers for whom the outskirts 
formed the background of a personal experience as a migrant or social outsid-
er, the magnificent Middle-European metropolis is portrayed as a broken and 
distorted urban space. Ivan Cankar, nowadays generally deemed the founder 
of modern Slovenian literature, lived in Ottakring during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. This bohemian and boozer without means found accommo-
dation at the flat of a seamstress, and made his suburban everyday experience 
the substance of his novels and short stories. We could not conceive of a greater 
contrast than that of Cankar’s world to the splendor and shine of the inner city. 
Cankar’s suburbia is a world of darkness and dirt, a dungeon that cannot be es-
caped from, as depicted in his 1900 short story Mimi:
“The heavenly sun never shines here. There is smoke from the industrial 
plants around the roofs and if you stroll along the lanes, soot will fall into 
your face. The tenement blocks are high and boring; the people you meet are 
badly dressed, with hollow cheeks, their glances expressing discontent. This 
dreary suburb is extending over a huge area, no end to the east, no end to the 
west. I knew a man with a gray beard and a crooked back that had not once 
in his life reached the end of that seemingly endless street that leads into a 
world more lucid. The suburbs are a gigantic penitentiary; not one single free 
man does live there. Every now and then I was reflecting on what crimes 
these prisoners had committed. One morning I was crossing that street and 
watched them coming up in long rows, with heavy, tired steps and sleepy 
eyes; I thought I could hear iron chains jangling under their clothes. They 
got lost in large, gray buildings without windows, and the doors were heavily 
closing behind them...”10
Cankar’s emphatic and personally affected view is paralleled very specifically 
by the social text inscribed onto suburbia by the medical, distanced, objectified 
8 Cf. kLäGer, 1908.
9 Cf. Winter, 1925; ibiD., 1905(1); ibiD., 1905(2).
10 Cankar, 1995, p. 7-8.
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diagnosis of the municipal government. Thus given expression, the instrumen-
tality of the Modern takes minutes of a total archeology of desperate housing 
and living conditions, social deviance, and pathology. Victor Adler first directed, 
in a very spectacular way, attention to those conditions. In December 1888 Adler 
published the results of hidden inquiries he had undertaken at the grounds of the 
Wienerberger brickworks.11 The series of articles under the title The Situation of 
the Brick Layers in his weekly “Equality” (Gleichheit) came as a sensation and a 
scandal. It disclosed a genuine glance into a hitherto inconceivable social abyss 
and revealed a counter-world: the hidden, filthy, other side of the fin de siècle 
coin, the ousted, repressed, forgotten ‘Other’ of a widely praised metropolis, a 
world of exploitation, estrangement, and dulling apathy.
Adler reported on the “poorest slaves the sun has ever shed its light upon”. 
Tied to a complex system of hierarchies and dependencies, bricklayers were to-
tally subject to the Company and a carefully conceived truck system. Their sala-
ries, scandalously low to begin with, were not paid in ‘normal money’ but given 
out in the form of metal coupons. These coupons were accepted as a means of 
payment exclusively by the canteen keepers of the Company. The quality of 
the goods offered was poor, the prices excessively high, and each worker was 
assigned to one of the canteen keepers as an object of exploitation.  “Well aware 
of his power”, Adler wrote, “such a keeper responded to a complaining worker: 
‘Even if I was going to shit into your dishes you ought to eat it up.’ And the guy 
is right, they would have to.”
While the workers were forbidden to purchase anything outside the works 
premises, they were nonetheless allowed to beg. Adler writes about hordes of 
people who would set upon the nearby Inzersdorfer cannery every evening, 
scrounging for waste products.  Whoever could arrange it undertook a one-and-
a-half hour walk to get hold of one of the eighty portions of vegetable soup the 
hangman of Vienna distributed daily: “There is more mercy with the hangman 
than with the Company and its paid slave-drivers.”
As if this weren’t enough, the bricklayers were forced to live on the premis-
es. Up to ten families lived in every single room of the workers’ houses, “men, 
women, children wildly mixed up”. There were so-called sleeping halls for oth-
ers, where fifty to seventy persons would be herded together on old straw, body 
next to body. In one of these halls a woman gave birth to her child “in the pres-
ence of fifty half-naked, dirty men. We should not talk about modesty, however, 
11 ParteiVorstanD Der soziaLDem okratisCHen arbeiterPartei DeutsCHöster- 
reiCHs, vol. 4, 1925, p. 11-35. The citations following are taken from the first article 
published in Gleichheit 49 (1888).
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as this is a luxury reserved for property owners only. The life of a mother is ac-
tually threatened under those circumstances. But who cares about a poor broad.” 
The main factory grounds at the Laerberg were even more distinguished in that 
respect. Whole bunches of mainly single workers had to sleep on top of the huge 
industrial brick ovens, partly exposed to the night freeze, partly almost burnt 
from below, and covered only meagerly by filthy rags. The prisoners in Siberia, 
Adler summed up, were better off than these poor sods whose only crime was to 
work for the profits of the Company.
Adler’s sensational revelations led to an epilogue in Parliament without any 
consequences, while his journal Gleichheit was confiscated and Adler himself 
was fined for non-licensed distribution of a periodical. Yet he was to produce 
further sensational pieces of investigative journalism. For his most important 
one, an April 1889 article on the living and working conditions of the tramway 
drivers, he was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment.12 
IV
In spite of these revealing indicators it would be misleading to regard the urban 
periphery and the suburbs only as zones of enduring misery or as mere func-
tion of the new and rigid industrial paradigm of production. Such a view would 
ignore essential dimensions of the social and cultural configurations of these 
areas. The following two scenarios elaborate suburban life-worlds and contexts 
as emblematic examples of social contradiction and cultural antagonism.
On September 17, 1911 a hunger revolt took place in the proletarian dis-
trict of Ottakring. Entire quarters and most houses, windows, and streetlamps 
were damaged.  A state of emergency was proclaimed, barricades were erect-
ed, streetcars were burned, and street fights with rapidly deployed army units 
took place. Young men and women, central agents of this revolt, seized and 
devastated school buildings and set fire to books and papers. For the first time 
since the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 army units fired on the civilian pop-
ulation, killing four, and the sub-proletariat looted shops and pubs. The young 
Austro-Marxist librarian of Parliament, to later become chancellor and president 
of the Austrian Republic, Karl Renner, stated that the most desperate, alienated, 
and seedy people had left their homes to demonstrate and thereby to protest the 
conditions held in place by the social order.13 
12 Cf. brauntHaL, 1965, p. 59-64.
13 Cf. renner, 1911, p.1-4.
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The Vienna Police Department stated in its report that the police units were 
unable to stop devastation and pillage since the looters and plunderers were 
anywhere and nowhere and disappeared quickly when confronted by force. Ac-
cording to the department it would have taken all army units stationed in Vienna 
in order to secure public order and to control the undisciplined crowds in the 
streets. It took many hours to restore order due to the fact that the revolting 
crowds were supported and egged on by large segments of the civilian popula-
tion. From windows and houses stones, glasses, iron pieces and the like were 
thrown at police and army units.14 On the side of the young mob, women and 
mothers, whose objective according to the “Workers’ Daily” (Arbeiterzeitung) 
should have been to think clearly and rigorously, took part in street fighting and 
provided the young mob with stones.15 
This short day of anarchy stood for more than the harsh political economy of 
suburban life and more than a battle about power and the hegemony over public 
space. The “grotesque” character of the hunger revolt, frequently diagnosed by 
police and media reports, refers to a cultural articulation of difference and antag-
onism. Those crowds were not only composed of the old urban underclass but 
also of the many new migrants who brought with them their desire for a better 
life in the city – something not to be fulfilled in the contemporary urban context 
of devastating work and poor consumption. 
These migrants had left their oral, pre-modern, and rural cultures of origin 
in order to find a new perspective and better life chances in the metropolis. Still 
mentally attached to an imaginary village of the past, they searched for a home 
in a different urban geography that was increasingly linearly and fragmentarily 
configured by technology, science, and rational conduct. Pushed towards the 
social margins, they were unable to find a new habitat but ended up in poverty 
and collective alienation. The seemingly irrational and grotesque character of 
the hunger revolt and the anarchic strength of its violence, however, reveal an 
obscure, ambivalent logic and rationality of its own: A largely hopeless venture 
to call into question the new symbolic order of modernity, modernization, and 
the metropolis.16
One-and-a-half years after the hunger revolt the same crowd showed up in 
the same Ottakring location but expressed itself in a different way: disciplined 
and with dignity. But before examining this outstanding event yet to come, a 
14 Cf. austrian state arCHiVes/österreiCHisCHes staatsarCHiV, Ministerium 
des Inneren, Präsidium, 9798, 19.09.1911.
15 Cf. arbeiter-zeitunG, 19.09.1911, p. 2.
16 Cf. maDertHaner/musner, 1999(1), p. 34-37.
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short excursion into the urban development of this proletarian district might 
be useful. During the so-called Gründerzeit in the 1860s and its capitalist re-
structuring, the preindustrial villages of Ottakring were turned into industrial 
suburbs, and a ‘hard texture’ of factories and tenement blocks, of traffic and 
communication lines was imposed, thereby rationalizing and disciplining every-
day life. In parallel, the suburb became a projection screen of power in which 
economic interests blended with fantasies about the alien ‘Other’. The specula-
tive building boom as well as a massive influx of migrants condensed the sub-
urbs into zones of extreme social and spatial density. While the facades of the 
hastily built tenements imitated the neo-baroque architecture of the center, their 
interior was characterized by pure capitalist rationality of minimal space shelter-
ing a maximum of tenants. In his 1894 investigation of housing conditions in the 
Viennese suburbs, the famous Austrian social reformer Eugen von Philippovich 
concluded that tenants live under spatial circumstances which do not even meet 
the basic standards of army barracks.17 
A prototypical example of the capitalist mode of suburban urban develop-
ment was the so-called Schmelz, a former army training ground. In one of the 
most spectacular undertakings in Vienna’s architectural history, the northern 
part of it was turned into a drawing-board structure of ‘Americanized’ urban 
housing characterized by standardized tenement blocks. In spite of the fact that 
this urban no-man’s-land appeared like a final disposal site of the low classes, 
it became the location of the largest mass demonstration ever held in Vienna. 
This happened on the occasion of Franz Schuhmeier’s funeral on February 16, 
1913. Schuhmeier, a popular leader of the workers’ movement, had been assas-
sinated shortly before. The social-democratic workers’ party had mobilized its 
already significant organizational apparatus, which covered all the suburbs, but 
the turnout surpassed all expectations and was to prove almost uncontrollable. 
Nearly half-a-million people came, literally every fourth inhabitant of Vienna. 
The funeral service assembled high-ranking representatives of the political, bu-
reaucratic, military, and diplomatic elite. A large choir, composed of court opera 
and workers’ singers, intoned Franz von Suppe’s Ruhe, Müder Wanderer when 
the coffin was closed, and the end of the service was marked by Richard Wag-
ner’s pilgrim chorus of Tannhäuser. A horse-drawn carriage and horsemen in 
old Spanish costume brought the corpse to its final place of rest, where tens of 
thousands of mourners covered the grave with a sea of red carnations.  
This grandiose funeral was no accident since Franz Schuhmeier was not only 
the most popular social democrat in Vienna at the turn of the century, but also a 
17 Cf. feLDbauer, 1977.
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mass politician of the new style, an agitator as talented as he was populist and 
a stirring speaker; a man of the people who had risen from the poorest back-
ground into the highest levels of politics. Unlike any before him, Schuhmeier 
had managed to lead the politically and socially deprived of the suburbs out of 
their isolation to form an organized, politically aware, and thus identity-shaping 
mass movement. With this funeral it was not only a hero of the people who was 
paid homage according to tradition, the people in their new social organization 
and political expression turned into a public force. The funeral thus became the 
exposition of a political counterculture, which opposed the dominance of the 
petty-bourgeois radicalism that the Christian-Social mayor Karl Lueger had two 
decades before formed into the dominant local political force and brought to 
municipal power.18
Lueger’s great political achievement at the time was the creation of an an-
ti-liberal middle-class bloc which reunited the groups that had been split follow-
ing the Revolution of 1848, the petty bourgeois on one hand and the wealthy 
middle classes on the other, into a clerical, antisocialist and anti-Semitic citi-
zens’ group.19 Lueger was to prove to be a master of rewriting political history. 
He created the idea of the true, authentic Viennese as a new phenomenon in 
political life and thus gave the city its own new tradition. He cast the ostensibly 
true and real Vienna of the lower middle class as opposite to the experience of 
alienation and the working-world shock of modernity. Lueger created a patri-
archal image of Vienna as a Vaterstadt, an imagined community of the petite 
bourgeoisie. Therein he forged an image of the capital city as the paragon of a 
pre-industrial, middle class, familial, and ‘evangelized’ city based on authority, 
paternalism, patrimony, and Christian-Catholic values. Lueger recognized in 
Schuhmeier a worthy opponent, his congenial popular counterpart. Their clash-
es in the municipal council were legendary. With both, repartee, wit, sarcasm, 
and scorn could suddenly turn into profound enmity. But their shouting matches 
and invectives just as often ended in theatrical gestures of reconciliation, and in 
such cases Lueger especially would always allude to the Vienna-ness so innately 
a part of the both of them. 
Franz Schuhmeier and Karl Lueger, both literally “children of the suburbs”, 
were prototypical exponents, actors and at the same time directors of a period of 
transition that followed the end of the liberal era in Vienna and of the reforma-
tion of political power relations. The period between 1890 and 1910 initiated the 
politics of the masses, reacting to the unfulfilled social promises of liberalism 
18 Cf. maDertHaner/musner, 1999(1), p. 176 - 208.
19 Cf. sCHorske, 1981, p. 116.
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and at the same time signaling its end. Though social democracy, by creating 
a modern mass party, successfully managed to take up the unfulfilled political 
agenda of liberalism, it was largely excluded, on account of a municipal elec-
toral law in force until 1919, from any real political influence in the city. Lueger 
and his party of Christian Socials, however, destroyed the political power of the 
liberals, primarily via their “municipalization” (Verstadtlichung) projects and by 
building up a loyal power-base among the municipal civil servants, while leav-
ing the social and political structures intact. Lueger enthroned the lower-mid-
dle-class citizen as the new political ruler on a local level; in place of liberal 
ideology, his own ideas became the basis for a policy agenda.20
Social democracy as a mass movement, by contrast, was restricted to pro-
claiming the city as the site of a different future politics, a different society, and 
a different culture. In this way it developed the idea of a utopia of equality, one 
that was to take on concrete form after World War I in Red Vienna. Lueger, by 
contrast, relied on a policy of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Instead of ad-
dressing the welfare of the city as a whole, he reinforced social tensions and 
divisions. His policy was one of ‘evangelizing’ the poor and excluding those 
who had recently migrated to the city. If Franz Schuhmeier also played on an 
anti-Semitic resentment that was already deeply embedded in the attitudes of all 
the various social groups comprising Viennese society at the turn of the century, 
this remained fundamentally distinct from Lueger’s outright hatred of Jews.21 
Lueger’s marginalization and defamation of Jews as a group was aimed at 
covering up the problems inherited from liberalism and making the social ten-
sions it had left behind the basis for a xenophobic populism. In this way, his 
anti-Semitism became not only an instrument of mass mobilization but also an 
integral component of a new kind of political culture, one that incited the masses 
against the old elites, and the integrated against the outsiders. Schuhmeier and 
the social democrats, by contrast, made the social tensions and contradictions 
their point of departure; overcoming them became the basis of their political 
agenda. Lueger used the ‘Others’, Jews and foreigners as outsiders, to satisfy 
symbolically the disparate interests of his clientele and thus to remain in power. 
The social democrats aimed at integration in order to come to power and to cre-
ate, via an alliance of the working class and the assimilated intellectual Jewish 
community, a social order in which both would be citizens instead of outsiders, 
in the center instead of on the periphery. Yet, however different these new forms 
20 Cf. boyer, 1995, p. 236, 154.
21 Cf. PuLzer, 1988; PoLLak, 1997.
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of mass politics were articulated, in their collective dimension they reflected 
Robert Musil’s common breath. 
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Revisiting Campbell Bunk
Jerry WHite
Campbell Bunk – more properly Campbell Road in the North London borough 
of Islington – was an unlikely slum.1 It was, when laid out from the 1850s, a sub-
urban street of 100-or so quite substantial houses on three floors, designed for 
respectable clerks and not the poor. Even in the 1920s and 1930s, the interwar 
years of which I made a detailed study, Campbell Bunk was an atypical slum in 
spacial terms. The worst run-down housing in London being cleared as slums 
in those years were mainly two- or even one-storey dwellings built in courts or 
alleys and tucked behind the main streets of old London, in the ancient districts 
of Holborn, Finsbury, Stepney and Southwark, all close to the original City of 
London. They were narrow, congested, largely hidden from view. But Campbell 
Bunk was a long wide street that opened off one of London’s main cross-routes 
and close to the busy suburban transport interchange of Finsbury Park railway 
and tube station. On either side and all around were respectable working-class 
streets which in general were not poor. Yet here it was, the most notorious street 
in this densely-populated segment of north London and wide open to the public 
gaze. But slum it was by any definition. It was  one of just eighteen or so streets 
in the whole metropolis coloured entirely black – its population cast as ‘semi-
criminal and degraded’ – in the poverty maps drawn up by the London School 
of Economics around 1930. It had also been coloured entirely black in Charles 
Booth’s poverty maps of forty years earlier.
It was, then, an unlikely slum. And it had become one by an accident of his-
tory, or rather a conjunction of accidents. Its development had been stunted from 
birth. Not all its building plots were sold in the initial speculation of 1857-8; the 
1 Cf. WHite, 2003. This was first published as The Worst Street in North London: 
Campbell Bunk, Islington, Between the Wars, London, 1986. All page references 
here are to the 2003 edition.
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local market for new houses was glutted, so building did not begin until 1865; 
six years on and the road was still unmade and only half-built on; not all the 
empty spaces would be filled with houses until the early 1880s, some eighteen 
years or so after building began. Mud and filth on the ground caused rents to fall 
and the clerks to leave. Their place was taken by chimney sweeps, general dea-
lers, street sellers, porters and building labourers. The neighbourhood’ s rough 
boys and men gambled in the empty spaces. And in 1880 came the fatal tipping 
point. A large house on the street’s middle junction, intended to become a public 
house, couldn’t get a magistrates’ licence and was instead converted to a com-
mon lodging house for ninety men. The shiftless homeless poor of London had 
been introduced to Campbell Bunk. Other houses soon followed suit. Within a 
decade there were more common lodging house beds in Campbell Road than 
any other street in Islington.
So Campbell Bunk’s reputation was established by the 1890s. This is how 
Charles Booth, who uniquely accorded the street three pages in Life and Labour 
of the People in London, described it at that time: 
“A street fairly broad, with houses of three storeys, not ill-built, many being 
occupied as common lodging-houses; broken windows, dirty curtains, doors 
open, a litter of paper, old meat tins, heads of fish and stalks of vegetables. 
It is a street where thieves and prostitutes congregate. The thieves live in the 
common lodging-houses, paying fourpence a night, and the prostitutes, gene-
rally two together, in a single furnished room, which they rent at four or five 
shillings a week. They are the lowest class of back-street prostitute, and an 
hour or two after midnight they may be seen returning home.”2
A few years later and a local sanitary inspector vented his feelings about the 
street in a report to Islington Council: 
“This road is the king of all roads. I have been in practically all the slums 
in London; Notting Hill, Chelsea, Battersea, Fulham, Nine Elms, and also 
the East End, but there is nothing so lively as this road. Thieves, Prostitu-
tes, cripples, Blind People, Hawkers of all sorts of wares from boot laces to 
watches and chains are to be found in this road, Pugilists, Card Sharpers, 
Counter Jumpers, Purse Snatchers, street singers, and Gamblers of all kinds, 
and things they call men who live on the earnings of women, some of whom 
I saw outside the Town Hall with the unemployed last week. I could say a lot 
2 Cited in WHite, 2003, p. 23f.
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more about this road, but I think I have said enough to prove to you the class 
of people who inhabit it. Of course, there are a few who perhaps get an honest 
living, but they want a lot of picking-out.”3
That was written in 1909, and I was myself a sanitary inspector for Islington 
Council some sixty years after my predecessor wrote these words. My job title 
had changed by 1970 to public health inspector, but the work was pretty much 
the same. And although Campbell Bunk had been demolished fifteen years befo-
re, its reputation was hardly less vivid than it had been. Indeed, I kept on hearing 
stories about it and by the end of the 1970s I had determined to investigate its 
story further by talking to people who had lived there. By this time I had got into 
the press my first book, an oral history of a Jewish East End tenement block4 – a 
different sort of ghetto we might call that – so I was experienced enough with a 
tape recorder and reasonably adept at finding people to talk to. I wrote an article 
in “History Workshop Journal” on what I called this ‘lumpen community’ and 
thought I’d disposed of the Bunk.5 In fact I hadn’t. The place continued to haunt 
me. And despite not wanting to write another book about another tiny sliver of 
London, I spent in all some eight years trying to tease out the many contradic-
tions of this extraordinary place. Central among them, to my mind, was this: 
Campbell Bunk was a close community where people would steal from one 
another, and was in numerous other ways at war with itself, as well as at war 
with the world beyond it.
The book was published twenty-six years ago, and was finished a year or 
more before that. Since then, of course, our terminology and explanatory frame-
works have shifted. I don’t recall that ‘social exclusion’ was much used, if at all, 
at the time. Had it been, then I believe “Campbell Bunk” would have provided 
insights into the contradictory mechanisms involved in the social exclusion pro-
cess, and I’ll come back to this point in a moment. The ‘underclass’ was written 
about at the time, but it’s an unsatisfactory term, I think, and I didn’t use it: it 
seems to describe a social formation too inert, too removed from possibilities 
of change, too far isolated from the shifting dynamics of economic opportunity 
and class relations, to be a useful descriptor of social reality. Marxism was a far 
more popular theoretical tool for social historians then than now, and I myself 
began from a ‘base and superstructure’ model of change in Campbell Bunk. In 
the event I found it incomplete and unsatisfying when trying to comprehend a 
3 Cited in ibiD., p. 25.
4 ibiD., 1980.
5 ibiD., 1979.
Jerry White
138
‘whole society’ or ‘total way of life’, and I needed the introduction of gender ful-
ly to explain the street’s history. The cultural or linguistic turn, I confess, passed 
me by at the time – and so have the re-turns and about-turns since then. I remain 
an unrepentantly old-fashioned social historian.
So looking back, revisiting Campbell Bunk as it were after twenty-six years 
away, what do I find?
First, it has to be said that in many ways, of course, this really was a socially 
excluded space and culture. But the picture of social exclusion we find there is 
complex and contingent, as perhaps all historical reality proves to be. 
Certainly, though, Campbell Bunk actively set itself apart from – turned its 
back on - contemporary London in a number of ways. 
It was, for instance, distinctively in-bred, with longterm traditions of settle-
ment that were quite unusual. Many families in the street in the 1930s could 
trace their residence there back to the 1890s and before. Kinship patterns were 
frequently extensive – one man I spoke to could count more than forty relatives 
in a street of a hundred or so houses (about a thousand people). It was more fre-
quent for young men and women to marry fellow-Bunkites than was the case in 
neighbouring streets. And longterm settlements and kinship were reinforced by 
the street’s traditional connection with gypsies, which seems to have developed 
by the 1880s. This was an element in Bunk culture that strengthened a tendency 
to economic independence outside wage labour that I found to be a culturally 
distinctive, almost a defining, component of the Bunk’s separateness. I wrote 
that
There is no documentary evidence for a gypsy connection with Campbell 
Road, but the oral tradition is overwhelming (although not shared by the street 
as a whole). A gypsy – or ‘pikie’ in cockney slang – pedigree was claimed by 
Harry James and for a number of other families. There were the Brothertons, 
who moved into the street some time in the 1920s; Dolly Mills and his family 
put up in Campbell Road whenever they were in the neighbourhood; Gypsy 
Jack Hobbs sold manure from a horse and cart and later married a girl from the 
street; Liza Harmer and Mrs Knowles, the street sellers, both had ‘Romaner’ or 
‘pikie’ backgrounds.
The James family was headed by George, known as Dido. He was a tinker, 
repairing cane chairs and mats and sharpening scissors, knives, lawnmowers 
and so on from a richly-decorated barrow which he pushed over the streets of 
North London. He once fought Ernie Barnes, another knife grinder with a simi-
lar heritage, for the title of Campbell Road’s ‘King of the Pikies’. He went to 
Barnet Fair every September, a gathering place for gypsies, and he was said to 
have some sort of title to land there. He taught his son words which were not 
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even in the varied London underworld cant of the 1930s – words like ‘jas’ for 
go, ‘yog’ for fire, ‘chokkors’ for boots. And at least two of his boys never took to 
work, becoming professional thieves until after the Second World War.6
If this independent economic element was defining, there were numerous 
other cultural components that separated Campbell Bunk from its neighbours. 
Its pleasures, for instance, had a rough component about them that had gone out 
of fashion in working-class London even before the First World War. It retained 
a culture of heavy drinking and drunkenness among men and older women, in 
part no doubt an antidote to the foul, crowded and verminous living conditions 
there. Its collective male pleasures were dominated by illegal street gambling 
with dice and coins. There was a passion for fighting. Some men were terrors, 
to their neighbours and to others, but most men seem to have resorted to fists or 
worse on the slightest provocation. This rubbed off on many Bunk women and 
girls, some urged by their parents to settle their differences with violence. Vio-
lence, illegal pastimes and the way in which many people from the road made 
their living in the streets as costermongers, hawkers, scrap-metal dealers and so 
on, brought many Bunk dwellers into a sharp and brutal collective antagonism 
with the police. And that again was distinctively different from most working-
class streets in Islington.
But apart from setting itself apart, it was also cast out, excluded by contem-
porary London. Take poverty. Not everyone in Campbell Bunk was poor, for 
its thieves, prostitutes, dealers and rent collectors could make a good return, if 
only for short and irregular periods; and there were always wage-earners in the 
local economy who kept well above the poverty line. But the depth of poverty 
in Campbell Bunk in the 1920s, at least, was sometimes at pre-war, almost Vic-
torian levels. It became a reservoir, perhaps a sanctuary, for the very poorest in 
interwar North London. Here are some instances.
John Morley, 11 years old, was arrested for begging in November 1919. He 
had chronic conjunctivitis, ‘fassy’ eye or sticky eye, common enough in Camp-
bell Road. “He was in a filthy condition. It was a cold, wet day and he has no 
shirt. When food was offered to him he ate it ravenously.” Daisy Booth, 19 years 
old in 1925, and prosecuted for theft, had a baby to keep: “They were practically 
starving and without money […]. ‘I had no milk and no fire at home, and not a 
penny coming in.’” When a Campbell Road painter was convicted of stealing 
milk from a doorstep in February 1932, the Court Missionary “said there was 
no doubt [his] child was hungry.” A police report in May 1933 on a 31-year-old 
labourer found he “had no food in the house beyond a little bread.” “See, we 
6 Cf. ibiD., 2003, p. 55f.
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was like animals, we was like animals at home, all of us hungry […]. I used to 
sit eating cabbage stalks cos I was that hungry,” recalled Ronnie and Marjie 
Drover from number 25. And Mavis Knight’s mother suffered from psoriasis, 
rheumatoid arthritis and chronic under-feeding: “She has to wear dark glasses 
cos her eyes was so affected by the malnutrition.”7 
“I’ve been to school many times with women’s shoes on, and women’s sto-
ckings tied up in a knot there [for socks],” and so did other boys from Campbell 
Road. “No kids went to school in long trousers in them days,” recalled Walter 
Spencer. “But they did from the Bunk because they were men’s trousers cut 
down with your arse hanging down.”8 Walter and his two brothers slept on a 
wooden platform with a flock overlay as a mattress, built into the tiny attic at 86 
Campbell Road. The makeshift bed was covered with war-surplus blankets and 
their Uncle Charlie’s army greatcoat. There was a paraffin lamp on the wall, and 
the room was just big enough for the bed and little else:
“And I remember up there Christmas time. One particular Christmas […] we 
used to hang our stockings over for Christmas […]. I remember this particular 
year – my brother remembers it, never forgot it. We woke up – I felt mine. 
‘Oh’, I said, ‘we’re alright […] we got some ink ‘ere!’ Cos it felt […] hard, like. 
We used to have orange a penny, and a few nuts and that. I thought ‘Oh it’s all 
right, we got something,’ cos the old man had had a bad year, that Christmas. 
Oh, when we got up, you know, it was light in the morning, never looked at it 
until the morning, never forget: it was cinders out the grate and hard bread. 
And my brother ate that bloody bread! He really ate it – he was crunching it.”9  
                                             
The very reputation of the Bunk conspired to keep its residents poor and con-
spired to exclude them from contemporary London, to some degree at least. 
Labelling or stigmatization of the street and its residents in the local press, in 
the police courts and by word of mouth – the myths and exaggerations that 
persisted long enough after the street’s demise to make me interested in it in the 
first place – directly affected the life-chances of the people living there. They 
could, indeed, be excluded from the labour market by employers for whom a 
Campbell-Road address was sufficient to mark out a boy as a thief and a girl as 
something worse. Perhaps the fear of discrimination was more pervasive than 
discrimination itself. For example it was said that the Ever Ready battery factory 
7 ibiD., p. 71.
8 ibiD., p. 71f.
9 ibiD.
Revisiting Campbell Bunk
141
in Fonthill Road would not take girls from Campbell Road, but it sometimes 
did. Yet there was no doubt that discrimination was felt to be real, and that it 
was experienced as a direct and personal rejection by the labour market. “I have 
written for hundreds of jobs,” complained ‘A British Legionite (an ex-service-
man) to the local newspaper in 1922, “and when I mention Campbell Road it is 
all up, simply because the street has been given a bad name.” Another wrote “I 
lived there five years [and] I could never obtain a berth from there. People said 
to me, you will never get anything while you live there […]. It is like dynamite 
to mention the road. Why don’t you alter the name? I wish, from the bottom of 
my heart, I had never known of its existence.”10 
The street’s name was indeed changed from Campbell Road in 1938, to 
Whadcoat Street. There were, though, ways of avoiding the stigma: one youth 
from number 52 – on the Paddington Street corner – always gave his address 
as 52 Paddington Street. And in 1924, a charwoman convicted of theft from 
an employer was said by the police to have “lived in Campbell Road but gave 
another address.”11
These then were the traditional ‘ghetto’ elements, as we might call them, 
which distinctively isolated – socially excluded - Campbell Bunk from all 
around it. Yet, and this cannot be stressed too highly, these ghetto walls were 
porous. The outside influences on the street were numerous, especially in the 
lives of its young people – school, of course, but also the various clubs for boys 
and girls run by the missions and working-men’s clubs that had Campbell Bunk 
as their primary focus. Though the street’s housing market attracted only the 
poor, there were many newcomers to the street, residents who came and went 
and sometimes settled for lengthy periods; they brought connections with other 
parts of London and no doubt spoke of different ways of doing things. 
Even more important, these connections with London, even with a wider 
world, were strengthened by the expanding cultural life of the metropolis in the 
1920s and ‘30s, and by a growing culture of working-class consumerism. We 
might mention, for instance, the influence of the cinema. Cinema penetrated 
everywhere, even to Campbell Bunk. From this new cultural element of talking 
pictures, with all its baneful influences according to contemporary puritans, and 
all its richness of new associations and thrills for the young people of Campbell 
Bunk, some could weave a fantasy world that the old London music-halls had 
never offered. It was noted in 1934 how, in Islington’s ‘most notorious café’, 
the conversation was mostly in American accents. Nearly every girl there was 
10 ibiD., p. 51.
11 ibiD.
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acting a “hard-boiled Kate” role. Nearly every youth, with a very long overcoat 
and a round black hat on the rear of his head, was to himself a “Chicago nut”.’12
The connections with contemporary London, and the road out of a socially 
excluded Campbell Bunk, was strengthened most of all by changes in the labour 
market. Despite the Great Depression and the Crash of 1929, and despite the 
economic distress common to many parts of industrial Britain, demand for con-
sumer durables in London was fuelled by the suburban growth of the 1920s and 
the building boom of the decade to come. London prospered, and the demand 
for factory labour seemed inexhaustible. The demand was strongest for girl la-
bour. Even the girls of Campbell Bunk were invited to find work at the factory 
bench. And never had there been so many things to spend their earnings on.
It was this dynamic world opening up for young women in Campbell Bunk 
that sowed the seeds of the street’s dissolution during the interwar period, a ge-
neration before the bulldozers moved in. It was not an easy process. For the new 
world opening up for young women in Campbell Bunk was frequently viewed 
with anger and jealousy by their mothers. Something like an inter-generational 
struggle took place between mothers left behind in the slum and their daughters 
trying to make their way out. In true Campbell Bunk fashion it could be accom-
panied by threats, bullying, theft and violence. We have room for only a couple 
of instances to stand in for many. 
The twenty-year old May Purslowe worked at a North London sweet fac-
tory in the early 1920s. Her mother was a hard-drinking charwoman or casual 
domestic servant, and the family lived in two rooms in Campbell Road, where 
three girls shared one bed and May’s mother and young brother shared another. 
Rows soon began over how much May should pay her mother for her ‘keep’. 
May and her mother had always been at loggerheads. May, accoding to Mrs 
Purslowe, “had got too much of what the cat licked its arse with.”13 May became 
particularly vocal over how she should be clothed. Mrs Purslowe had taken it on 
herself to clothe May out of the money the girl handed over. But her mother’s 
choice of courier was restricted to totters’ barrows in Campbell Road and the 
Fonthill Road rag shop. Clothes became, for mother and daughter, a fiercely 
contested symbol of independence: 
“And this one particular day I said to her, ‘I’m not giving you all my money, 
I’m gonna buy my own clothes.’ And I went to Chapel Street, Islington mar-
ket, and I bought a velvet skirt and a blouse. And when I came home, washed 
12 Cited in ibiD., p. 166.
13 ibiD., p. 202.
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meself, dressed to go out, she says to me, ‘And where do you think you’re 
going?’ I said, ‘Well, I’m going out.’ So she says, ‘Oh are you?’ And she did 
no more, she tore all these clothes off me. And of course I cried and went 
into me aunt’s which was next door but one, number 31 […] and I said to her, 
‘Mum’s tore all my clothes.’ So she said, ‘Oh, you’d better stay in here then.’ 
And I had to go indoors back again to get me old clothes to put on.”14
May chose a route out of Campbell Road that many other girls took – they found 
a husband as quickly as they could: the mean age of marriage of girls in England 
and Wales in the 1930s was 25 years; in Campbell Road it was 21.2; in the street 
next door, fewer than one in eleven girls (under 9 %) were twenty years old or 
younger when they married; in Campbell Road it was nearly one in three. But 
May found that her mother did not react well to the prospect: 
“First night he took me home I said to him, ‘You don’t want to come down to 
my door,’ I said, ‘because if me mother comes home drunk you’ll be sorry.’ 
So he said, ‘Well, that’s all right,’ he said. So of course, home they come from 
the Duke public house all merry and bright and singing. And when she went 
to come indoors, there was my boyfriend, Bob, standing there with me and 
she says to him, ‘What the effin’ hell are you doing here?’ So he said, ‘Well, 
I’ve brought your daughter home.’ So she said, ‘Well you can effin’ well sling 
yer ‘ook again.’ So that was that. So I said to him, ‘Come on, stand up on the 
corner.’ She said, ‘And you don’t want to stop up there all night else I’ll have a 
bucket of piss poured over yer!’ So that was the wonderful reception he got.”15
May had to creep indoors after she had been out with Bob once in case her 
mother caught her staying out late. And one, when dressed in her finest clothes 
to go with him to the Wood Green Empire, her mother threw a bucket of slops 
over her because May hadn’t done the washing up. But eventually all ended 
happily. In 1922, May and Bob were married at Tottenham, and chose a house 
in respectable Wood Green.
Nancy Tiverton, my second example, had similar experiences a few years 
later, working at a local brush factory. The job itself she found because of her 
dissatisfactions with her appearance, especially how she was clothed. She sen-
sibly decided to keep any new paid job secret from her mother and keep paying 
her the same amount from her previous worse-paid employment:
14 ibiD.
15 ibiD., p. 203.
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“I thought to meself, I don’t know what to do, you know, as I am now I’ll 
never get a rag on me back. I was a disgrace, I was, honest. And it wasn’t my 
fault. So I thought to myself, I know what I’ll do. I won’t tell mum. I’ll go 
after the Christmas holiday, go down the Star Brush, see if I can get on […]. 
So I didn’t say a word to her. I come out as though I was coming to work, and 
down the Star Brush [factory] I went, and got on.”16
Every penny she had went on clothes. Her mother kept a watchful eye on her 
purchases:
“‘How much you pay for that costume?’ So I said, ‘Four guineas.’ So she said, 
‘Oh. How much them boots?’ ‘Twelve and six.’ So she said, ‘Oh.’ They was 
down the pawn shop Monday. She asked that so she knew what to ask for, see? 
Down there Monday.”17
This was not the only one of Mrs Tiverton’s tricks. Nancy’s sister Marjie, four 
years her elder, was courting a print worker from Walthamstow, well-off indeed 
in Campbell Road’s terms. Each time he visited Marjie he’d give young Nancy 
half a crown. But Mrs Tiverton spotted this the first time it happened and clai-
med the money as her own thereafter. She cadged, too, from a Campbell Road 
boy who asked her permission to take Nancy to Finsbury Park Empire:
“So you know what? Before he could take me out my mum say, ‘Lend us half 
a crown, Freddie?’ Nancy  had to hide her money in a makeshift money belt 
tied with string round her waist under her clothes; ‘I kept that secret. If I’d 
told her she would have had it she would.’”18
Marjie left home over her mother’s depredations. Mrs Tiverton had pawned one 
of the rings given her by the Walthamstow fiancé. And Nancy, too, fell unwit-
tingly into a similar trap. Mrs Tiverton provoked a row and told Nancy to go. 
She gave Nancy a parcel of her clothes – “‘Take that with you, you haven’t got 
to come back no more here for that.’”19 But the treasured costume and boots 
were not in the parcel, and Nancy had to go back to her mother for the pawn 
ticket. It cost her some 15s  to redeem her own clothes from the pawnbroker.
16 ibiD., p. 205.
17 ibiD., p. 206.
18 ibiD.
19 ibiD.
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Both these young women turned their backs on Campbell Bunk, and so did 
their sisters, by the end of the 1920s.
If we sum up the picture of social exclusion we find in Campbell Bunk in the 
two decades after the First World War we might characterise it thus. Social ex-
clusion was a traditional element in the street’s make-up and had been for forty 
or fifty years before. It worked both ways, the street’s culture rejecting the local 
economy and the local economy rejecting the people of Campbell Bunk. But 
this was never watertight, and there have been many economic and cultural con-
nections with a wider London that got stronger from the 1920s. The key element 
in weakening social exclusion in Campbell Bunk was, I think, first and foremost 
a combination of economic opportunity and expanding desires affecting young 
girls and drawing them bodily into a more inclusive working-class and metrop-
olitan world. This helped undermine slum culture from the inside, dissolving as 
it were the cement that held the street together; traditional life two decades and 
more before the bulldozers eventually moved in. Finally, if I may, a word on 
the book’s reception. I wrote it very much for myself, to try to understand this 
most extraordinary place as best I could. For a wider audience I had in mind the 
intelligent general reader, even though I’d included a lot of what we might call 
academic baggage. But although I gave a copy to each of the main people I’d 
interviewed I didn’t really think they’d like what I’d done. So I was surprised 
and delighted when old Bunkites told me they’d read it from cover to cover. One 
told me that it had helped him come to terms with his parents’ behaviour that had 
troubled him all his life. And I know that some others treasured the book and felt 
proud that they’d had a hand in it. Even the man – not from the Bunk but well 
known in it and a famous local bookmaker – who told me on publication that he 
would sue me for every penny I had if his reputation were tarnished in any way 
did not need to trouble his solicitors.
There were other surprises. A reunion of Bunkites was arranged at a working 
men’s club in Finsbury Park, and some who hadn’t seen each other for years 
were brought together again. Two plays were made out of material in the book 
and staged in Finsbury Park and Nottingham. And, astonishingly, another book 
with the Bunk as a major theme appeared in 1986. Tom McCarthy, who had 
been born in Campbell Road in 1925 and left in 1986, wrote an autobiography 
called Boysie, brought out by a small publishing firm in Devon.20 Mr McCarthy 
had lived in Newcastle and he and I knew nothing of each other. Our approach 
was very different and it was fascinating to see how this microscope part of 
20 mCCartHy, 1986.
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London could sustain two entirely contrasted narratives. If I remember right, 
episodes from Mr McCarthy’s life found their way into the plays, too.
Nearly thirty years on, it would not be possible any longer to recover through 
oral history this sort of dense study of neighbourhood life in the 1920s and 
1930s. Memories die out so quickly. It is one of the enduring satisfactions of a 
book like this that it creates its own archive of tapes and transcripts, for others 
to listen to and use. And that these recollections were captured before memories 
of life in Campbell Bunk, a representative rough London slum of the first half of 
the twentieth century, had died out forever.
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Creating the City of Delhi  
Stories of Strong Women and Weak Walls
sonJa WenGoborski/JasP aL naVeeL sinGH
1. Introduction
Situated in the Gangetic plain of northern India, Delhi has been of major econo-
mic, military and cultural importance since at least three millennia. In popular 
portrayal Delhi’s history is conceived of as a successive layering of seven, or 
more, cities. In India’s great epic, the Mahʻbhʻrata, we find reference to the 
possible first city, Indraprastha, the mythical capital of the Pʻʻʻhavahʻ king-
dom, popularly believed to be situated between India Gate and New Delhi Zoo. 
Painted Grey Ware pottery was excavated between 1954 and 1971 at this site, 
suggesting the existence of human settlements at around 1000 BCE; yet the 
factual existence of Indraprastha remains debatable.1 It becomes apparent from 
the Mahʻbhʻrata description that the city was imagined to have witnessed in-mi-
gration from different social milieus – this is not rendered as being necessarily a 
problematic or chaotic thing:
“When the city was built, there came, O king, numerous Brahmanas well-
acquainted with all the Vedas and conversant with every language, wishing 
to dwell there. And there came also unto that town numerous merchants from 
every direction, in the hope of earning wealth. There also came numerous 
persons well-skilled in all the arts, wishing to take up their abode there.”2
Although this passage suggests a clearly defined social hierarchy or classifica-
tion, the diversity of social milieus is presented as a vital, or at least a normal, 
1 Cf. sinGH, 2009, p. 19. 
2 GanGuLi, 1970, Mahʻbhʻrata Book I, Section CCIX, ital. i.o.
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feature of a functional city. Similarly, Danu Roy, in his stimulating essay City 
makers and city breakers, makes the somewhat obvious, but oft-forgotten, ob-
servation that cities and built environments are always the collective oeuvre of 
diverse social groups:
“The visible structure of the city is always imposed upon its social founda-
tions. For instance, when even a casual visitor looks up at the imposing walls 
of the forts built by the Tughlaqs and the Mughals, it could occur to him that 
these walls could not have been ‘built’ by the kings. There must have been 
masons and stonecutters, water carriers and sand loaders, mixers and helpers, 
woodcutters and carpenters, ironsmithsand potters, labouring men and wo-
men and donkeys by the thousands who did the actual work. So where, in the 
pages of history, did they all disappear?”3
Roy’s observation surely alleviates a one-dimensional perception of Delhi’s his-
tory as a subsequent accomplishment of great kings, emperors, city planners and 
politicians and calls to put the actual workers, the city makers, into the focus. 
However, the near absence of these city makers in historical sources and the 
overrepresentation of the ‘grand’ figures like rulers and famous architects leaves 
us with the difficult task to reconstruct from available sources the astonishing 
life-stories of the more ‘mundane’ individuals of history. The status of sources 
has surely improved in modern times, but still the overwhelming majority of 
scholarly work (except for perhaps literary studies and ethnographies) makes 
use of official documents, colonial sources and documented historical caesuras 
(like wars, or political decisions) and other accounts of those who are and have 
been powerful. In the first part of this article, exactly such an approach will be 
presented: we are drawing on official documents of city planning and academic/
journalistic writings about the city’s management of urban poverty. In the se-
cond part, this viewpoint will then be contrasted with insights of modern Hindi 
literature, which will foreground the lived experiences of the individual social 
actors in the financially poorer milieus of Delhi. 
2. Pre-independence Delhi and the creation of ‘slums’
Over the three millennia after Indraprastha, several cities were constructed in 
the area of contemporary Delhi, first several bastions of indigenous kings, later 
3 roy, 2010, p. 144.
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fortified cities of Muslim rulers, who were invading the region from central 
Asia. The most recent of those fortified Muslim cities is Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd, which 
was founded by the Moghul emperor Shʻh Jahʻn in 1648. After Moghul power 
began to wane in the late 18th century, the British took possession of the walled 
city of Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd in 1803, and the control of the Moghul emperors was 
confined to the palace, the so-called Red Fort. 
Figure 1: Schematic map of Delhi (adapted from descriptions/map in 
KacKer, 2005, p. 70, and map in chadha, 2005, p. 94). 
The Indian Mutiny of 1857, an unsuccessful but yet traumatic military upheaval 
against British rule (the Raj), was a consequential event for Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd. 
Batra and Mehra regard the Mutiny as something like the founding myth of 
slums in Delhi. During the skirmishes, the British increasingly regarded the ci-
ty’s small lanes and narrow back alleys, the mohullas, as dangerous, unruly 
and potentially threatening. After the Mutiny, these experienced anxieties were 
ideologically linked to notions of dirt:4 
4 HosaGraHar, 2005, p. 87, notes: “The events of 1857 had seriously influenced 
colonial perceptions of disease, dirt, and disloyalty. During the period immediately 
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“‘Native’ culture was now admonished for its inferiority, its propensity for 
dirt, filth, dampness and congestion, and an effort was made to introduce 
contemporary European ideas of city order and planning to ameliorate the 
poor condition of the city and its inhabitants.”5
The British began to demolish almost one third6 of the seemingly impenetrable 
housing structures to ensure better surveillance and control (see also Ghalib’s 
accounts in section 4.1). Attempts were even made to raze the entire city of 
Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd to the ground, but luckily not enough explosive was accessi-
ble at the time.7 Instead, the British removed themselves from the native popu-
lation and created their own quarter, Civil Lines, north of the walled city of 
Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd. After the massive clearances following the Mutiny, the area out-
side the western city walls became increasingly urbanized (Sabzʻ Mandʻ, Sadʻr 
Bʻzʻr and Pahʻrʻ Ganj). This created a major concern for colonial city planners 
in the second half of the 19th century, who endeavoured to plan the western ex-
tension in an orderly way.8
In 1911, at the height of their imperial power in India, the British decided 
to transfer the capital of their Indian Empire from Kolkata (spelled ‘Calcutta’ 
at the time) to Delhi. A vast area south of Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd was selected to build 
the imperial city New Delhi, which was completed in 1931. The imperial vision 
of the British architects Sir Edward Lutyens and Sir Herbert Baker created an 
imposing assemblage of octagonal axes and broad avenues, inspired by Ver-
sailles and Washington, D.C., and monumental buildings in the architectural 
traditions of classicism and historicism, while maintaining an ‘oriental’ flavour 
by incorporating decorative ornaments of Mughal and Hindu architecture; this 
stylistic pluralism was meant to symbolize British superiority and rationality, 
and staged New Delhi as the apex of Indian civilization, and perhaps of civili-
zation in general. 
New Delhi starkly differs in appearance from Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd, or Old Delhi, 
as it is now often called. What is more, in spite of its allusions to rationality and 
orderliness, the creation of New Delhi was itself a cause for further congestion 
and ‘slummifying’ of other – now neglected and further enclosed – parts of the 
following the rebellion, the inhabitants’ houses, streets, and ways of living appeared 
to be even more unclean and diseased than before it.”
5 batra/meHra, 2008, p. 393. 
6 Cf. HosaGraHar, 2005, p. 85.
7 Cf. roy, 2010, p. 145.
8 Cf. HosaGraHar, 2005, p. 115-142.  
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city. Hosagrahar comments: “In less than a century after they had taken over, co-
lonial officials declared Delhi, the home of Emperors and princes, the mystical 
and exotic city of the Orient, an uncivilized ‘slum.’”9 In 1936, the entire walled 
city of Old Delhi was catalogued as ‘slum’ in the city’s planning codes10 and in 
more recent documents of city planning, Old Delhi and its adjoining neighbour-
hoods to the west were dubbed ‘Special Area’.11 
3. A historical outline of city planning  
 of post-independence Delhi
The colonial dichotomies of order – disorder, (western) rationality – (oriental) 
irregularity and slum – non-slum were taken up in the independent Indian Re-
public. Chandigarh, the newly created joint capital of the Indian states of Panjʻb 
and Haryʻʻa, is one drastic example: a hyper-order of square blocks and straight 
axes, create functionally separated sectors (e.g. a sector for shopping, a sector 
for restaurants, residence sectors etc.). However, the architectural mastermind 
behind Chandigarh was not an Indian, but the Swiss-French modernist Le Cor-
busier. Likewise, the heads behind Delhi’s first master plan (MPD-62) were the 
American architect and city planner Albert Mayer and a committee of members 
of the Ford Foundation. These international inputs helped India to overcome 
colonial associations of a nostalgic ‘Orient’, while simultaneously maintaining 
the colonial legacy of rationality.
The post-independence strategies of city planning in Delhi can be roughly 
structured into three phases: the 1950s and 1960s saw modernist and socialist 
attempts of centralized city planning and expansion. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
more pragmatic and rigorous endeavours of coping with the challenges of infor-
mal settlements and urban poverty came to the fore. From the 1990s onwards, 
a globalized alignment of India integrated the corporate and capitalist world-
system into city planning. Thus we observe a paradigm shift from what could be 
described as ‘rationalist’ to ‘cleaning-up’ to ‘neo-liberalist’. The three phases/
mindsets are not necessarily in harmony with each other, and we can actually 
observe how the ‘rationalist’ phase of the 1950/60s was in effect overturned 
by the ‘cleaning-up’ phase of the 1970/80s, which in turn was rearranged to 
a degree by the more recent ‘neo-liberalist’ phase. This development parallels 
9 ibiD., p. 149.
10 Cf. batra/meHra, 2008, p. 393. 
11 Cf. DmP-2001, p. 4; DMP-2021, p. 45.
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India’s political, economic and societal transition from a socialist to a capita-
list system, epitomized in the liberalization of the markets in the early 1990s. 
It becomes apparent, however, that processes of Delhi’s city planning of the 
pre-1990 era foreshadowed India’s capitalist alignment. It is exactly this over-
lapping and intertwining of the three phases/mindsets that carries a potential for 
ideological justifications, for example by drawing on historical traditions of city 
planning on the one hand and by projecting futuristic visions of a ‘world-class 
city’ on the other. 
3.1 A city for everybody:  
 The rationalist mindset of the Nehruvian era
When New Delhi became the national capital of the Republic of India in 1947, 
the city witnessed an unprecedented rate of in-migration. With a decennial 
population growth rate of 90 percent, Delhi’s urban population mushroomed 
from under 700,000 in 1941 to 1.4 million in 1951,12 almost doubling the density 
of persons per square kilometre from 613 to 1174 persons.13 It can be assumed 
that most migrants were refugees from north-west India, escaping the civil wars 
during the India-Pakistan Partition in 1947/48.14 In addition, the bureaucratic 
and administrative apparatus, foreign missions and other institutions attracted 
many civil servants, administrators, functionaries and other professionals. Fi-
nally, after Lahore had been included into Pakistan, the trade and wholesale 
business of northern India concentrated on Delhi, and specifically on the already 
congested Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd/Old Delhi. 
In the 1950s two governmental agencies, the Ministry of Rehabilitation and 
the Delhi Improvement Trust, were created to restore order and provide adequa-
te housing for the emergent metropolis. Together with numerous private land co-
lonizing companies, the government acquired vast areas in the west, the east and 
in the south of the city and created housing colonies and, moreover, transformed 
areas inhabited by ‘tribal communities’ into middle-class neighbourhoods. De-
spite these efforts, housing for all Delhiites remained unattainable. Large porti-
ons of the city’s population lived in unserviced illegal squatter settlements with 
no prospect of betterment. What is more, in 1955, an outbreak of jaundice, due 
12 Cf. Gazetteer, 1976, p. 120. These figures represent the urban population of the 
Delhi territory. The rural population of the time was ca. 220,000 in 1941 and ca. 
306,000 in 1951. Cf. Figure 2 for an overview. 
13 Cf. ibiD., p. 125. Again, these figures represent Delhi’s urban population. 
14 Cf. also in the following kaCker, 2005, p. 69.
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to inadequate sanitation measures in some of the new colonies, killed approxi-
mately 700 people, mainly in the affluent areas of New Delhi and Civil Lines.15 
The government was forced to react, and in 1957 the newly created Delhi De-
velopment Authority (DDA) set out to device a Master Plan for Delhi which 
came to be known as the MPD-62. 
Figure 2: Population of Delhi from 1901 to 2011. Figures are for total 
population of the National Capital Territory, i.e. Delhi’s rural and 
urban population (adapted from Government of IndIa, Census of India 
2011).
The MPD-62 predicted that the city’s population would increase to over five 
million by 1981.16 The plan estimated approximately 50,000 “dwelling units in 
bustis17 scattered all over the city”18 and suggested to relocate these squatters to 
“various parts of the urban area so that they are integrated into the neighborhood 
community”19 which, however, should not be “too far away from major work 
centres”.20 These plans seemed to acknowledge the vital function of squatters 
15 Cf. roy, 2010, p. 149
16 Cf. master PLans for DeLHi. mPD-62, p. i.
17 A bustī or bastī is a north Indian term for ‘informal settlement.’ Other words that 
are used in the master PLans for DeLHi. mPD-62, are ‘jugghie jhonpari’ or ‘JJ 
Cluster’ and ‘slum.’ 
18 master PLans for DeLHi. mPD-62, p. 5. 
19 ibiD., p. ii. 
20 ibiD., p. 27. 
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and low-income groups, who constitute the majority of workforce in small-scale 
industries, domestic labour and other low-wage duties. 
Such plans were nurtured – on a more ideational level – by the newly esta-
blished government under Jawaharlal Nehru, which envisaged a ‘city for ever-
ybody’ and announced to subsidise housing for low-income groups.21 The idea 
seemed persuasive: to eliminate private speculation and rising land prices, in 
1959 the government froze on all vacant or undeveloped land around the city 
limits, making the land available on reasonable prices at any given time; the 
DDA would then develop this land and sell or rent 50 percent of the housing 
plots on the free market, acquiring revenue, which would then be used both to 
purchase new land and to subsidise the remaining 50 percent of plots for low-
income groups.22  
3.2 Time for some action: The politics of eviction
After Nehru’s death in 1964, however, it became apparent that his vision was 
unattainable: only eleven percent of the plots had reached lower-income groups, 
while most plots were openly auctioned with the aim to maximize profits: “Land 
was released in a staggered manner, and plots in developed areas were delibera-
tely withheld, to push prices up.”23 By the 1970s it became clear that the size of 
the city’s population would significantly surpass the DDA’s predictions and that 
attempts to provide housing for low-income groups and labouring squatters had 
drastically failed. In a “frenetic burst of activity, the administrative machinery 
swung into action”24 and between 1975 and 1977 around one million squatters 
were forcibly relocated from the city centres to the low-lying flood plains on the 
eastern bank of the Yamuna River. Each family was entitled to a 25-square-yard 
plot with common water, electricity and sanitation services. The vacated spaces 
in the city were used for building an infrastructure required for the Asian Games, 
which Delhi was to host in 1982. 
Paradoxically, to construct all the necessary roads, flyovers, hotels, offices, 
apartments and stadiums, around one million migrant workers immigrated to 
the city during 1979 and 1982, squatting on the construction sites or nearby,25 
and making up, as it were, for the one million squatters who had been relocated 
21 Cf. kaCker, 2005, p. 73. 
22 Cf. ibiD., p. 74. 
23 ibiD.
24 Also in the following roy, 2010, p. 151.
25 Cf. batra/meHra, 2008, p. 398. 
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a few years earlier. Moreover, most of these workers stayed in the city after the 
games, inflating the population of Delhi to over six million in 1981.  
The radical resettlement politics of the 1970s were in fact rather attempts to 
demolish informal settlements than to relocate them in an ordered or rational 
manner as the MPD-62 proposed. Batra and Mehra (2008) call this the ‘Emer-
gency Period’26 and the authors provide some insights of how the processes of 
slum demolitions work in practice:27 first, a notice is given to the local pradhāns, 
the spokespersons or ‘strong men’ of an informal settlement. These then might 
or might not pass on this information to the local residents. Several practices are 
employed that divide the residents along various lines. For instance, a certain 
cut-off date is usually announced, which is perhaps set 15 or 20 years prior to 
the eviction. The residents who stayed in the settlement before this cut-off date 
are either exempt from demolition or can claim for reparation or a plot in the 
resettlement area. Such residents are sometimes in support of demolition, either 
covertly or overtly, in hope of acquiring more plots or gaining financial benefits. 
Others, often under assistance of non-governmental organizations, launch legal 
cases and instigate public protests in order to prevent or delay the arrival of the 
demolition squads. This short glimpse into the potential communal conflicts re-
sulting from the politics of eviction shows that we cannot conceive of dwellers 
of informal settlements as monolithic groups, but rather we deal with actors who 
have different beliefs about and interests in the settlement which are created 
inter alia by individual biographies and differing socio-economic statuses. In 
Section 4 of this chapter we will provide a discussion of some accounts of such 
local and personal life-stories of residents in informal settlements in modern 
Indian literature. First, however, we would like to outline the more recent de-
velopments of the politics of city planning in Delhi. 
3.3  Visions of a world-class city:  
 The neo-liberalist strategy of city planning
A second Master Plan was drafted in 1985, and notified in 1990, this plan came 
to be known as the DMP-2001. In 1988, a cholera outbreak, again due to in-
adequate sanitation measures contaminating the groundwater, killed ca. 1500 
people, but unlike in the jaundice epidemic of 1955, the 1988 victims were all 
from the 1975-77 resettlement areas across the Yamuna River and from other 
26 ibiD., p. 397. 
27 Cf. ibiD. p. 407, also in the following.
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illegal squatter settlements.28 And unlike 1955, the cholera disaster of 1988 did 
not prompt the DDA to react. Instead the DDA concentrated on constructing 
spaces that were to become visible emblems of India’s modernity and that cate-
red predominantly for the emerging middle classes.29
Sunil Kumar provides us with an example. His ethnography in the South 
Delhi medieval village Hauz-i Rʻni describes how the village was suddenly 
surrounded by the middle-class housing colonies Saket and Pusʻp Vihʻr. The 
village, which was first mentioned in Persian documents in 1246, is inhabited 
predominantly by a traditional Muslim population, who used the hauz (a large 
water reservoir), after it has been silted in the 19th century, as a graveyard for 
their community.30 When the Delhi authorities acquired the land surrounding 
Hauz-i Rʻni and the DDA started constructing the housing colony Saket in the 
mid-1970s, half of the area of the hauz was turned into a sports complex. At 
first, this sports complex was nothing more than three large fields without any 
barriers, thus the area was accessible for both Hauz-i Rʻni villagers and Sa-
ket residents. Kumar observed how children from Saket played football against 
their Hauz-i Rʻni peers and he notes that the “very absence of a structured sports 
regime allowed for an unregulated fraternising between the residents of the two 
neighbourhoods.”31 In 1990, however, the DDA constructed the ‘Saket Sports 
Complex’, with facilities for more up-scale sports like badminton, squash, ten-
nis and aerobics, and upon Kumar’s inquiry the DDA engineers were forthright 
in saying that the facilities were oriented towards the middle-class neighbour-
hood of Saket. Furthermore, the Muslim graveyard was seen as a disturbing, 
unclean ‘problem’ which the Hindu engineers of the DDA found repulsive. The 
Hauz-i Rʻni villagers perceived this exclusion and denial of access as accentua-
ting the distance and mistrust between the communities. In turn they began to 
build buffalo and goat pens on their half of the hauz, to emphasize their stake 
and they barricaded all paths to their area with thorn and bistle bushes; they also 
put up placards that underlined the historicity of the village and the graveyard 
and constructed the inhabitants as Sayyads (descendents of the Prophet Moham-
med), again emphasizing their right to occupy the space.
This example shows how city development can produce communal conflict 
and alienation. In the post-1990 era, India’s rural and poorer population has 
been drastically othered and made redundant in the country’s scramble for mo-
28 Cf. roy, 2010, p. 153. 
29 Cf. kaCker, 2005, p. 76f.
30 Cf. also in the following kum ar, 1999, p. 160-169. 
31 ibiD., p. 168. 
Creating the City of Delhi
157
dernity. A globalized and capitalist vision has created – and still creates – spaces 
for consumption, business, service, ‘high’-culture and recreation, which can be 
showcased to national and international visitors and construct the nation’s ca-
pital as an epitome of the new India. In 2004, for instance, the Yamuna resettle-
ment area mentioned above has been ‘cleared’ in order to ‘develop’ the area.32 
Some of the large-scale restructurings completed until now are: the Delhi Metro 
Rail Corporation headquarters, the colossal Aksʻardhʻm Temple, the Yamuna 
bio-diversity park and the games village for athletes and officials who were 
participating in the 2010 Commonwealth Games, for which the city, mirroring 
the developments before the 1982 Asian Games, delved into a massive urban 
renewal programme.33 
Although the liberalization of the Indian markets in the early 1990s has all-
owed for wide-ranging investments of the (multinational) private sector, the vi-
sion of a world-class city is not only a market-driven process, it is also pressed 
forward by both grassroots organizations and state institutions. Under the ban-
ner of democratic rights, environmentalism, urban development and beautifica-
tion, middle-class lobbying associations increasingly petition for urban renewal, 
all too often with drastic consequences for inhabitants of informal settlements. 
These petitioners take advantage of new procedures introduced to legal redres-
sal in India. In the so-called ‘Public Interest Litigations’ basically anyone, from 
powerful trade or industrial interest groups to residents’ associations to ‘concer-
ned’ individual citizens, can use the legal apparatus to put forward claims about 
urban ‘problems’. The Public Interest Litigation is not a regular legal case, in 
which two parties have equal voice; rather it is a proactive investigation, in 
which courts constitute committees of specialists to present evidence which, 
however, is never assessed in cross-examination.34 This process “brings together 
city officials, court commissions and amicus curiae on a democratically non-
accountable platform to administratively and logistically work out solutions to 
the urban ‘problems’”.35 The voices of the affected parties, those who will lose 
their dwellings, their belongings and their right to centrality, are lost in the legal 
apparatus. 
Although the Public Interest Litigations clearly mark a paradigm shift in the 
practices of Indian state institutions, the courts surprisingly use the MPD-62 as 
32 Cf. master PLans for DeLHi. MPD-2021, p. 118.
33 Cf. batra/meHra, 2008, p. 404f.  
34 Cf. ibiD., p. 403, refer to Vandenhole, 2000. 
35 ibiD., also in the following. 
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an “imaginary reference”36 and ordered to demolish all ‘illegal’ housing structu-
res and ‘polluting’ small industries. Sundaram comments: 
“Egged on by sympathetic media and advocacy groups, courts appointed 
special committees spread over every aspect of civic life, causing terror and 
fear in the neighborhoods they visited. A phantom civic subject emerged in 
this very public legal discourse, identifiable middle-class, post-political, and 
projected as the injured legatee of the urban body.”37  
The latest of the Master Plans (DMP-2021) accentuates this post-political, and 
consumption-oriented activism of the model middle-class citizens. To upgrade 
the physical structure of Delhi, the plan proposes ‘user pays’ facilities and pu-
blic-private partnership models for managing investments and calls for more 
community participation and decentralization.38  The effects of the latest Mas-
ter Plan are still unclear. With the globalized, post-political ideologies that are 
emerging currently, any centralized master planning appears superfluous. The 
state can do hardly more than provide the best possible legal and economic 
options for citizens and organizations to plan and construct ‘their own’ cities, 
according to their aspirations and needs. As it appears until now, the emphasis 
has been put on middle-class life modes and the multinational cooperate world; 
the general model, in theory, would however allow for any group to participate 
in the processes of city planning. It is possibly the cultural differences between 
the underprivileged and the powerful that are incommensurable and that have 
excluded the underprivileged from participation. In the next part, we will illust-
rate some aspects of these cultures of urban poverty as they are represented in 
modern Hindi literature, and we thereby provide one avenue for understanding 
and perhaps overcoming the discrepancies of participation in the planning and 
construction of Indian cities like Delhi. 
4.  The capital in Hindi-literature
In this part of the chapter we shall first pay a visit to the observations of the de-
struction of parts of Delhi in the time after the Mutiny as communicated in some 
letters of an Urdu und Persian writing poet. The section to follow is devoted 
36 sunDaram , 2010, p. 247.  
37 ibiD., p. 248. 
38 Cf. DMP-2021, p. 181.
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to novels and short stories dealing with the life of the inhabitants of informal 
settlements.
4.1  Delhi after the Mutiny
The famous poet Ghalib (1797-1869) who spent many years of his life in Delhi, 
comments in his letters on the proceeding destruction of Shʻhjahʻnʻbʻd after 
the Mutiny:
“Agha Baqir’s Imambara [...] is an ancient foundation of exalted fame. Who 
would not grieve at its destruction? [...] More than that, barracks for the Bri-
tish soldiers are to be built in the city, and in front of the Fort, where Lal 
Diggi is, there is to be a great area of open ground. It will take in the whole 
area right up to the Khas Bazaar [...]. Put it this way: from Ammu Jan’s Gate 
to the moat of the Fort, except for Lal Diggi and one or two wells, no trace of 
any building will remain. Today they have begun demolishing the houses of 
Jan Nisar Khan Chatta.”39
Six months later he notes:
“All the buildings in Fil-Khana, and Falak Paira and around Lal Diggi have 
been pulled down. The fate of Bulaqi Begam’s Lane is still undecided. The 
military is for pulling it down, but the civil authorities want to preserve it.”40
One year later he draws a picture of utter desolateness:
“[...] in all the wells in Lal Diggi the water has suddenly turned brackish. [...] 
I tell you without exaggeration that from the Jama Masjid to the Rajghat Gate 
is a barren wilderness, and if the bricks piled here and there were taken away 
it would be absolutely bare. [...] Now they have cleared a path for the railway 
from the Calcutta Gate to the Kabuli Gate. Panjabi Katra, Dhobi Wara, Ramji 
Ganj, Saadat Khan’s Katra, Jarnail ki Bibi ki Haveli... [and other localities] 
– you won’t find a trace of them. In short the city has become a desert, and 
now that the wells are gone and water is something rare and precious, it will 
39 GHaLib, 1969, p. 213 (dated July 26, 1859). We want to thank Arnd Bruns M.A., 
Institute for Indology, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, for drawing our 
attention to this publication.  
40 ibiD. p. 225 (dated December 16, 1859).  
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be a desert like that of Karbala.41 [...] Delhi is no more a city, but a camp, a 
cantonment. No Fort, no city, no bazaars, no watercourses […].”42
4.2  Post-independence Hindi-literature and urbanization
In her study on three novels of Bhisham Sahni, Ines Fornell outlines the develop-
ment of the progressive literary movement in India which is held in high esteem. 
It was in the 1930s that the term ‘pragativād,’ lit. ‘progressivism,’ was coined 
in the context of Hindi literature. Fornell emphasizes the fact that literates such 
as Premcand had taken up social issues of the poor already before the emergen-
ce of this movement. The first All India Progressive Writer’s Conference took 
place in April 1936 in Lucknow. One of its prominent participants, though never 
member, was Premcand. In his keynote address which was published as an essay 
titled Sāhitya kā uddeśya (The objective of literature), he explained his ideas on 
matters of style, theme, such as ordinary worker’s and peasant’s lives, and his 
conception of literature as criticism of life, ‘jīvan kī ālocanā.’ 
Mishra, in his study on modern Hindi fiction, acknowledges the influence of 
the prerevolutionary Russian author Anton Chekhov on the development of the 
Hindi short story and its authors,43 while Knirsch observes the relevance of so-
cial and humanitarian issues in the development of the Hindi short stories after 
1960 up to the end of the second millennium.44  However, one should not forget 
that the majority of India’s population is until today rural rather than urban,45 a 
fact which is reflected in the phenomenon of regionalism in Indian literature. 
The capital of Bhʻrat, India, happens to be situated in a Hindi-speaking re-
gion. Thus Delhi is the location of many novels and short stories written in this 
language. Following the phases of city planning in post-independence Delhi as 
outlined in the previous sections (3), the following part deals with literary works 
reflecting everyday lives of the city’s less well-off inhabitants.
41 [Fn. 1]: “The place where Husain and his companions were martyred, after their 
access to water had been cut off.”
42 ibiD. p. 252 (dated January 11, 1861).  
43 Cf. misHra, 1983, p. 2-3 and 26.
44 Cf. knirsCH, 2012, p. 58-99.
45 Cf. tHe WorLD faCt book. soutH asia. inDia: https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html, 07.05.2013.
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4.2.1  Heading towards the capital
Young Yashpal became a revolutionary.46 Born in 1903 in Firozpur, Panjʻb, he 
graduated at Lahore. After trying to assassinate a leading British official in 1929 
he was arrested in 1932. It was then that he devoted himself to writing. In 1938 
he was released. During his life he published more than 50 books, mainly collec-
tions of short stories, novels, and essays. Yashpal died in 1976, as the recipient 
of that year’s Sahitya Academy Award conferred to him for his Hindi-novel 
Merī Terī Uskī Bāt.
In the short story Devī kī līlā, The game of the goddess, Yashpal introduces 
his readers to the life of Devʻlʻl, a man originating from Jʻlandhar (Panjʻb), 
the region the clerks working in the Accounting Department of New Delhi’s 
Central Secretariat usually come from. Housing prices are exorbitantly high in 
Delhi. Thus he gave up the idea to find a room in Pahʻrʻ Ganj and took a room 
for his wife and himself in a compound inhabited by people from his native 
region, situated in ʻakti Nagar about six miles away from his place of employ-
ment. Having to spend 40 Rupees on monthly rent, he regrets paying another 19 
Rupees on bus fares in order to get to work. Though he never envied the great 
Sāhibs driving along in their own cars, he dreams of joining the Bābūs (clerks) 
who ride home on their pushbikes. Selling her golden bangles, his wife makes 
her husband’s dream of an own bicycle come true. 
It could be interpreted as a clash of village life with city life that Devʻlʻl lea-
ves his new bicycle standing at a bus stop, when unaware for a moment, chatting 
with a colleague and entering the bus that he used to catch until this day. After 
realizing a few moments later, he immediately gets down from the bus and heads 
back to the bus stop. Luckily he finds the cycle still there, takes it and goes to 
worship in the Devʻ’s temple in order to thank the great Goddess for having spa-
red him the loss of the valuable means of transportation, but ironically his new 
unlocked cycle gets stolen from the entrance. 
46 Cf. also in the following, meisiG, 2001, p.120-127; saHitya aCaDem y aWarDs. 
yasHPaL: http://indiapicks.com/Literature/Sahitya_Academy/Hindi/Hindi-1976.
htm, 07.05.2013; tHe HinDu. 07.05.2006: http://www.hindu.com/lr/2006/05/07/
stories/2006050700010200.htm, 07.05.2013.
Sonja Wengoborski/Jaspal Naveel Singh
162
4.2.2  Accepting one’s fate in silent rebellion:  
  Basanti and Anaro
Basanti
Bhisham Sahni was born in 1915. In the times of disturbance that woke after 
gaining independence from the Raj, the famous Hindi author, originating from 
Rawalpindi (what was to become part of Pakistan in 1947), shifted with his fa-
mily to India. He published his novel Basanti in 1980. 
The story is set out between two instances of slum eviction. The protagonist 
is the young woman Basanti living in a bastī, in Delhi. Her father, the barber 
Chaudhri, belongs to a caste, onto which the leading Rʻjput members of the 
community look down as inferior. However, this time the imminent danger of 
eviction cannot be averted by a delegation of theirs. Clad into their traditional 
Rʻjasthʻni clothes the men return empty handed from meeting an influential 
Sāhib who turns the group over to his deputy rather than listening to its cause 
himself.
In the introduction to his translation of Bhisham Sahni’s Basanti, Jaidev ela-
borates:
“[...] even their modest basti in Delhi is never secure. Any day, it can be bus-
ted by a callous state apparatus which holds out to them nothing more than 
bogus promises. There is no going back home (the novelist doesn’t waste even 
a line on spurious nostalgia of the countryside), but even in Delhi displace-
ment returns inevitably, like seasons. A basti is built, only to be pulled down 
by the administration, another is built, that too is going to be demolished one 
day […].”47 
Jaidev elucidates the capital’s attitude towards its recently immigrated inhabi-
tants:48 “In its relentless urge for expansion, the city of Delhi sucks in the labour 
and lives of people whom it soon discards as dirt.” In this case the huts of the 
bastʻ, “near Ramesh Nagar remained intact even after that colony was ready. 
This happened because they did not touch it but were built upon an uninhabited 
mound in between two forking roads.”49 Since its male inhabitants are masons 
and artisans, the place evolves to resemble a Rʻjasthʻni town. The women have 
taken up relations with the neighbouring middle-class settlements doing house-
47 JaiDeV, 1997, p. xi.
48 Cf. ibiD., p. x.
49 saHni, 1997, p. 6.
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hold-scores in a communal framework which the translator refers to in a prece-
ding note: “Hindi and Urdu words for which there are no equivalents in English 
have been retained as such. For example, chauka-bartan is not simply washing 
dishes or performing household scores, let alone handling the kitchen work.”50 
Though the settlement is “far from being a slum”,51 its lack regarding legality 
keeps up a state of uncertainty and insecurity that rests on its inhabitants. 
Again Jaidev explains that things are not as plain as one might expect them 
to be: 
“Within this overall frame where survival is posited as the lone virtue for the 
victims of an inequitable class system, the novelist introduces a variety of 
complex threads. For the basti is not a simple, homogenized class space. It is 
split from inside along caste and gender lines. What the administration and 
its Sahibs, with the help of law and police, do to the basti, the basti Rajputs do 
to those below them in the caste hierarchy, and in turn the latter do the same 
to their daughters and wives.”52
Thus her father treats Basanti as a kind of commodity, marrying her off for an 
attractive sum to an old tailor – a marriage Basanti refuses not in open rebellion 
but rather she runs away from what was supposed to be her home.  
Chance has it, that Basanti is saved from this marriage. Her father and the 
tailor had the date fixed spontaneously, yet at this very morning police and 
trucks arrive at the site in order to clear the basti that is meant to be torn down. 
Everybody grabs whatever household-goods the families are able to take along 
with them.  Basanti’s father treats his wife as if she was a pack mule and he just 
bothers not waking up his young son whom he carries protectively in his own 
arms. Meanwhile some of the unemployed inhabitants of the bastʻ are paid to lay 
hand on what used to be their own homes.
Regarding Basanti Jaidev remarks: 
“Even before she is sixteen, she has seen enough of men, families, classes. 
[...] It is a homage to her resilience and natural vivacity that she can take in 
all these blasts of wisdom without shedding her spontaneous laughter, her 
delicate dreams, or her zest for living.”53
50 JaiDeV, 1997, p. xvii.
51 saHni, 1997, p. 5.
52 JaiDeV, 1997, p. xi.
53 ibiD.
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Anaro
Mañjul Bhʻgat (Manjul Bhagat) was born in 1936 in Meerut, but brought up in 
Delhi where she devoted herself to writing. She died in 1998. Anaro is a short 
Hindi novel that was published in 1977 and laid the foundation for Bhagat’s 
fame as an awarded writer. It was translated into several languages; the author 
herself translated it into English.
Anaro is the tough mother of a girl and a boy. Her husband, Nandlal, a me-
chanic, had brought her from Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, to Delhi at the age of 14. 
During his wife’s first pregnancy, he had started a relationship with a mistress. 
He either lives on Anaro’s costs or runs off and vanishes for months. Anaro 
scratches a living out of doing household scores at several middle-class homes 
situated at Greater Kailash and East of Kailash. 
“Anaro was still ignorant of the mysteries of married life, when she conceived 
Ganji. That winter, all of them had to shift to Madangir. The Golden Bridge 
slum settlement was being demolished. Each hut was in shambles. They were 
all bundled on to a waiting truck and left standing on the bare grounds of 
Madangir. Nandlal was on one of his sprees. He had vanished days earlier. 
For a couple of days she had a covered cot, standing close to her head to shield 
her from the icy winds. Then she could bear it now longer. She collected torn 
bits of tarpaulin, straw, tin, wood and jute rags, and proceeded to build a hut. 
The neighbours lent a hand. Thereafter, she built and rebuilt her little hut into 
a stronger home, never asking her husband for help.”54
Living in Madangir, she brings up her children alone. She managed to fix a con-
crete roof on her hut that does not ever leak even during the monsoon. Though 
illiterate, she holds a saving account. She yet ends up with almost unlimited 
obligations to all those households from which she borrowed money in order to 
meet her sense of duty of what is traditionally supposed to be taken care of by 
the bride’s parents. Her life’s aim is to see her daughter married decently and 
she readily even ruins her health to achieve this goal. She fulfils what should be 
a father’s duty, making her husband return from Mumbai only for the sake of 
formality. She devotes herself to this task, striving to fulfil what she considers to 
be done to keep up pride and honour, ever willing to stick to caste rules. In doing 
so she transcends the framework of the role model of a traditional wife without 
ever reflecting on this point. At the end of the novel Nandlal acknowledges his 
54 bHaGat, 2001, p. 55.
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wife’s capabilities by assigning her an imaginary place of honour traditionally 
reserved to males: 
“Listen! Listen to me, all of you gathered here. This day, I honour my wife, 
declaring my deep-felt admiration for her. She is indeed not my wife... but 
my elder brother. I am proud that she has so enhanced my prestige in the 
community.”55
4.2.3  In times of disillusionment: Pollution
The author Gaurinath was born in 1972, holds an M.A. degree in Hindi and 
worked for several years as an Assistant Editor for the monthly magazine Haʻs 
in which the short story Pradūṣaṇ was published in 1998.56 Its protagonist is 
Manoramʻ, a young woman born in a village and brought to Delhi by her hus-
band Vinay. 
The story begins with memories of her first encounter with Delhi. For a start 
the young couple lived in a small room in Wazirpur. Reaching there the place 
gave her an impression as if entering a mound of dirt and garbage, the acidic air 
had caused her cuffing. As for that first home Manoramʻ remembers a horrible 
mixture of dust, dirt, saliva and slime with acid as soon as she set her foot in 
front of the door of their room, the stinking drainage and the factory noise ad-
ded to the nuisance caused by a complete lack of facilities such like a toilet, a 
decent space for having a bath or washing clothes. Feeling ashamed to defecate 
openly in public, her husband had to accompany her in the darkness of early 
mornings or after the setting of the sun, to do so at the faeces besmeared banks 
of a nearby drain ditch. Adding to these difficulties Vinay worked far away from 
Wazirpur at a shop behind Old Delhi Railway Station near Chandni Chowk. In 
the following month they had shifted to Sʻlampur where living conditions were 
perceptibly better and both of them could make use of the nearby public toilets. 
But in spite of the improvement of the outward living conditions, the mother of 
a now four-year-old daughter experiences another kind of pollution: Santosh, a 
far off relative of her husband’s, tries to court her during the head of the hou-
sehold’s absence. The main part of the short story deals with these temptations 
that Manoramʻ somehow manages to resist. Thereby she also resists the social 
55 ibiD., p. 62.
56 GaurīnītH (Gauri natH), p. 42: http://in.linkedin.com/pub/gouri-nath/33/a82/72b, 
07.05.2013.
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‘pollution’ of urban poverty. The social organization of the urban settlement is 
far removed from what the inhabitants were used to from their villages. 
5.  Conclusion
In this contribution we have first outlined a post-colonial history of Delhi’s offi-
cial management of urban poverty. We have identified three major trends in this 
management: an idealistic approach of the 1950s and 1960s, a hasty interven-
tional phase of the 1970s and 1980s, and finally the contemporary neo-libera-
list strategy. These phases represent India’s grapple with coming to terms with 
both its colonial past and its place in a globalized modernity, in which Delhi 
certainly takes a principal position. Urban poverty is somewhat orthogonal to 
these developments and the double standards that emerge from dealing with it 
are manifestations of Delhi’s paradoxical disposition. The literary accounts that 
we have presented show how individuals themselves deal with this situation; 
for instance when Anaro tries to reconcile her sense of duty with her disinteg-
rating family structures, or when Manoramʻ for time being effectively resists 
Santosh’s courtship and thereby saves her family from splitting up. The role of 
strong women in these literary accounts is perhaps no coincidence. It appears 
as such Anaros, Basantis and Manoramʻs, are an integral element in keeping 
families and communities functioning; although their incredible efforts and their 
careful manoeuvres remain largely veiled behind the grand designs of official 
city planners, politicians and other ‘strong men.’ We hope our contribution all-
eviates such misrepresentations to a degree. 
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Urban Meeting Locations of Nicaraguan 
Migrants in Costa Rica’s Metropolitan Area 
and the Spatial Effects on their Social 
Support Networks
Hauke Jan roLf
1.  Introduction
After a brief review of the theoretical framework, key historical and current 
migration processes of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica are presented. Furthermore, 
the general urban development of Latin American cities and more specifically of 
the metropolitan region of Costa Rica’s Central Valley are discussed to respond 
to the spatial distribution or rather concentration of Nicaraguan migrants with-
in this urban area. Subsequently, three exemplary places of the case study are 
described and compared to illustrate the specific relationship between locations 
and the local and transnational support networks of Nicaraguan migrants in the 
urban area. The article finishes with some conclusions about the presented plac-
es and the reciprocal impacts between these locations and the local and transna-
tional support networks.
2.  Theoretical framework of the case study
The migration from Nicaragua to Costa Rica has a long historical tradition and 
has always been transnational even though the term transnationalism had not 
been used in social sciences until the appearance of the so-called globalization, 
that is the increasing social, political, and above all economic interconnection 
and interdependence of the world, induced by technological innovations of new 
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transport and communication media.1 Instead of unidirectional movement of 
people with a gradual process of an inevitably long-term settlement and so-
cio-cultural assimilation, the Nicaraguan migration to the neighbouring coun-
try in the south has always been characterised as durable, circular, pendular 
or rather multidirectional movements. This resulted in bi-national economic, 
cultural and familiar interrelations, plural socio-cultural identification and, last 
but not least, political tensions between the two involved nations and societies.2 
These processes correspond with the features of transmigration defined by Lin-
da Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Blanc-Szanton: 
“We define ‘transnationalism’ as the processes by which immigrants forge 
and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies 
of origin and settlement. […] Immigrants who develop and maintain multi-
ple relationships – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and 
political – that span borders we call ‘transmigrants’. […] Transmigrants take 
actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded 
in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more 
nation-states.”3
Particularly over the last twenty years, the migration of Nicaraguans to Costa 
Rica has been highly politicised in Costa Rican immigration policy debates. It 
is not only due to a rapidly increasing inflow of migrants since the beginning of 
the 1990s and its transnational character as “[…] the ongoing interconnection 
or flow of people, ideas, objects, and capital across the borders of nation-states, 
in contexts in which the state shapes but does not contain such linkages and 
movements […]”4. But the increase in attention to the Nicaraguan immigration 
(and related problematisation) is also because of its new directions. While his-
torically the migration from Nicaragua has always been characterised by move-
ments within the frontier region and towards the rural areas, urban immigration 
dynamics of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica’ s metropolitan Central Valley are still 
a new phenomenon.
1 Cf. CasteLLs, 1996; beCk, 1997; urry, 2001; sassen, 2002; DürrsCHm iDt, 2002.
2 Cf. moraLes Gam boa/Castro VaLVerDe, 2006; sanDóVaL GarCía, 2003; Jim énez 
matarrita, 2009.
3 basCH et al., 1994, p. 7-8. Cf. also Pries, 2010; faist, 2000; LeVitt et al., 2003; 
Portes et al., 1999.
4 GLiCk sCHiLLer/LeVitt, 2006, p. 5.
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Looking at the urban migration movements of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica, it 
is fruitful to explore the specific structure and functions of the local and transna-
tional networks that they have created within and beyond the metropolitan area. 
In this context, a focus on migrant networks is useful to explain not only the 
dynamics of the so-called chain migration (that is the effect of following migra-
tion processes as a result of pioneering emigration paths) but also to explore the 
migrants’ social resources. On one hand, due to the precarious living conditions 
of the majority of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica’s urban area, they have estab-
lished reciprocal social support networks that help them cope with the everyday 
struggle for socioeconomic and spatial resources on a local level. On the other 
hand, they stretch their social ties to kin, friends and other affiliated actors in 
their country of origin on a transnational level. In a multidirectional perspective, 
these transnational ties serve as much to broaden the potentials of the migrants’ 
social resources as to fulfil social obligations towards their descendants and oth-
er relatives, close friends and sometimes informal creditors, who stayed behind 
in Nicaragua. 
The approach of social support, for its part, is an activity-oriented focus on 
social networks that highlights not only the structural relationships and social 
positioning of the network’s members (for example by focusing on the ability 
to stabilise horizontal and/or vertical socio-economic linkages of social bond-
ing and bridging) but also the quality of such relationships and the functional 
contents of social interactions.5 According to the activity-focus, social resourc-
es of networks are not just understood as potentially available social capital 
of a somehow solidarity bonded and homophilic structured community but as 
concrete social interactions that generates collective opportunities and orien-
tations. In consequence, this approach is markedly appropriate to explore the 
specific character of a social relationship (if it is unidirectional or reciprocal, 
unidimensional or multiplex et cetera) in correlation to the particular constitu-
tion of the social ties (if they are primarily family-, community- and/or work-
based). By this means, it is possible to focus not only on structural elements of 
social networks, predicated for example on their size and relational density,6 but 
also to highlight the dynamics of social interactions. This approach offers the 
opportunity to differentiate between potential and actual support, received and 
perceived help, autonomy and dependence or positive and negative impacts. 
In addition, the focus of social support provides the possibility to distinguish 
5 Cf. Putnam , 2000; ryan et al., 2008.
6 Cf. HoLLstein, 2006; HoLzer, 2006.
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between different kinds of support capacities upon which the social networks 
depend, such as functional, economic, informative or emotional functions.7
However, it could be criticised that the spatial dimension of social support 
networks has been neglected or even rejected within this concept. In consider-
ation of the diverse character of social networks and their different structural 
and functional interlinkages with regard to distinctive localities of socio-spatial 
settings such as an urban area, it seems to be extremely important to focus on the 
spatial effects of social networks.
When analysing the collected data of ethnographic interviews and observa-
tions resulting from a fieldwork period in Costa Rica’s metropolitan highlands 
in 2009-10, one of the main questions the researcher had to deal with was how 
these social networks are organised and reproduced within the urban space and 
to what extent migrants’ meeting locations influence their social support rela-
tionships both locally and transnationally. 
The ethnographic fieldwork was launched on two assumptions. First, it had 
been supposed that such concrete meeting places would serve not only as a 
precondition for social linkages by providing direct face-to-face contacts for the 
exchange of information, goods and different types of support, but also as local-
ities of socio-cultural representation within the foreign society to highlight the 
distinctive collective identity as Nicaraguan migrants. In this perspective, the 
physical space can only be reflected on as socially generated or rather occupied 
and is therefore always an expression of the social structure and the socio-polit-
ical struggle of power relationships. As Pierre Bourdieu says,
“The physical space could only be thought of as an abstraction, […] as a lived 
and occupied space that means a social construction and a projection of the 
social space, a social structure in an objectivated condition […], the objecti-
vation and naturalisation of past and current social relations.”8
The conceptualization of the physical space as a reproduction of past and cur-
rent social power relationships thus demonstrates the importance of focusing 
not only the contemporary structure of the urban space, but to adopt an entirely 
historical perspective of the urban and socio-spatial development in all its sedi-
mentary complexity (equivalent to a biographical exploration of the city and its 
society, its physical materialisation and social milieus).
7 Cf. DieWaLD, 1990; nestm ann, 2001; keuPP, röHrLe, 1987.
8 bourDieu, 1991, p. 28 (translation by the author).
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The second prior assumption was that these locations cannot be understood 
as separate places that exist independently from the spatial and social surround-
ing. Instead of defining these places as internally coherent and static, it is argued 
that their uniqueness results especially from the dynamic interconnections with 
other locations and social constellations. Inspired by Doreen Massey, these lo-
calities are considered to be interrelated with the socio-spatial environment of 
the city as a whole. To quote Massey,
“With such a set of connections, and such a history, it becomes clear that to 
romanticize places as settled, coherent and unchanging is highly dubious. […] 
to see places as bounded can lead to their interconnections being ignored, 
and thus may result in parochialism. To see them […] as particular sets of 
interconnections in a wider field might hold open the possibility of both ap-
preciating their local uniqueness and recognizing their wider interlinkages.”9 
In a relational socio-spatial perspective, as it has been framed by Bourdieu and 
Massey, such localities can hardly be seen as internally closed. Focusing on 
the social interactions it is obvious that spatial-related activities are as much 
directed to local strategies and orientations as to interconnections to the en-
tire urban space and society. According to this theoretical comprehension, the 
social interrelations are not just contextualised within an intrinsic logic of the 
very local places themselves. These locations are reciprocally interlinked with 
the physical and social environment and also with other external socio-spatial 
constellations on an urban scale, but also on a national and even transnational 
level. From this perspective, these places not only interrelate to different social 
networks within an urban setting, in addition they may also function as gate-
ways between local and transnational ties. Moreover, it remains to be seen if 
these urban places themselves have been transformed on the basis of the diverse 
interactive processes of local and transnational exchanges into kinds of trans-
national localities.
The illustrated assumptions have led to the comparison of several urban lo-
cations where the social interactions of Nicaraguan migrants’ networking take 
place in a different manner. To this end, characteristic localities of activity and 
settlement of the Nicaraguan migrant population have been investigated, such as 
two precarious residential districts, diverse inner-city parks, certain restaurants 
and bars, clubs and dancing halls as well as churches and the offices of migrants’ 
associations and civic organisations. Out of this broad variety of places, three 
9 massey, 1995, p. 66.
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particular locations are discussed in this article to identify the interconnections 
between specific local and transnational networks of social support and distinc-
tive spatial settings. The exemplarily compared locations are (1) a suburban squat 
named La Carpio with a remarkable proportion of Nicaraguan inhabitants, (2) 
the main baseball stadium of San José, the capital of Costa Rica, and (3) the in-
ner-city park called La Merced that is mostly frequented by Nicaraguan migrants.
3.  Historical and current migration processes of  
 Nicaraguans to Costa Rica10
Currently, as well as historically, Nicaraguans are and have been the most import-
ant migrant group in Costa Rica with more than 50 % of all foreigners living in the 
country (see the table below). Approximations vary between six and ten percent of 
the national population without knowing the precise proportion of temporary, sea-
sonal and particularly irregular migrants. Moreover, updated representative statis-
tics are not available since the last national census in the year of 2000. Supposed 
approximations resulting from selective case studies mostly act on the assumption 
that more or less 50 % of the Nicaraguan migrants are in the country illegally. 
Populace of Costa Rica and the proportion of inhabitants born outside the 
nation concerning their country of origin between 1950 and 2000
National Census
1950 1963 1973 1984 2000
Populace 800,875 1,336,274 1,871,780 2,416,809 3,810,179
Foreigners 33,251 35,605 22,264 88,954 296,461
Nicaragua 18,954 18,722 11,871 45,918 226,374
Panama 2064 3255 1598 4794 10,270
USA 956 2001 2151 5369 9511
El Salvador 574 769 766 8748 8714
Columbia 610 676 517 1678 5898
Others 10,143 10,182 5361 22,447 35,694
10 The historical review of Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica is based on the work 
of: moraLes Gam boa, Castro VaLVerDe, 2006; rosero-bixby, 2004; aLVarenGa 
VenutoLo, 1997. Cf. also HuHn, 2005; Pérez, 2006; funkHouser et al., 2002. 
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Percentage of inhabitants born outside the nation concerning their country of 
origin relative to the populace of Costa Rica between 1950 and 2000
1950 1963 1973 1984 2000
Born 
outside the 
country 4,2 2,7 1,2 3,7 7,8
Nicaragua - 2,4 1,4 0,6 1,9
Panama - 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,2
USA 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2
El Salvador - 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,4
Colombia - 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1
Others - 1,3 0,8 0,3 0,9
Percentage of inhabitants born outside the nation concerning their country of 
origin and relative to all foreigners in Costa Rica between 1950 and 2000
1950 1963 1973 1984 2000
Nicaragua - 57,0 52,6 53,3 51,6
Panama - 6,2 9,1 7,2 5,4
USA 2,9 5,6 9,7 6,0 3,2
El Salvador - 1,7 2,2 3,4 9,8
Colombia - 1,8 1,9 2,3 1,9
Others - 30,5 28,6 24,1 25,2
Source: Inec (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa Rica).  
From the national census 2000.
There have always been migratory movements from Nicaragua to Costa Rica for 
economic, cultural and familial reasons. Traditionally, these dynamics occurred in 
the border region of the two neighbouring countries and could be explained by the 
narrow historical and socio-cultural interrelationships within this region and by 
the minor influences of the historically weak central nation states. Moreover, in 
the 19th century the political boundary had changed in bellicose conflicts when the 
province Guanacaste became part of the Costa Rican territory after the failure of 
a Nicaraguan military invasion in 1856. Furthermore, the definite borderline had 
still not been clearly defined until the beginning of the 20th century – and still is the 
cause of bilateral tensions. Even after the declaration of a contractually fixed line of 
demarcation, systematic border control had not been established for decades until 
the appearance of the first migration movements for political reasons due to the rise 
of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. Even today, the frontier is still not con-
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trolled like in other immigration countries, but the Costa Rican state spends much 
more public funds to check the legal entrance to the territory than before.
While traditionally the Nicaraguan immigration to Costa Rica had mainly 
been directed towards rural areas to work in the seasonal agricultural production 
of coffee and bananas, the urban migration of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica’s metro-
politan area is still a quite new phenomenon, appearing only within the last twenty 
years. The main explanation for historical movements from Nicaragua to Costa 
Rica is the migration for labour reasons, forced by the distinctive economic devel-
opment of the two states. While Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries of the 
whole Latin American hemisphere Costa Rica is one of the wealthiest and is also 
called Switzerland of Central America with regard to the numerous mountains 
and the relative socio-economic prosperity. In distinction to former movements 
and migratory intentions of Nicaraguans towards Costa Rica, the first significant 
wave had resulted from the earthquake of 1972 in the Managua region and the 
rates accelerated each year to reach a preliminary peak in the 1980th due to the 
civil war in Nicaragua (at first against the Somoza regime and afterwards against 
the Sandinista authority). In the time of civil war the former political emigration 
of a few intellectuals and opposition members became increasingly a mass phe-
nomenon of the Nicaraguan population that originated mostly from the devastated 
rural regions. In conjunction with the high rates of Nicaraguan immigration, the 
demand for a stricter regulation of the immigration policy within the Costa Rican 
society also increased. In spite of a more restrictive legislation in Costa Rica in 
the 1990s, the Nicaraguan migration did not decline even though the civil war had 
ended. In contrast, the established social networks between former refugees and 
latter newcomers had created a constant chain of migration no longer led by sea-
sonal labour intents but rather by the aim for a permanent life in a wealthier coun-
try. With regard to the concept of dual labour markets, the predominately young 
migrants mainly found work in labour segments of lower income, mostly without 
any access to insurance or a formalised contract.11 For example, in 2001 64 % of 
the workers hired in the coffee production were migrants and a remarkable 94 % 
did not possess all of the necessary documents to work in this sector. 
Finally, the new phenomenon of the Nicaraguan migration to the metropoli-
tan Central Valley is also characterised by an economic integration into the lower 
segments of the urban dual labour market, although the types of activity differ. 
Accordingly, the male Nicaraguans work predominantly in the sectors of lower 
services and construction or are hired as informal vendors and security guards. 
Female migrants mostly work as housemaids, employees in restaurants and other 
11 Cf. Piore, 1979.
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unqualified services or in the so-called maquiladora industry that is mainly char-
acterised by textile processing, and in some cases they work as prostitutes. In 
distinction to their marginal proportion in the agricultural sector, the female pop-
ulation represents more than 50 % of the urban migrants (see the table below).
Proportional Distribution of Nicaraguan and Costa Rican males and females 
in selected labour segments in comparison (2000)
Nicaraguans Costa Ricans
Labour segment Males
Agricultural unskilled worker 28,8 14,5
Mason/carpenter 8,7 3,7
Unskilled worker in the sector of mining and 
construction 8,3 2,3
Security guard 5,9 4,6
Formal vendor 3,4 5,6
Agricultural skilled worker 3,2 6,0
Unskilled worker in manufacturing industry 2,7 2,0
Welder/mechanic/metal worker 2,3 1,5
Truck or personal driver 2,0 7,5
House employee/concierge 2,0 1,6
Percentage 67,3 49,3
Nicaraguans Costa Ricans
Labour segment Females
House maid 48,4 14,9
Service in restaurants 10,3 5,7
Formal vendor 7,1 9,9
Unskilled worker in the textile industry  
(maquliladora) 4,2 2,6
Agricultural unskilled worker 3,5 1,8
Skilled worker in the textile and leather 
production 2,9 4,8
Street vendor 2,3 1,7
Nursing service 2,1 1,9
Cashier 2,0 3,1
Other non qualified services 1,9 0,7
Percentage 84,7 47,1
Source: flacso (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Costa Rica), 2005.
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In consideration of the historically restricted migration to the Central Valley – for 
example, it had been forbidden to the black Caribbean national population to move 
to the metropolitan area up to the declaration of the Second Republic in 1948 – this 
new type of urban migration meant a profound change for the Costa Rican society. 
As the centre of cultural, political and economic activities as well as the core of na-
tional self-identification, Costa Rica’s urbanised Central Valley has always played 
a quite important role for the country’s development and was treated like an exclu-
sive and precious space of – not only topographically – higher spheres.
4. The urban development of Latin American cities  
 and Costa Rica’s metropolitan area
To explain the specific location, spatial distribution and clustering of Nicara-
guan migrants within Costa Rica’s metropolitan Central Valley relative to their 
settlement, economic and socio-cultural activities, it seems to be important to 
explore the genealogical context of the urbanised space. Therefore, it is quite 
useful to highlight some benchmarks of the general urban development in Latin 
America and of Costa Rica’s metropolitan highlands specifically. These outlines 
could serve for a better comprehension of the current aspects of socio-spatial 
fragmentation within the urban space into which the Nicaraguan migrants have 
settled. 
In the era of globalization, significant processes of urbanisation and mi-
gration are seen as two closely meshed phenomena of contemporary social 
transformation.12 In Latin America, for its part, the process of urbanisation has 
begun much earlier than in Africa or Asia, and much faster than previously 
in North America or Europe. In consequence of a policy of the so-called im-
port substituted industrialisation, high levels of internal migration and urban 
birth rates have accelerated the relative percentage of the urban Latin Ameri-
can populace from 17 to 70 percent just between the years of 1965 and 1987. 
Nowadays, the proportion of the urban populace in Latin America has reached 
almost 80 percent. While historically the process was mainly characterised by 
a tendency of metropolisation, meaning a high concentration of the populace in 
the most important urban agglomerations (mostly the capital), by now the pro-
cess of urbanisation predominately takes place in metropolitan areas of smaller 
scales. 
12 Cf. sassen, 2002; roLf, 2006. 
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The metropolitan area of Costa Rica’s central highlands is such a mid-size 
urban agglomeration that contains the four main cities (San José, Alajuela, Cart-
ago and Heredia) with a populace of almost 3 million inhabitants, corresponding 
to more or less 50 percent of the national population. Even if the rapid urban 
growth of the 1960s and 70s has decelerated, the annual growth still represents 
2,8 %, representing a duplication within 25 years. (In comparison: in 1990 the 
annual growth still corresponded to a proportion of 3,7 %)
Referring to the typology developed by Axel Borsdorf, Jürgen Bähr and Mi-
chael Janoschka, the urban transformation of Latin American cities is character-
ised by four steps from the dense colonial city to the fragmented urban agglom-
eration of current days.13 The originally Hispanic colonial city – in distinction to 
the Portuguese – was structured in the strict logic of a military camp according 
to a grid with a central square, the plaza mayor, surrounded by the main build-
ings such as the cathedral, the city hall, other administrative buildings and the 
residents of the most important families. The farther the inhabitants lived from 
this central core, the poorer they were. 
This centralised structure has been transformed in a second step of urban 
transformation in the beginning of the 20th century, which the authors call the 
emergence of the sectoral city. This corresponds to a partial and linear subur-
ban development that depended on the infrastructural subdivisions with a strict 
segmentation between places of economic production and residence as well as 
between the residential districts of the urban rich and the working class. 
In a third step, Borsdorf et al. describe the era of the rapid growth and in-
dustrialisation of Latin American agglomerations during the 1960s and 70s as 
a development which they call the polarised city. This era of urban expansion 
is basically characterised by high rates of rural-urban migration, a significant 
lack of housing and the appearance of activities such as the taking over of 
peripheral or rural public land and the construction of huge marginal squats 
by the urban poor while the centres were still predominantly occupied by the 
richer ones. 
The last and current step represented by the fragmented city corresponds 
to a more diverse and sometimes opposite transformation of a so-called ar-
chipelagoisation on a micro level with downgraded and abandoned inner-city 
spaces next to the central business districts, peripheral gated communities of 
the upper and middle class next to consolidated or precarious squats, and resi-
dential islands within industrial districts. Last but not least, this transformation 
process was strengthened by the effects of the IMF and World Bank structural 
13 Cf. borsDorf et al., 2002. 
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adjustment programs of the 1980s which had induced the de-formalization of 
the urban labour markets on one hand and on the other the informalisation of 
urban development. The privatisation of urban space and infrastructure was on 
the one hand accompanied by the appearance of gated community-projects of 
different size and on the other by the emergence of an informal and commer-
cialised housing and rental market within the various squats. At the same time, 
the establishment of a few countable social housing programs during the 1960s 
and 70s has mostly ended due to the constraints of reduced public investment 
budgets.
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The described panorama of the fragmented city also coincides with the cur-
rent situation of Costa Rica’s urbanised Central Valley. In distinction to some 
other agglomerations, the uncontrolled spatial expansion in the metropolitan 
highlands is restricted in size due to the surrounding mountains that delimit 
the Central Valley. Nevertheless, the urban region is characterised by a mainly 
horizontal urban sprawl corresponding to aspects such as the high frequency of 
earthquakes and a traditional culture of estate property. 
As in other Latin American cities the climax of land takeover ended in the 
1980s and the current process is mainly characterised by a densification of the 
populace within the existing squats in terms of parcelling out the already occu-
pied space. Even if Costa Rica has not experienced such a process of econom-
ic decline and de-industrialisation like other Latin American nations and cities 
during the so-called lost decade of the 1980s – a process which Mike Davis has 
identified as an urban expansion without economic growth14 - the metropolitan 
region of the Central Valley is confronted with a tendency to urbanised pauper-
isation. And remarkable proportion of these urban poor equates to the segment 
of Nicaraguan migrants.
In consideration of the socio-spatial fragmentation it is finally quite import-
ant to ask how the Nicaraguan migrants are spatially distributed and where they 
settle, work and live within the metropolitan area. According to Davis’ opinion, 
the spatial locations of social inequality do not necessarily correspond with pro-
cesses of ghettoization. On one hand, the so-called slumlords, which are local 
estate agents, do not necessarily fit in with the characteristics of poverty, on 
the other, many construction workers live within the building yards where they 
work and most of the house maids live directly in the houses and gated com-
munities of their employers. Nevertheless, a spatial concentration of poverty is 
verifiable, and these are in consequence also the districts where many of the Nic-
araguan migrants are located (that is in the South, the North and the North-West 
of the metropolitan area). The comparison of the average housing conditions of 
Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans also shows high rates of Nicaraguans in precari-
ous dwellings (see table below).
14 DaVis, 2007. 
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Indicators of the Housing Conditions corresponding to the origin of the head 
of a household 2000 (in  %)
Characteristics Costa Rican Nicaraguan 
Type: slum dwelling (tugurio) 1,2 7,2
Housing in bad condition 9,6 25,3
Without connection to water 10,1 18,2
Without connection to canalisation 6,8 17,0
Sanitarian equipment but without canalisa-
tion or sewage work (tanque séptico) 
7,1 28,4
High density 9,5 27,3
Source: Inec (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa Rica). Data 
from the national census 2000.
5. Presentation of three exemplary urban locations
In the following three exemplary urban locations are presented to show that 
especially in a fragmented metropolitan area such as the San José region the 
migrants’ socio-spatial orientation and operating range is not just exclusively 
limited to their places of settlement, but also to different meeting places in pub-
lic and (semi-)private spaces. Referring to some results of the own research 
project, these places serve to illustrate the specific relationship between the spa-
tial distribution or rather concentration of Nicaraguan migrants in the urban area 
and the impacts that spatial effects could have on the formation of their social 
support networks. To this end, the comparative presentation contains: first a sub-
urban squat with a remarkable proportion of Nicaraguan inhabitants; second, 
the baseball stadium in San José; and third, an inner-city park which is mainly 
frequented by Nicaraguan migrants. Even if it is not possible to compare these 
quite distinctive places by their size, structure and social diversity in all their 
dimensions, it is still fruitful to compare these locations with respect to their 
functional role for specific types of social networks.
Urban Meeting Locations of Nicaraguan Migrants
183
5.1. The suburban squat La Carpio
The suburban squat called La Carpio with about 20,000 inhabitants is one of the 
largest in Costa Rica’s metropolitan area and has a considerable concentration 
of the Nicaraguan population with a proportion of almost 50 %. As opposed to 
other squats, in the case of La Carpio the Nicaraguan households did not move 
into precarious dwellings of an area already occupied by Costa Ricans, but rath-
er were part of the original land takeover in 1993, which was one of the latest. 
The social support networks within this area were mainly led by a common 
strategy of all inhabitants (Nicaraguans as well as Costa Ricans and a few other 
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migrant groups) to pursue local interests such as the regulation of their property 
rights, access to basic infrastructure (like paved roads, electricity, fresh water 
and drainage), access to public housing programs, the establishment of educa-
tional and health services, playgrounds and so on. 
The social networks are predominately structured by local family- and com-
munity-based neighbourhood associations and semi-institutionalised organisa-
tions centred on very local activities without any transnational ties that exceed 
personal contacts to visitors or newcomers from the country of origin. While 
practical and material help is predominantly based on social support networks 
resulting from the neighbourhood associations and the resident family members, 
mostly emotional support is contextualised with transnational ties by the inter-
viewees from La Carpio. In contrast, transnational exchanges, for their part, are 
quite a rare phenomenon in the squat. Apart from some political campaigns of 
Nicaraguan politicians that visited La Carpio during their stay in Costa Rica to 
engage the migrants’ sympathy for their candidature in the native country, polit-
ical activity in La Carpio is mainly represented by debates and conflicts with the 
city council, the public administration and the state. The economic activities are 
also locally based, even if some of the stores and stalls sell traditional food from 
Nicaragua that is demanded from Nicaraguans as much as from Costa Ricans. 
In a socio-cultural perspective, an interesting fact about La Carpio is that the 
Purísima, one of the most important traditional festivities in Nicaragua, is today 
celebrated in the squat by almost all inhabitants. Instead of representing an exotic 
and exclusively Nicaraguan festivity, the Purísima has become more and more a 
symbol for the entire district to show their community-based intercultural identi-
ty and function in part as a nostalgic retrospective view by the Nicaraguans. As 
numerous interviewees from La Carpio stressed, they do not really distinguish 
between Costa Rican and Nicaraguan inhabitants in the squat and highlight the 
political and infrastructural achievements they have fought for collectively. More-
over, after a long period of shame and stigmatisation due to living in this squat, 
today they feel proud to call themselves Carpeños, which has become a more im-
portant feature of self-identification for many interviewees than their Nicaraguan 
origin. As Martha Lidia A., a 24 year old Nicaraguan resident of La Carpio, said:
“Before, hmm (...) before I always felt in a way (…) kind of ashamed to be 
from La Carpio. And, well (…) additionally to be Nicaraguan, hmm (…) I 
always told the people that I live in Uruca because (.) because I was afraid of 
what they might think. (…) If they think that I am a criminal, that I have a 
bad education, that, hmm (.) that I am not a trustworthy person. (…) But now 
I feel something like (.) proud in a way, (...) to be Carpeña. (…) proud of all 
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that my parents have achieved, the whole community has reached. […] We 
are all proud now, proud to call ourselves Carpeños.”15 
5.2. San José’s baseball stadium
15 Martha Lidia A., 24, resident of La Carpio, in Costa Rica since 1998. Interview 
from 25.11.2009.
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Another location that has been studied during the ethnographic fieldwork in 
Costa Rica is the main baseball stadium of San José. It serves as a meeting 
place not only for the Nicaraguan population but also to connect them with other 
groups of migrants from the Caribbean and from Central and South America. 
While Costa Ricans are mainly interested in soccer, the baseball stadium is fre-
quented mostly by Nicaraguans, but also by Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Columbians 
and other migrant groups and people (so for example a single retired US-citi-
zen), according to the predominant sport of their home country. 
As a somehow protected place that is partly open, partly separated from 
the outside world, the stadium has a strong family-oriented character, where 
migrant families can go for a weekend activity without spending much money 
(for example, in contrast to shopping malls, where they can hardly remain for an 
entire day-trip without being forced to buy something). Normally they just pay 
the symbolic entrance fee and bring their own lunch. Due to the shared interest 
in baseball, the stadium serves as a meeting place not only between migrants and 
the national population, but also, and predominantly, between different migrant 
groups that would not interact in such a way in other public areas. Moreover, the 
visitors come from all parts of the urbanised Central Valley and use the location 
of the stadium to get in contact with others whom they could not meet elsewhere 
because of the lack of alternative time and spatial opportunities.
Reactively, the importance of the migrants for the Costa Rican Baseball is 
not just reflected in the physical and symbolical occupation of the once aban-
doned and neglected stadium by Costa Ricans, but also in the constellation of 
the teams. While some teams are composed of players of different nationali-
ties, others signal their predominantly Nicaraguan origins by giving themselves 
names like the Tiburones Nicaraguenses, the Nicaraguan Sharks, or the Equípo 
Managua, the Managua team, to refer to their home country or even city. More-
over, while the baseball stadium is mainly a place that brings together people 
of different nationalities at the local level, it has also been used (or misused) in 
a transnational way during the election campaign in Nicaragua when the candi-
date of a Nicaraguan political party came to Costa Rica and held a speech in the 
stadium to his ex-compatriots, in full recognition of their importance for their 
home country as they send remittances, start investments and keep transnational 
ties alive.
Additionally, Julio César R., the general director of the Costa Rican National 
Baseball League, a Nicaraguan who moved to Costa Rica more than 20 years 
ago, also reported about a special event when a famous team from the Nicara-
guan capitol Managua has been invited to play against a selection of Nicaraguan 
migrant players in San José:
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“They all (.) all the Nicaraguan migrants have been very thankful that we 
could have organised this game. (…) Well, our team lost but (.) the stadium 
was almost overcrowded. (.) And such an ambiance! Almost like in Nicara-
gua, with all the banners, the equipment, (.) the music. (…) The event has also 
been noted in the Nicaraguan newspaper.”16
5.3. The inner-city park La Merced
16 Julio César R., 37, the general director of the Costa Rican National Baseball 
League, in Costa Rica since 1991. Interview from 13.11.2009.
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The third place being discussed in greater detail here is the inner-city park La 
Merced, also called the Nica Park by Costa Ricans as well as by Nicaraguans 
themselves. For about 15 years now, the once abandoned park has been occu-
pied physically and symbolically by Nicaraguan migrants and serves as a central 
location with a variety of support functions for the Nicaraguan communities. 
Surrounded by a church, a hospital and low-rise buildings, the inner-city park 
has a rural character that might fit with the predominately rural origin of many 
Nicaraguan migrants. Moreover, next to the park is an important bus station 
where many buses arrive from the outskirts like La Carpio where most of the 
Nicaraguan migrants live. The park is frequented during the entire week and 
especially on the weekends – and even during the rainy season it serves as a cen-
tral meeting location until the afternoon when the thunder storms usually start. 
In a way, the park is a place of cultural reproduction where Nicaraguan fes-
tivities are celebrated, traditional Nicaraguan food and utensils are sold by in-
formal vendors and where Nicaraguan music is played by traditional musicians. 
Moreover, it is also a place of collective socialising and emotional support, a 
first connection for newcomers as well as the last resort for long-time migrants 
in precarious situations.
The support functions within the park are quite diverse and range from brief 
informational support about employment, housing or legalising the immigration 
status to a profound kind of support concerning the reunion of family members 
and friends and the creation, maintaining and stabilising of a durable social net-
work between compatriots and - more specific - certain occupational groups like 
the housemaids that only have public spaces such as these to meet and interact.
Apart from these local support functions, the park is embedded in transna-
tional ties in ways that go far beyond the regular queues in front of the public 
phones to call the family in Nicaragua and to indulge in the reproduction of 
a socio-cultural nostalgia. It is because the park environment has profoundly 
changed over the past 15 years. The entire district around the park, once aban-
doned by the Costa Rican population, has now become an area of so-called 
ethnic businesses, with numerous remittance banks, typical bars and restaurants, 
lawyer offices and NGO accommodations for legal support, hotels for newcom-
ers and postal, travel and goods transport agencies to Nicaragua. 
At the same time, the park itself has witnessed a dramatic social change. 
Long-term migrants recount in a nostalgic way that the park used to be a place 
for socialising, familial meetings and even served as a marriage market, and 
lament the park’s socio-spatial decline into a place which is today character-
ised by criminality, alcoholism and prostitution. Moreover, the informal vendors 
within the park have a lot of trouble with the municipal police, which was not 
Urban Meeting Locations of Nicaraguan Migrants
189
the case in the past. As Danélia C., a 50 year old political activist for the rights 
of the Nicaraguan migrants, reported:
“Always, always. I am going to the park since I have come to San José (…). 
This is the place where the Nicaraguan community is gathering, where you 
can meet your folks. The park is the park. The park has always been the park. 
[…] But the problem is that the park has changed a lot, you see, you’ve got all 
this proliferation of, (.) of prostitution, of alcoholism, of drugs, of criminality 
(…). Before, the park has been a much more familial place (.) but (.) with the 
time it has lost, hmm, (.) a little bit it’s spirit.”17 
In contrast, newcomers, the informal vendors or the prostitutes, as some of them 
ascertained in the interviews, still see the importance of the park to meet and 
link together with their compatriots, to support each other or just to do their 
business.
While there has been some kind of institutionalisation of the migrant activ-
ities in the entire district around the park which originated from the park itself, 
the park has changed its symbolic relevance for the heterogeneously structured 
community of Nicaraguan migrants over time. 
In this sense, one’s symbolic self-positioning towards the park seems to be 
not only a possibility of social differentiation towards the Costa Rican society 
but also among the Nicaraguan migrants themselves to distinguish, for exam-
ple, between newcomers and long-term migrants, between well established and 
precarious migrants, and to point out (or conceal) one’s social status within the 
migrant group and the Costa Rican society. Accordingly, Javier M., a 34 year 
old Nicaraguan musician, noted:
“Yes, there are differences (...) I would say that, hmm, the people who go to the 
Parque de la Merced (…) they, hmm, they are just the men on the street, (.) the 
people originally from the countryside. […] I would say that the Nicaraguans 
who go to the Plaza de la Cultura or to the Parque Central have a kind of (.) a 
little bit more like, hmm, (…) they have a higher cultural level. (.) Or they think 
that they are something better (.) or something like that. They go to Kentucky 
to eat a chicken and they wouldn’t eat the food from the park, I think.”18 
17 Danélia C., 50, Nicaraguan political activist, in Costa Rica since 2002. Interview 
from 18.10.2009.
18 Javier A., 34, Nicaraguan musician, in Costa Rica since 2005. Interview from 
10.12.2009.
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6. Conclusions
By contrasting and comparing these different locations, the particular connec-
tions between different types of social support networks and the specific con-
ditions of concrete meeting places have been identified. In this context, it has 
been assumed that the collective linkages to a certain place reinforce as much 
the network’s composition as the socialised place is produced and reproduced 
reactively by the social action and the physical and symbolic occupation of a 
particular group such as the Nicaraguan migrants.
The previous assumptions and the comparison of the different places in a 
fragmented urban agglomeration such as Costa Rica’s central highlands have 
led to a differentiation between more locally-oriented places with a high impor-
tance for the direct migrant’s networking and of more transnationally related 
locations for the reciprocal exchange between the host and the native country. 
While, for example, in the La Carpio squat only locally-based entrepreneur-
ial activities could be set up sustainably and other activities, such as the estab-
lishment of a remittance bank or a transport agency, have been implemented but 
have never been successful, the district around the park as a central hub of the 
socio-spatial activities of locally widespread Nicaraguan migrants has changed 
into a space of semi-professional transnational activities. Therefore, it is ques-
tioned, whether this area is not only a transnational interlinked location with 
constant and multiple interconnections across national borders that are anchored 
in the migrant’s daily live or if such a park could also be called a significantly 
transnationalised place.
Further investigation could probably focus on the interconnections between 
specific transnational localities on both sides of the border to highlight the inter-
linkages among different types of networks. Such investigation in the tradition 
of multi-sited ethnography19 could explore for example the mutual exchange 
relations of the diverse business persons involved in the fields of remittance 
banking, transborder travel or goods transportation agencies. The spatial clus-
tering of such activities on both sides of the border could be understood as a 
geographical mapping of transnational social networks.
19 marCus, 1995.
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Urban Poverty and Gentrification  
A Comparative View on Different Areas in Hamburg
inGriD breCkner
Since the end of the 20th century, German cities with population growth such 
as Munich, Berlin, Hamburg or Cologne are facing a strong spatial polarisation 
due to economic, cultural and political diversities, which more and more influ-
ences the access to labor and housing. In this context, gentrification became a 
keyword for such types of urban changes in media and scientific discussions, 
although convincing empirical data explaining and generalising such develop-
ments are still lacking.1 According to Tom Slater “[…] a careful analytical in-
dictment of the mainstream research output (typified by scholarship concluding 
that gentrification is acceptable if it is ‘managed’ by policy) is necessary but 
not sufficient. Such an indictment needs to be coupled with further research that 
seeks to document displacement (in any or all of its forms) ‘from below’ in the 
sobering terms of those who experience it. The absence of qualitative accounts 
of displacement is striking and shocking when juxtaposed with quantitative 
measures, or with all those accounts of the trials and tribulations of the new 
middle class.”2  
The critical reflection of literature on gentrification over four decades3 shows 
that quite different reasons and procedures of urban transformation are summa-
rised under the term of gentrification, which tends to lose its descriptive and 
explanatory capacity.  In order not to enter into such a precarious discussion, 
the following arguments shall focus on three differently structured urban spaces 
in Hamburg: Ottensen, St. Pauli and Wilhelmsburg. Their different stages of 
urban transformation are related to specific economic, political, social and cul-
1 Cf. breCkner, 2010.
2 sLater, 2011, p. 580.
3 Cf. Lee et al., 2008.
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tural structures and processes, however, all of them are labeled as more or less 
gentrified. These examples show different aspects of the relationship between 
urban poverty, gentrification and urban policies and underline the necessity of 
scientific analysis with a focus on displacements of poor populations based both 
on quantitative and qualitative empirical findings.
As the complexity of micro-spaces can never be understood without relating 
them to their interferences with an always specific meso- and macro-spatial con-
text4 and the overlapping of different urban functions, I shall start my argumen-
tation with a brief presentation of poverty in Hamburg, followed by a view on 
structural specificities and developments in the urban spaces under investigation 
and a final discussion of relations between poverty and gentrification in the de-
velopment of the selected urban areas and in a general perspective.
Poverty pockets in a wealthy city:  
The case of Hamburg 
Hamburg is the second biggest metropolis in Germany with approximately 
1,800,000 inhabitants. Situated on the Northern and Southern shores of the river 
Elbe, the city had the chance to develop the largest German harbor since medie-
val times. Nowadays, commercial relations with China are dominating the busi-
ness on a growing number of container terminals. Therefore, the harbor moved 
step by step to the West because the new large container ships needed more and 
more depth and the digging of sand from the river became increasingly difficult 
due to costs, lacking storage space for contaminated sands and an old tunnel 
under the river, which cannot be removed. The port is politically still conside-
red as the heart of the urban economy, although the port businesses lost their 
central importance for the local labor market due to technological innovations. 
New economic activities in the sectors of aviation, biotechnology, health, me-
dia, entertainment, tourism and other services created growing job opportunities 
mostly for educated people. They attract increasing numbers of students as well 
as regional, national and international immigrants. At the same time, many low 
skilled elderly people lost their jobs with few perspectives to access the postin-
dustrial labor market. They represent the group of long-term unemployed labor 
force more or less hidden by the way of diverse statistical tricks.
The long lasting tradition of international relations related to port activities 
and those based on service economies lead to a population of more than 100 na-
4 Cf. LäPPLe, 1993.
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tionalities speaking more than 300 languages in Hamburg. 2012 nearly 30 % of 
the population had a migration background, meaning that these persons or their 
parents were not born in Germany. Because a lot of these inhabitants had the 
chance or were forced to get a German citizenship, the percentage of foreigners 
– as people without a German passport – in Hamburg is much lower (14 %). 
Both figures show huge differences regarding urban spaces: In Hamburg’s cen-
tral district nearly half of the population has a migratory background, while 
those with the highest percentage cope with up to 70 % of immigrants; low 
numbers of immigrants are characteristic for semi-central and marginal districts 
with high percentages of middle and high income residents. 
Beside immigration the growing regional, national and international tourism 
and a high number of commuters to the city from the suburban surrounding (see 
chart 1) contribute to the cities diverse labor force as well as to its importance as 
a rich consumer capital in northern Germany.
Chart 1: Commuters to the City (Green Arrows) and from the City (Red 
Arrows) 2002
Source: Soyka, 2006, p. 2
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This inflow of consumer capital changed the perspective of urban policies: In 
Hamburg, many administrative, political and economic capacities are invested 
for the marketing of the city while neglecting the serious effects of social and 
spatial polarisation on the increasingly difficult living conditions of poor and/
or excluded people.
The City-State of Hamburg5 is administratively subdivided into seven dis-
tricts and a huge number of highly diverse neighborhoods. 
The map in chart 2 has been updated recently in the context of the regular 
Social Monitoring, provided by the federal administration with responsibility 
for urban and environmental development, planning and construction. Green co-
lors in the legend indicate a high socioeconomic status with positive, stabile or 
negative dynamics in the micro-spatial development of the last year. Blue colors 
indicate a mid-range status with different dynamic aspects. Low and very low 
status is indicated by yellow and red colors and shows risky urban developments 
in Wilhelmsburg as part of the inner city district as well as on the margins of the 
city center and some peripheries. This picture shows that Hamburg has poverty 
pockets with specific characteristics referring to their history, their social and 
economic structure, policy-interventions and activities of the civil society in 
place.
The selected neighborhoods under investigation in this article are Wilhelms-
burg, Ottensen and St. Pauli, all of them situated near the city center with its low 
density of inhabitants. They are marked dominantly with red and dark yellow 
colors but in different extensions. The population of Ottensen and St. Pauli were 
of similar size in 1990 but St. Pauli lost nearly a third of its population in the last 
20 years; Wilhelmsburg was always much more populated and had to cope with 
a growing number of inhabitants in the last 20 years (see table 1).
Spatial mobility patterns for the investigated neighborhoods show decreasing 
numbers of immigrants but – with the exception of Ottensen in 2010 – a still 
positive migration balance. The reason for this difference is the fact that urban 
renewal of residential buildings from the 19th century was completed in Ottensen 
during the 1990s and there is not very much space for new construction activi-
ties. Urban renewal led to bigger flats and a decrease of social density so that 
there is no more capacity for many interested newcomers. The figures related to 
foreign immigrants show the highest concentration in Wilhelmsburg and more 
5 City-states in Germany as Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen have a double political 
function: They act as federal states with access to respective taxes and delegate 
communal responsibilities to their districts. In so far they have more money at their 
disposal and the right to decide about their federal laws.
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 Chart 2: Social Fragmentation of Neighborhoods in the City-State   
 Hamburg 2011
Source: Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2012, p. 29.
than the cities’ average also in St. Pauli. These two areas still offer a higher per-
centage of social housing and less living space per inhabitant than Ottensen and 
the average of Hamburg. Ottensen and St. Pauli are dominated by single-house-
holds and single-parent families, but access to jobs is much easier in Ottensen 
than in St. Pauli and Wilhelmsburg and indicates different education levels of 
the population. Higher education expresses itself also in different income levels, 
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where Ottensen corresponds to the average of Hamburg, while inhabitants of St. 
Pauli and Wilhelmsburg reach only 2/3 of the average. The dependency on soci-
al welfare in Wilhelmsburg ranges between 20 and 26   %, in St. Pauli between 
14 and 20  % and in Ottensen between 8 and 14  %.6
Table 1: Social Characteristics of Investigated Neighborhoods  
from 1990 to 2010    
Ottensen St. Pauli Wilhelmsburg Hamburg
1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010 2010
Population 33,161 33,052 31,888 21,469 46,686 50,472 1,7 million
Incomings 8900 3367 9555 2952 6444 4329 0,18 million
Outgoings 7508 3413 8322 2799 5418 4043 0,16 million
migration 
balance
+1352 -46 +1233 +153 +1,026 +286 +0,02 million
migrant 
background
- 25,5 % - 35,8 % - 56,8 % 29,6 %
social 
housing
- 7,8 % - 18,9 % - 29,4 % 10,7 %
living 
space p.p.
31,8 37 23,6 31,1 26,9 28 37
Singles - 60,3 % - 68,7 % - 47,9 % 53,1 %
single par-
ents (a)
- 38,8 % - 41,8 % - 29,8 % 30,5 %
jobless 
(15-65)
- 5,7 % - 9,0 % - 10,7 % 6,1 %
income 
2004 
29,270 ʻ 20,509 ʻ 20,354 ʻ 32,505 ʻ
(a) of all households with children
Source: statistikamt nord, selected data by Ingrid Breckner 
6 Cf. kastenDieCk/brooCkm ann, 2012, p.6.
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Urban transformations in Ottensen, St. Pauli and 
Wilhelmsburg since the 1980th
Looking back on the long-term history of Ottensen, St. Pauli and Wilhelmsburg 
we can find some explanations for the diversities in the urban tissue of Hamburg 
and these areas. An important year for the cities’ development is 1937, when 
Adolf Hitler decided to enlarge the city through the incorporation of huge parts 
of its surroundings. With his ‘Greater Hamburg Law’, Altona (including Otten-
sen) became a district of Hamburg as well as Harburg (including Wilhelmsburg). 
For a long time, these areas were on the periphery of the traditional Hanseatic 
City and suffered degradation in the process of industrial decay after 1960. 
Ottensen, as a traditional manufacturing area, was first scheduled to be rene-
wed by the way of the demolition of old urban structures. However, the existing 
plans for physical ‘slum clearing’ provoked intensive and continuous political 
protest in the 1970th which succeeded in realizing the first participative ‘soft re-
newal’ approach in Hamburg. Physical, social, symbolic and regulative changes 
of the urban space where negotiated in an integrative perception plot by plot and 
street by street between inhabitants, advocatory planners and architects, house 
owners and representatives of the city. This renewal process required more than 
30 years and is still ongoing in certain areas; but it achieved highly appreciated 
results. Today, Ottensen is one of the most sought-after living spaces near to the 
city center because of its functional and social mix, offering a wide range of 
life opportunities for different social milieus. It became interesting for so called 
‘gentrifiers from inside’ (e.g. former students engaged in the slow and integra-
tive modernisation and now well paid academics) and people from outside with 
better salaries, yet still offers public housing for low income people constructed 
on former industrial plots. The mix of milieus in Ottensen is also evident in 
the structure of services and commerce in the neighborhood, which allows the 
residents to satisfy their daily requirements in this multicultural ‘urban village’.
Until the beginning of the 21st century St. Pauli survived with its image ‘poor 
but sexy’. With its well-known red light district around the Reeperbahn, the area 
attracted huge numbers of male tourists mostly on weekends and offered living 
space for different groups of low income people: students, artists, lower wor-
king class. The biggest house owner in the area showed a lot of responsibility 
for the ‘left overs’ in the postindustrial society: He offered acceptable rents for 
housing and commercial space, encouraged his tenants to take care of elderly 
and infirm neighbors and held weekly “open hours” in the lounge of his hotel in 
order to understand the development process and to find the right moment for 
necessary interventions. For the last decade the city of Hamburg has been trying 
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to modernize this area full of urban survival spots. An old brewery on the shores 
of the river Elbe has been replaced by expensive private and rental housing and 
opened ‘the village’ for middle class people. Two over-dimensional open air 
stages became the central place for events. When travelers and homeless people 
discovered these public places with roofs against rain for sleeping or meeting 
points, the management of the place installed a water system in the roof of the 
stages and let it rain at random with the aim to discourage the unexpected und 
unwanted persons from using this public area. Parts of St. Pauli’s low budget 
milieu started to organise an anti-gentrification protest together with owners of 
traditional shops and entertainment areas, encouraged by young professionals. 
However, the pressure of neoliberal renewal continues, forced by local, national 
and international real estate investors: They buy buildings and plots in advance 
for hotels, offices and high level housing under minimal formal political control, 
expecting high revenue in the future. The power of protest from the local and 
regional civil society is ineffective as long as policies and the cities’ middle and 
upper class mainstream support the modernisation strategy without a solution as 
to where and how the specific milieu of St. Pauli is to survive under acceptable 
social, economic and spatial conditions. St. Pauli’s traditional social mix faces 
an extreme risk of erosion and will produce extensive welfare costs together 
with much individual and collective insecurity.
Since the 1960s, Wilhelmsburg suffers from intensive urban decay. The flood 
in 1962 claimed more than 300 victims because dams in this area where lower 
than in other parts of the city. After the flood, the whet low standard houses 
where no longer attractive for those inhabitants who could afford to live in other 
areas. House owners lost interest in investments and politicians declared that 
Wilhelmsburg should no longer be treated as a residential, but primarily as an 
industrial area. Thus, the first “guestworkers” took over the residences conside-
ring the low prices and short ways to their jobs in the port or the railway compa-
ny. In the 1970s, the city changed its policy and decided to build the new public 
housing quarter Kirchdorf Süd in Wilhelmsburg near the highway, without pro-
viding adequate public transport, educational, health and daily life infrastructu-
re. For quite some time the more than 50,000 residents of Wilhelmsburg where 
forced to organise themselves and to find a way of living in this geographically 
isolated island in the river Elbe and cosmopolitan ‘city in the city’. Until the 
beginning of the 21st century, Wilhelmsburg was a well-known symbol of mar-
ginalisation and exclusion. As housing costs in Hamburg increased, students 
started to discover this city diaspora in their search of cheap housing. Many of 
them turned back quickly because they could not find the basic infrastructure for 
their daily life and felt mostly frightened by the wide range of social and cultural 
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diversities. Better-off immigrants suddenly began to flee their “arrival city”7 
once they could afford it in order to lose the discriminating address. The cities’ 
decision for the “Leap over Elbe” after 2000 was based on the recognition that 
the city state of Hamburg could not cope with the intended economic growth 
and rising immigration if everything concentrated on the north side of the river. 
Under this perspective, Wilhelmsburg and the further south of Hamburg became 
interesting as economic and social development areas. However, this meant a 
change of the living conditions in Wilhelmsburg. This difficult task within an 
urban area neglected for a long time was expected to be solved with the com-
plementary implementation of an International Building Exhibition (IBA) and 
an International Garden Show (IGS).8 IBA opened in March 2013 and presents 
innovative ecological housing concepts, new models of energy supply, renewal 
of downgraded public housing with immigrant residents under the key themes 
“Cosmopolis”, “Metrozones” and “Cities and Climate Change” until autumn 
2013.9 The opening anniversary was accompanied by anti-gentrification demon-
strations of local people and political activists articulating their realistic fear of 
rising housing costs for low income residents. This risk is structurally given as 
long as legal rent regulations consider only new rental contracts for the yearly 
identification of the average rent for different housing stocks which cannot be 
exceeded by house owners. Thus, if in Wilhelmsburg IBA succeeds in motiva-
ting private investments in the housing stock, it will clearly result in rising rents 
for those residents. Housing security under these conditions is provided only 
for tenants in the public housing stock as long as their rents are legally limited, 
which is the case for maximum 15 years. The International Garden Show aims 
at improving the green spaces and leisure facilities in the area, which again has 
the effect of increasing property values and attracting well off residents.
The urban transformations in the three areas under investigation can be sum-
marized as follows and will be used as empirical material for the interpretation 
of relations between poverty and gentrification in these urban spaces.
7 Cf. saunDers, 2011.
8 Cf. internationaLe GartensCHau (iGs) Ham burG: http://www.igs-hamburg.de, 
07.05.2013.
9 internationaLe bauaussteLLunG (iba) Ham burG: http://www.iba-hamburg.de/
en/nc/themes-projects/projekte-a-z.html, 07.05.2013.
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Ottensen District of Altona, since 1937 part of Hamburg suffered 
degradation and social conflicts until the 1960s. Plans 
for ‘slum clearing’ turned to participative urban renewal 
under professional coordination after huge political pro-
test since the 1970s
 
with effects of stabilisation through 
gentrification from the in- and outside. This first integra-
tive (physical, social, symbolic and regulative) renewal 
approach in Hamburg created a mix of spaces for differ-
ent social and economic milieus coexisting nearly without 
conflicts. But the loss of poor population and rising living 
costs are evident.  
St. Pauli This ‘poor but sexy district’ still hosts a temporary amuse-
ment park and touristic spaces with niches for different 
low budget milieus under pressure of neoliberal renewal 
since 2000. Local, national and international real estate 
investors force the modernization of the area with lacking 
formal political control but accompanied by intensive 
protest from different groups of Hamburg’s civil society.
Wilhelmsburg Since its integration in the city state of Hamburg in 1937 
the Elbe island became the most expensive example of 
social, economic, political and ecological failures of 
urban governance. The flood experience in 1962 and 
disinvestments lead to a neglected infrastructure (schools, 
public transport, etc.), poor leisure areas and dominating 
immigrant economies. For a long time, self-regulation 
of neighborhoods was the only survival strategy and 
came under pressure of urban renewal strategies with the 
International Building and Garden Exhibitions (IBA/IGS) 
opening in 2013 due to local protest and high professional 
expectations.
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Relations between poverty and gentrification  
in urban developments
The analyzed examples of urban spaces in Hamburg show developments in 
different stages of post-industrial modernization. The case of Ottensen stands 
for participative renewal, possibly simultaneously also empowerment and dis-
placement of less educated immigrants with low incomes. Poor young people 
living independently from their families with high cultural and social capacities 
are more and more excluded from the housing market in Ottensen because of 
constantly rising rents. There are no precise data to examine exactly who moved 
away for what reasons and who arrived in which socioeconomic condition in 
specific phases of the modernization process. The only fact we know definitely 
is that immense protest lead to a slow modernization process with the participa-
tion of politically oriented residents. Today, there is still a social and functional 
mixture in the area as long as the existing public housing stock remains under 
legal rent regulation, thus securing access to people with low income. If this 
political regulation erodes, the quarter shall become dominated by middle and 
high income groups and will risk the loss of its urban flair currently consisting 
of social, cultural and functional diversity and tolerance.
In St.Pauli and Wilhelmsburg the modernisation process initiated much la-
ter than in Ottensen under completely different societal conditions. Neoliberal 
policies had been established for more than a decade and Hamburg, as a tenant 
metropolis with moderate prices for real estate properties, was discovered by 
national and international investors seeking good revenues. Since the financial 
crisis in 2008 there is a huge interest from the in- and outside to use real estate 
properties as an investment because the trust in banks is decreasing.10 Under 
these conditions urban renewal cannot be discussed any more as such: It has to 
be precisely contextualised with economic, political and social developments on 
a regional, national and global level. Its immediate or long term micro-spatial 
effects are much more difficult to relate to their reasons than in the long lasting 
renewal process in Ottensen since the end of the 1970s. The cases of Wilhelms-
burg and St. Pauli show that the post-industrial labor market is less accessi-
ble for poor and elderly people without qualifications for rapidly changing and 
heavily internationalized service jobs. Therefore, overlapping of unemployment 
or precarious jobs and poor housing or homelessness succeeded to a growing 
number of the population even being part of the middle class. This explains 
the wide spectrum of people protesting against urban transformation in general 
10 Cf. mester, 2013, p. 27.
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and interventions in the housing market in particular. This is the only reason 
why the city of Hamburg decided quite quickly to rebuy the inner city area cal-
led “Gängeviertel”, which was given to an investor from the Netherlands who 
speculated with the property for more than six years waiting for higher profit. 
This example shows that members of the local government and the city’s public 
opinion is still traumatised by the 20 years of fights for buildings in Hafenstraße 
(Harbor Street), which finally resulted in a collective renewal process with the 
participation of the former squatters and the assistance of advocatory planners. 
At the moment it is difficult to foresee how the ongoing protest activities in 
St. Pauli and Wilhelmsburg will develop in the future. There is some construc-
tive activity from the educated second and third generation of the population 
with migratory background articulating their identification with the formerly 
neglected neighborhoods. They protest against possible displacement caused 
by the political creation of a social mixture, because they do not want to lose 
their social networks established in the urban diaspora.11 Those immigrants, who 
can afford it, buy houses in their well-known quarters by pooling the money of 
larger families. Even if they earn less than small German households, they beco-
me economically successful in concurrence for the same flat or building due to 
their social capital. This situation often creates jealousy in parts of the German 
population which does not recognize, that this is the only possible way to keep 
their living environment in a discriminatory surrounding housing estate.
All over Hamburg the really poor population in central and semi-central dis-
tricts is increasingly at the risk of displacement to the margins of the city or its 
suburbs. As chart 3 shows, the city center was highly populated in the 1960th. 
Until the end of the 20th century the central area of Hamburg lost its residential 
function because of disinvestment in the old housing stock, lack of green areas 
and ongoing commercialization of these central spaces. Those who moved to the 
margins or to the suburbs were the classical middle classes expecting a more ho-
mogenous and healthy residential environment. Since the beginning of the 21st 
century we observe a trend called re-urbanisation (in contradiction to suburba-
nisation) or ‘renaissance of the city’ in Hamburg and other German metropolis12. 
New attractive residential opportunities in central areas are highly sought-after 
by well-off households from the cities’ periphery and from outside.13 
11 Cf. bLokLanD, 2003.
12 Cf. LäPPLe, 2005; kanai/LäPPLe, 2005.
13 Cf. menzL et al., 2011; breCkner/menzL, 2012.
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Chart 3: Distribution of Population in Hamburg in Dependency to the 
Distance to the City Centre 
Source: breckner et al., 1998, p. 27
They rent and buy residences while people with lower incomes cannot afford the 
expensive housing costs in the central areas. Demographic change also creates 
pressure for the poor population in central city districts because even midd-
le class parents, whose children left home, decide to reduce their living space 
and prefer to move to central areas.14 Thus, the attractiveness of central urban 
living spaces goes hand in hand with risks of displacement for poor elderly and 
young people, single parent families and new immigrants to closer or further 
peripheries. These households mostly cannot afford or are not able to drive cars 
and are in danger to lose their established social contacts and necessary health 
infrastructure. Therefore, in the future poverty and capacities of self-organisa-
tion need to be analyzed in marginal districts of metropolis and in suburbs whe-
re we cannot expect yet the same complex competences for the production of 
space as in megacities of developing countries.15 The German overregulation of 
spatial planning and the still existing lack of cooperation between institutions 
and professions involved in the production of space risk to create new poverty 
issues outside of the metropolis in cases of low political responsibility and lack 
of economic resources for societal inclusion.
14 Cf. sLaVik, 2013, p. 25.
15 Cf. DeLL, 2009.
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Europe’s only Megacity 
Urban Growth, Migration and Gentrification  
in 21st Century Mos cow
JuLia röttJer/Jan kusber
At the beginning of the 21st century, Moscow is the largest city and the only 
Megacity in the European context.1 It is therefore a case study to be considered 
in the frame of this conference volume about perspectives of cultural sciences 
on urban slum areas and their inhabitants. The capital of the Russian Federation 
has been growing constantly over the last 20 years and the city itself is cur-
rently home to approx. 12,000,000,2 the Moscow agglomeration to more than 
17,000,000 inhabitants, in other words 12 % of the Russian population.3 Mos-
cow is the true centre of the Russian Federation, not only as the focus of a cen-
tralised political system, but also as the hotbed of Russian economy. It has been 
a widely accepted saying that the Russian capital is “one of the most expensive 
cities of the world” – it also seems to stand for gated communities, a concen-
tration of powerful oil companies, Soviet city planning heritage, the menacing 
collapse of traffic and an extremely uneven distribution of wealth. At the same 
1 One may discuss the case of Istanbul here. Fedor Kudriavcev speaks of European 
cities in contrast to cities like Istanbul, Cairo and – Moscow. Cf. kuDriaVCeV, 
2012, p. 374. The heritage of the socialist metropolis planning stands against this: 
Lentz, 1997, p. 110.
2 Statistical projection on the basis of the last official number in 2010 (11,514,300), 
the inclusion of new areas into the city, and the development since 2002: 
Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ naseLeniia 2010 GoDa: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_
site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, 07.05.2013.
3 Cf. makHroVa, 2006: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0247/tema01.php, 
07.05.2013.
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time, the Moscow of today does not appear to feature the aforementioned “urban 
slum areas” in a sense that might be associated with other Megacities.4 Never-
theless, processes of social segregation and gentrification as well as urban mi-
gration into and within the city are issues which concern the development of this 
European Mega-Agglomeration and will be considered in this paper. Its aim is 
to put Moscow into the debate of this collection, because this Megacity is worth 
to be researched permanently and interdisciplinary. Within its limited space we 
shall briefly focus on some points of recent developments in Moscow:
• Urban growth: What are the general stages in Moscow’s development until 
today? What current challenges are there and what is the character of the 
anticipated future growth?
• Urban migration: Who lives where in this city and what spaces are occupied 
by different groups of Muscovites? Which groups are migrating into the city? 
What can be said about the urban poor?
• Gentrification: Who ‘owns’ the city? What groups are migrating within the 
city and what are the reasons? How are groups of Muscovites expelled from 
different areas of the city? 
Not all points shall be answered fully, but there always is a historical perspective 
as a rele vant context-setting category. As this article is written by two historians, 
this may be their appeal for a closer collaboration of historical and social scienc-
es dealing with the phenomena in question.
4 During its history, poverty in Russia has been a topic that was investigated on 
many levels, and poverty in the city of Moscow has naturally been included in this 
research. However, at the same time it can be witnessed that St. Petersburg seemed 
to be more in focus concerning the sketching of urban social issues – cf. for a recent 
example JaHn, 2010.
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Urban growth and development of  
”The best city in the world”5
The city of Moscow gradually grew around the Moscow Kremlin, beginning in 
the 14th cen tury. It was the capital of the Grand Duchy, after 1547 Tsardom of 
Muscovy up to 1712, when Peter the Great made the newly founded St. Peters-
burg his capital. Of course, the loss of the function as the political centre of the 
state led to a decrease of population of approximately 150,000 down to some 
120,000, however, with its location in the Russian heartland and still being cen-
tre of commerce the city soon recovered. Moscow once again became capital of 
the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1991, and of the Russian Federation since 1991.6 
Situated on either bank of the Moskva River, during the 16th to 17th centuries 
the city grew up in divisions, formerly separated from one another by walls: the 
Kremlin, Kitaigorod (”walled town”, but interpreted as “Chinatown” by folk ety-
mology), Bielyigorod (”white town”), Zemlianoigorod (”earthworks town”), and 
Meshchanskiigorod (”bourgeois town”) out side the city walls. When Catherine 
II came to power in 1762, the city’s filth and smell of waste and the irregularity 
of the streets were depicted by observers as a symptom of disor derly lifestyles 
of lower-class Russians, most of them with a peasant background. Elites called 
for the improvement of sanitation, which became part of Catherine’s plans for 
increasing control over social life. Although her ambitious General plan for Mos-
cow (1775) as a whole failed, the main achievements were the Mytishchinski 
water-pipe (built 1784-1804) and the street lightening, which made the centre 
of the city more secure. After the fire of 1812 as a result of Napoleon’s cam-
paign, the city ramparts were replaced with the Boulevard Ring and Garden Ring 
roads, replacing the walls around Bielyigorod and Zemlianoigorod, respec tively.7 
The city’s population grew from 250,000 to above 1,000,000 by the end of the 
19th century. National political and military successes from 1812 through 1855 
calmed the critics and validated efforts to produce a more enlightened and stable 
society. There was less talk about the smell and the poor hygienic conditions.
5 In 2013, Moscow is putting on a festival named “The best city in the world” – 
see the official Moscow website, presentation for the press March 29th, 2013: 
PraViteL’stVo moskVy(1): http://www.mos.ru/press-center/presentations, 
07.05.2013.
6 Cf. on the history of the city in general: LuzHkoV, 1997. On the persistence through 
the political changes of revolution and the breakdown of communism: sCHLöGeL, 
2011.
7 Cf. on the rebuilding of Moscow after 1812: sCHm iDt, 1989, p. 143-202.
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However, with Russia’s failures in the Crimean War in 1855-56, confidence 
in the ability of the state to maintain order in the slums eroded and demands for 
improved public health placed the issue of filth back on the agenda.8 In the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, Moscow was connected by railway: The first line was 
the one to St. Petersburg, opened in 1852. At the end of the 19th century, Moscow 
had become the centre of the country’s railway network and saw an influx of 
migrating peasants, who were the needed work force for the industrialisation in 
fin de siècle Moscow. With no general urban planning and no concept for public 
transport and housing at hand, factories were built at the embankments of the 
Moskva River, near to Kremlin, for example the chocolate factory “Einem”.9
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks moved the capital from Petro-
grad to Moscow in order to evade the wakes of the World War and the raging civil 
war. Whereas the population in Petrograd declined seriously, Moscow became the 
world capital of socialism with a further increase in population. The first Five-Year-
Plan saw Moscow as a centre of light and heavy industry. At the end of the twenties 
it became a “peasant metropolis”10. But the massive influx of peasants was a source 
of great concern for party officials. In their opinion, peasants, as members of a 
“petit-bourgeois” class, represented an “uncultured mass” fond of drinking, with 
no discipline or religious beliefs and a general lack of political consciousness. So, 
the city with now 2,000,000 inhabitants not only needed outstanding new buildings 
designed and built by avant-garde architects (Le Corbusier, Mel’nikov, and others) 
as worker-clubs and houses for leisure entertainment, but a general development 
plan. This “Master Plan for the Reconstruction of the City of Moscow”, devised 
by a commission under Lazar Kaganovich and co-signed by Stalin and Viacheslav 
Molotov on July 10th 1935, was intended as an offen sive against the old Moscow, 
which would transform the city as a whole. Four years in the making, the plan 
called for an expansion of the city’s area from 285 to 600 square kilometres that 
would take in mostly farmland to the south and west beyond the Lenin (nowadays 
Spar row) Hills. It involved 16 major highway projects and the construction of sev-
8 Cf. martin, 2008, p. 243-274. This subject was important, though a minor one 
during the revolution of 1905, cf. tHurston, 1987.
9 Cf. Huber, 2007, p. 25; DönninGHaus, 2012. The company became the famous 
“Red October” in Soviet times. The site was bought by a developer in 2004, the 
production moved to the rim of Moscow. Since, there have been several fantastical 
plans for a mix-use project in close proximity to the Kremlin, but nothing could be 
realised yet. Cf. makaroVa, 2010: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2010/2/ma25.html, 
07.05.2013.
10 So the title of a cultural study by Hoffm ann, 1994.
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eral monu mental buildings of “state-wide significance”, the well-known skyscrap-
ers that were to dominate the boulevards’ perspectives.11 It foresaw 15,000,000 
square meters of new housing to accommodate a total population of approximately 
5,000,000 within the next decades. Representative streets modelled after Hauss-
mann’s boulevards in Paris were built, most prominent the Gorkii street.12 The city 
would be surrounded by a green belt up to a width of ten kilometres.
Even while the master plan was being drawn up, old Moscow was giving way 
to the new. One of the showpieces of the Soviet capital was to be the Moscow Met-
ro, which broke ground in March 1932, went into service in May 1935 and serves, 
with its successively built lines, especially the ring line, as the backbone of public 
transportation until today.13 A second project, begun in the early 1930s, was the 
Moscow-Volga Canal built by an army of 200,000 forced labourers, which opened 
in July 1937. The hopes to make the system of rivers and waterways the major 
route for the transport of goods failed. The rail way remained and still is the domi-
nant means of transportation. In the year 1939, the popula tion of Moscow rose to 
over four million and by 1959, with the banned returning because of the dissolution 
of the GULAG after Stalin’s death in 1953, the number of inhabitants approached 
the 5,000,000 mark. The General plan of 1935 was superseded ahead of time.
During the Khrushchev-period, entire villages in the Moscow region and 
farmland that had been cultivated for centuries were ploughed under to make 
way for new apartment blocks organised in micro-districts.14 The prototype of 
such housing developments was Novye Cheremushki, south of the city centre.15 
Later, the neighbourhood of Medvedkovo in the city’s south-west and other out-
lying areas were subjected to the same process. Neverthe less, the new party pro-
gramme of 1961, which promised that the housing shortage would be eliminated 
during the first decade of building communism (1961-70), was far from having 
been realised in the country and in Moscow.
To bring the blue- and especially the white-collar-workers to their working place 
in the centre of the Soviet Union’s capital, the MKAD (Moskovskaia kol’tsevaia 
avtomobil’naia doroga), a ring road used only for military purposes, was opened to 
the public in 1962.16 It had four lanes running 109 kilometres along the city borders. 
11 Cf. for the Stalinist architecture noeVer, 1994. The building of the high rises was 
begun after 1945.
12 Cf. rütHers, 2007, p. 75-152. 
13 Cf. neutatz, 2001.
14 Cf. CoLton, 1995, p. 358-381.
15 Cf. rütHers, 2006.
16 Cf. kuDriaVCeV, 2012, p. 375.
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The MKAD marked the admin istrative boundaries of the city of Moscow until the 
1980s, when outlying suburbs beyond the ring road were being incorporated.
Whereas struggling heavily with controlling the migration into Moscow – 
especially the peasants, who came there just to sell parts of the harvest, melons 
from Astrakhan and other products to overcome the dysfunctions of planned 
economy,17 – the Summer Olympic Games of 1980 presented an unparalleled 
opportunity to showcase the superiority of Soviet athletes as well as the achieve-
ments of Soviet socialism in front of a world-wide audience.18 Extraordinary 
measures were taken to prepare for this grand festival. A renaissance of urban 
planning, typical of host cities, resulted in not only new stadiums, training fa-
cilities, and hotels, but also a new airport at Sheremetevo. The city itself was 
‘polished up’: Roads were newly paved, trees were planted − dissidents and the 
poor were banned or otherwise expelled from the city.19
When the USSR was dissolved in 1991, Moscow became the capital of the 
Russian Federation. Since then, the emergence of market economy in Moscow has 
produced an explosion of Western-style retailing, services, architecture, and life-
styles. The city has continued to grow during the 1990s to 2000s, its population 
rising from less than 9,000,000 to more than 11,000,000. Mason and Nigmatul-
lina argue that Soviet-era urban-growth central planning (before 1991) produced 
controlled and sustainable metropolitan development, typified by the building of 
the greenbelt in 1935. However, there has been a dramatic growth of low-density 
subur ban sprawl since then, created by a heavy demand for single-family dwellings 
as opposed to crowded apartments. In 1995-97 the MKAD ring road was widened 
from the initial four to ten lanes. In December 2002 Bul’var Dmitriia Donskogo 
became the first Moscow Metro station to open beyond the limits of MKAD. The 
Third Ring Road, intermediate between the early 19th-century Garden Ring and 
the Soviet era outer ring road, was completed in 2005.20 The greenbelt is becoming 
more and more fragmented and satellite cities are appearing at the fringe. Summer 
dachas are being converted into year-round residences, and with the proliferation of 
automobiles there is heavy traffic congestion. These fragmentations of the borders 
of the megacity and its expansion beyond those rims have to be noted when consid-
ering the Moscow agglomeration and its population.21
17 Cf. on the migration and mixture of population in the 60s and 70s: GaVriLoVa, 
2001, p. 130-171.
18 Cf. kusber, 2003, p. 108f.
19 Cf. kuP erm ann, 2007.
20 Cf. kuDriaVCeV, 2012, p. 375.
21 Cf. mason/niGm atuLLina, 2011.
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A view at the different historical layers of Moscow housing − from the 
Khrushchevki of the 1950s to later Soviet complexes and postmodern 
apartment blocks
Urban migration
Moscow is an independent federation subject of the Russian federation. At the 
same time, the city is the administrative centre of the federation subject it is 
surrounded by, the “Moscow region” (Moskovskaia oblast’). Within the oblast’, 
there are many larger cities and smaller towns located within the direct vicinity 
of Moscow. More than one million commuters are on their way to Moscow and 
back every day, while three to four million Muscovites spend the summer on 
dachas outside the city boundaries. Within this agglomeration there exists not 
only a close interconnection in terms of traffic, but in the labour and housing 
markets as well. Tenden cies that are true of the housing market of Moscow 
itself quickly spread into the agglomer ation, which has seen an unusually high 
building activity in the last years; it attracts not only Muscovites but also private 
housing investors from all over Russia.22
22 zubareViCH, 2012, p. 265.
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23
23 Table is based on numbers from Dem oGrafiCHeskii ezHeGoDnik rossii, 2001, 
p. 22 (1989); Dem oGrafiCHeskii ezHeGoDnik rossii, 2010, p. 29 (1995-2009) 
and from the official site of the 2010 census of the Russian Federation (2010): 
Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ naseLeniia 2010 GoDa: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_
site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, 07.05.2013.
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The table shows the rate of the growth of the Moscow population in compari-
son to that of the entire country; however, it also demonstrates that the fastest 
expansion of Moscow population happened between 1995 and 2000 and that 
it is currently slowing down. While in 1989, the combined population of Mos-
cow city and region made up 10,6 % of the Russian popula tion, in 2010 this 
rate rose to 12,2 %. According to the census of 2010, Moscow has 11,503,501 
inhabitants and the Moscow region 7,095,120, which mostly live in urban-type 
settlements.24 
Table 2: Population of Moscow agglomeration in 2002 and 2010; division into 
Moscow city counties (okrugi) and urban/rural population of Moscow region25
Overall 2002 Overall 2010
Percentage 
of Population 
in relation to 
Moscow city 
and Region in 
2010
Per-
centage 
Growth/
Decrease 
in 2010 in 
relation to 
2002
Moscow City  
and Region 17,001,292 18,598,621 100,0 % +9,4 %
Moscow City 10,382,754 11,503,501 61,9 % +10,8 %
Moscow Region 6,618,538 7,095,120 38,1 % +7,2 %
24 Cf. Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ naseLeniia 2010 GoDa: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, 07.05.2013.
25 The data was taken from the official web sites of the 2002 census: Vserossiiskaia 
P erePis’ naseLeniia 2002 GoDa: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=42, 
07.05.2013, and from Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ naseLeniia 2010 GoDa: http://www.
gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, 07.05.2013. 
For the values of 2002, the city of Zelenograd, counted separately in the census, 
was taken as the city okrug Zelenogradskii. Also, three in 2002 still independent 
smaller settlements were included in this table in the values of the South-Eastern, 
Western and Eastern okrugi, of which they became a part later on, in order for 
comparison with 2010.
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Overall 2002 Overall 2010
Percentage 
of Population 
in relation to 
Moscow city 
and Region in 
2010
Per-
centage 
Growth/
Decrease 
in 2010 in 
relation to 
2002
City okrug Eastern  
(Vostochnyi) 1,394,497 1,452,759 7,8 % +4,2 %
City okrug Western 
(Zapadnyi) 1,049,104 1,285,914 6,9 % +22,6 %
City okrug  
Zelenogradskii 215,727 221,712 1,2 % +2,8 %
City okrug 
Northern  
(Severnyi)
1,112,846 1,100,974 5,9 % -1,1 %
City okrug  
North-Eastern 
(Severo- 
Vostochnyi)
1,240,062 1,359,508 7,3 % +9,6 %
City okrug  
North-Western
(Severo-Zapadnyi)
779,965 942,223 5,1 % +20,8 %
City okrug Central 
(Tsentralnyi) 701,353 741,967 4,0 % +5,8 %
City okrug  
South-Eastern 
(Iugo-Vostochnyi)
1,116,924 1,318,885 7,1 % +18,1 %
City okrug  
South-Western
(Iugo-Zapadnyi)
1,179,211 1,362,751 7,3 % +15,6 %
City okrug  
Southern (Iuzhnyi) 1,593,065 1,716,808 9,2 % +7,8 %
Moscow Region: 
urban Population 5,248,534 5,683,710 30,6 % +8,3 %
Moscow Region: 
rural Population 1,370,004 1,411,410 7,6 % +3,0 %
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The city itself takes up 2,510 km² and is divided into twelve counties (okrugi) 
which, since the last city extension on July 1st 2012, consist of 146 administra-
tive sub-structures.26
In comparison to other big Russian cities, Moscow, as the centre of a cen-
tralistic and authoritative state, features many advantages for big companies 
including the energy sector. Thus, despite the fact that Moscow has a gener-
al post-industrial economy with more than 80 % of the gross regional product 
due to services, it is important that the large producing companies have their 
headquarters mostly in Moscow. The corporate tax princi ples in this centralised 
economic system provided for the payment of taxes at headquarters, at least 
until the issuing of a new regulation in 2012, which still excludes Gazprom. 
These taxes, paid to the capital by companies that produce goods elsewhere and 
offer their services all over the country, make up 43-45 % of the huge Moscow 
budget which comprised 38 billion Euros in 2011. Not only a high percentage 
of the Russian population is living in and around Moscow; also, compared to all 
of Russia, there is an even higher proportional amount of investment, housing 
construction and retail. The concentration of investment and financial resources 
is the motor of change to urban society. The share of Muscovites that can be 
defined as middle class doubles the overall Russian rate – it is about 40 %. The 
average income in Moscow is comparatively high – in other large Russian cities 
it is 35-60 % lower than in the capital.27 In Moscow, the nominal average month-
ly employment income in 2010 was 908 Euros, and the average pension was 192 
Euros, the average living space was 18,7 square metres per person.28
Moscow has always featured a low birth rate in comparison to the death rate, 
not unlike other very large cities. Especially in the 1990s, the birth rate sank to a 
very low level: While there were 120,000 children born in 1985, the number was 
only 68,500 in the year 1995. Still, during these years the population of the city 
26 There were 10 counties (okrugi) with 125 districts (raiony). In July 2012, with 
Novomoskovskii and Troitskii two more okrugi were added, consisting of 21 
administrative sub-structures, which are called “settlement” (poselenie). Cf. the 
official Moscow city site: PraViteL’stVo moskVy(2): http://www.mos.ru/authority/
structure, 07.05.2013.
27 Cf. zubareViCH, 2012, p. 265-267, based on information by the Moscow 
Independent Institute for Social Policy. As middle class indicators, Zubarevich 
uses two out of three of the following: income, education level and self-conception.
28 Cf. Federal agency of state statistics: reGiony rossii. osnoVnye sotsiaLno-
eConom iCHeskie P okazateLi GroDoV 2011: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_14t/
IssWWW.exe/Stg/centr/moskv-g2011_1.htm, 07.05.2013.
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rose. Concerning the average life expectancy, the capital has a lot to offer to its 
inhabitants and even leaves St. Petersburg far behind: For males the life expec-
tancy is 67 years (for Russia in general: 60), for females it is 77 years (for Russia 
in general: 73). These facts contribute to the phenomenon that the population of 
Moscow is increasing while the overall Russian population is declining. But the 
decisive factor is the migration into the city, which has always been playing an 
important role in Moscow until today.29
Table 3: Migration in Moscow City and Region compared to Russia, in 200930
Moscow 
City and 
Region
Russia Moscow City 
and Region
Russia
Arrivals
Total Number  
of Arrivals
Arrivals, Rate  
per 1000 Population
Total Number of Arrivals 191,709 1,987,598 11,1 14,0
Arrivals from Other  
Regions of Russia
155,805 766,436 9,0 5,4
Arrivals from  
Foreign Countries
35,904 279,907 2,1 2,0
Departures
Total Number  
of Departures
Departures,  
Rate per 1000 Population
Total Number  
of Departures
68,156 1,740,149 4,0 12,3
Departures to  
Other Regions  
of Russia
64,117 766,436 3,7 5,4
Departures to  
Foreign Countries
4,039 32,458 0,2 0,2
29 Cf. zaionCHkoVskaya/mkrtCHyan, 2009: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2009/ 
0389/tema02.php, 07.05.2013.
30 Data was taken from Dem oGrafiCHeskii ezHeGoDnik rossii, 2010, p. 29 (table 
1.7), p. 408, 411, 414 (table 7.2.).
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Moscow 
City and 
Region
Russia Moscow City 
and Region
Russia
Net Migration
Total Number  
of Net Migration
Net Migration,  
Rate per 1000 Population
Total Number  
of Net Migration
123,553 247,449 7,2 1,7
Net Migration from  
Other Regions of Russia
91,688 0 5,3 0
Net Migration from Foreign 
Countries
31,865 247,449 1,9 1,7
The aforementioned influx of migrants into the city during the 1920s brought 
both men and women into the city. They were in search of work, and not intent 
on founding large families, so a relatively low birth rate and small number of 
children became a consistent feature of the Moscow population. However, in the 
1960s until 1980s the progressing urbanisation in Russia spread this trend and 
led to an approximation of the overall Russian population age pyramid to that of 
the capital. Similar features were characteristic of the age pyramid of Moscow 
in 1989, but at the beginning of the new millennium the migration surge not only 
balanced the natural decline, it also rejuvenated the city’s population.31 Like in 
other large cities, the educational level in Moscow is rather high compared to the 
rest of the country. Being asked about their sources of income in the census of 
2010, 57 % of the Muscovites named employment income, including self-em-
ployment and family business, as a source, 27 % pensions (including invalidity 
pensions) and only 3,5 % (other) social benefits or governmental support. One 
quarter of the respondents stated that their income was dependent on other indi-
viduals. Thus, the rate of pensioners, the vast majority of them in the age groups 
60 years and older is about the same level in Moscow as it is in all of Russia.32 It 
is a phenomenon uncharacteristic for megacities with such high living expenses 
31 Cf. zaionCHkoVskaya/mkrtCHyan, 2009.
32 Respondents were all individuals 15 years or older. Multiple answers were possible, 
but app. 86 % gave only one and app. 14 % two sources; three answers or more 
were seldom. Analysed data was taken from 2010 census: Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ 
naseLeniia 2010 GoDa: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/
perepis_itogi1612.htm, 07.05.2013.
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that the group of pensioners and the ratio of older population is so strong, fos-
tered by city government, which subsidises the pensions out of its own budget.33 
The migration history and the present situation which have been forming 
Moscow’s population make it a multi-ethnic and multi-religious city. The stron-
gest groups in the Russian capital who perceive themselves as non-Russian, are 
inhabitants of former Soviet republics, mainly Ukrainians, Tatars, Armenians, 
Azerbaijani and Belo-Russians, but there are also other large groups, such as of 
Mordovians, Jews and Uzbeks:
Table 4: Overall population of Moscow City and Region, according to Nationality34
Population, according to Nationality
Moscow City and Region 1989  % 2002  % 2010  %
    
Overall Population 17,001,292 100,0 % 18,598,621 100,0 %
Russians 14,047,917 89,7 % 14,830,772 87,2 % 16,133,082 86,7 %
Ukrainians 438,508 2,8 % 401,452 2,4 % 273,578 1,5 %
Tatars 281,898 1,8 % 218,934 1,3 % 205,245 1,1 %
Armenians 78,305 0,5 % 164,085 1,0 % 169,772 0,9 %
Azerbaijani 31,322 0,2 % 110,214 0,6 % 76,184 0,4 %
Belo-Russians 125,288 0,8 % 101,565 0,6 % 70,890 0,4 %
Jews 313,220 2,0 % 89,258 0,5 % 53,145 0,3 %
Mordovians 46.983 0,3 % 45,243 0,3 %   
Chuvash 31,322 0,2 % 28,541 0,2 %   
Uzbeks 15,661 0,1 % 24,312 0,1 % 61,368 0,3 %
Chechens (city only) 14,465 0,1 %   
Ossetians (city only) 10,561 0,1 %   
Moldavians (region only) 10,418 0,1 %   
Koreans (city only) 8,630 0,1 %   
Kazakhs (city only) 7,997 0,1 %   
Bashkir (city only) 5,941 0,1 %   
33 zubareViCH, 2012, p. 268.
34 The data analysed was taken from the census of 2002: Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ 
naseLeniia 2002 GoDa: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=42, 07.05.2013, 
and from the census of 2010: Vserossiiskaia P erePis’ naseLeniia 2010 GoDa: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, 
07.05.2013. Cf. for 1989: GaVriLoVa, 2001, p. 420 (table 7). 
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Official data cannot provide any information about the significant number of 
nonregistered migrants from Russia and outside Russia living in the capital (ta-
ble 3 and 4).
Gentrification and segregation in inner Moscow
Prior to 1992, almost all houses in Moscow were state owned, municipal or 
corporate. There were practically no private houses in Moscow during Sovi-
et times. In the first years following the perestroika period the resources for 
municipal housing programmes in Moscow were scarce, while new forms of 
investment and public private partnerships had yet to evolve. The last census of 
the Soviet Union in 1989 had shown that the housing situation and its problems 
were an important issue for the Muscovites, but in 1995 there were still about 
650,000 households waiting in line for the opportunity to new living quarters 
and many Muscovites were living in a shared apartment (kommunalka).35 In 
order to effectively reduce this waiting line, the municipal building company 
DSK (the former Building Combine No. 1), which had survived the perestroika, 
continued in the construction of prefabricated housing.36 But the city was not 
only short of living quarters, but also of territory. The authorities thus turned to 
the five-story-buildings with a programme to relocate the dwellers in order to 
gain area for high rise living quarters. During the first years of the new millen-
nium, the inhabitants in need to be relocated represented competition for those 
already waiting – so, people from the waiting list who had filed their respective 
applications in 1987, were able to gain access to new living quarters in 2006.37
The capital could not provide nearly enough living quarters to its population 
and suffered an overall lack of investment into housing and city planning. At the 
point of dissolution of the Soviet Union, an intense era of construction began 
35 Cf. kuLakoVa, 2006, p. 238-241. The estimate percentage of kommunalka dwellers 
reaches from 9 % (kuLakoVa, 2006, p. 238) up to 45 % (baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 
2005, p. 118).
36 The house type P-44/17, first built in 1979, was continued until the year 2000; 
the 17-story panelled building can boast a total area of 18,814 m² in Moscow. 
Since 1998, new prefabricated types were introduced, as the P-44T, P44-TM, and 
the model Jubilee, advertised as “the first and only prefabricated house of a new 
generation with winter gardens (porches) and free layout.” Cf. Dom ostroiteL’nyi 
kom binat no. 1: http://www.dsk1.ru/Houses/History, 07.05.2013.
37 Cf. kuLakoVa, 2006, p. 242f.
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in Moscow almost immediately. The historic city centre attracted most of the 
activity, driven by the needs of the emerging market economy with all the new 
financial and business services and municipal policy alike. The concentration of 
wealthy companies or financial services and their headquarters in the city centre 
was followed by a concentration of wealthy inhabitants. So already in the early 
1990s, individuals and businesses started to purchase apartments in top quality 
locations in order to renovate them luxuriously. Badyina and Golubchikov, who 
analyse these processes, especially in the inner micro-district Ostozhenka, sum-
marise this phenomenon: “However, a central location and an expensive reno-
vation […] turned out to be not quite enough. […] The evolution from apart-
ment-by-apartment to house-by-house and then to block-by-block elite housing 
(re)construction signified the emergence of systematic gentrification in inner 
Moscow.”38
The micro-district of Ostozhenka is located south-west to the Kremlin in an 
area that was used as meadowland until the middle of the 19th century. At the 
end of the 19th century, the majority of tenants were small-scale retailers, crafts-
men, state servants of low ranks, students and impoverished members of the 
intelligentsia; landlords were mostly merchants. In the case of Ostozhenka, the 
extreme neglect of building stock in the late Soviet Moscow was even more evi-
dent: The general plan of 1935 had designated a site nearby to the megalomaniac 
– yet never realised – project of the “Palace of Soviets”. Thus, there were long 
existing plans to comprehensively redevelop the entire quarter with the palace, 
which prevented building or renovation on a smaller scale.39
At the beginning of the 1990s, the rate of Ostozhenka inhabitants living in a 
kommunalka was between 60 % and 70 %,40 and thus significantly higher than 
the average in central Moscow. With the introduction of housing privatisation 
in 1991, inhabitants gained the right to privatise their own living quarters free 
of charge; two years later one third of all flats in Moscow were in private hands. 
With the developing market economy this served as a basis for the mechanism 
of well-off private persons and agencies buying the separate kommunalka rooms 
from their inhabitants and combining them into apartments or office floors. The 
social structure of the micro-district started to change, the overall population 
declined, and the proportion of wealthier people started to rise, while the for-
38 baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 115.
39 Cf. GDanieC, 2005, p. 145; baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 115-117. The 1883 
cathedral Christ the Saviour that occupied the lot foreseen for the palace, was 
demolished in 1931.
40 Cf. GDanieC, 2005, p. 173 and baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 118, respectively.
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mer kommunalka inhabitants left, supported by the city rehousing programmes. 
After the 1998 Rouble crash and the following economic pause, large develop-
ment started to invest in the real estate sector. Ostozhenka, where the cathedral 
“Christ the Saviour” overshadowing the micro-district was being rebuilt on its 
former site long dedicated to the “Palace of Soviets”-project, was being market-
ed as an elite location in close proximity to the Kremlin. The new developments 
did not consist of the mere merging of single rooms into apartments, but of 
comprehensive building projects and the more there were the more intensive the 
elite status perception became.41
In Moscow, land ownership is separate from building ownership, so the 
land owner is the municipality, while developers can lease parcels to build on.42 
The city administration took an active part in promoting the physical and social 
change in areas such as Ostozhenka by resettlement mechanisms that required 
inhabitants to leave if their building had been marked by the city as in urgent 
need of repair. The administration had – and still has – to provide the expelled 
with an alternative housing or, in case of ownership, to compensate them. Often, 
these terms have been less favourable for the residents than direct negotiations 
with the investors. The vacated buildings could then be demolished, often ig-
noring the regulations of the sophisticated Russian monument preservation law, 
and give way to the new elite projects. Of the 3,725 officially registered tenants 
in 1992 in Ostozhenka, 1,263 persons were forced to rehouse during this com-
pulsory programme until 2004, while 1,584 persons had been relocated after 
private negotiations with developers. Additionally, there is a large number of 
Ostozhenka residents who sold their privatised rooms and flats or rented them 
41 Cf. baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 118-120.
42 In 2007 and 2008 Moscow legislation has been altered in order to assimilate it to 
the federal laws: new possibilities of land ownership or long-term land lease are 
being introduced. Also, the Moscow mechanism of planning the project in detail 
beforehand, and only then letting the parcel of land designated to that project, 
has changed: it is the objective to achieve more competitive and transparent 
forms of land lease. A row of projects begun in Moscow before the introduction 
of this legislation which were suspended, have since been revised or cancelled. 
Supposedly, an emphasis was put on some projects that had been planned in an 
especially semi-legal or extra-legal relationship between city administration and 
investor; cf. nobis, 2012, p. 130-135. On the network of authorities and developers 
and its personal, “intimate character” see also baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 
121f.; GDanieC, 2005, p. 170f.
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out and went to live elsewhere. So, the structure of the area’s population has 
undergone a thorough change.43
Today, real estate agencies claim that “Ostozhenka Street, ‘the Golden Mile’, 
is the most prestigious residential area not only in Moscow, but in entire Rus-
sia.”44 According to a ranking by “Financial News”, Ostozhenka street made it 
into the top ten of the “most expensive and desirable streets in the world.”45 In 
2010 the average price to buy a flat in one of the developments in Ostozhenka 
was 19,000 Euros per square metre. In one of the old buildings, depending on 
the status of renovation, the square metre costs from 5,500 up to 14,000 Euros 
(the lower end of the range being in proximity to the average price in Moscow 
city). The “Moscow Times” summarises the new character of this central area:
“Just next door from the multi-cultural, cross-class and eclectic Arbat, Os-
tozhenka could be a world away, or anywhere in the world, for that matter. 
[…] These top-end buildings remain worlds in themselves, with neither ob-
vious links to the city neighbourhood that surrounds them at a distance, nor 
direct access to immediate infrastructure — although one elite supermarket 
has finally opened on Korobeinikov lane this year. It has been alleged that 
most of the apartments here were bought during the gold rush by those who 
never actually intended to live in them, making the whole place the world’s 
fanciest ghost-town.”46
This perception of a separate world in itself and the elite concept is fostered 
by another phenomenon not alien to other Megacities: In order to protect the 
property of the new owners, concierges and door codes are not enough, but 
extra security guards and fences have started to arise and produce small islands 
of gated communities. Up until now, despite discussions about it, not the whole 
area of Ostozhenka has been fenced off. But elsewhere in and especially around 
Moscow, larger stretches of settlement have become gated quarters, public space 
43 Cf. baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 120-123.
44 aGenCy kniGHt frank; http://www.knightfrank.ru/eng/residential/homes/show/
t6UJ9A0052FN/, 07.05.2013.
45 neWs aGenCy rianoVosti, 09.03.2011: http://en.rian.ru/business/20110309/1629267 
00.html, 07.05.2013. 
46 Introduction to interview with three real estate agents in tHe mosCoW tim es, 
13.10.2010: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/realestate/residential/analysis/article 
/ostozhenka-unusual-in-every-way/418724.html#no, 07.05.2013. For average price 
see also zubareViCH, 2012, p. 265.
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has become private in the fenced areas of postmodern cities.47 The two phases 
that Badyina and Golubchikov observed in Ostozhenka – “the spontaneous in-
dividual-driven process of housing rehabilitation before 1998, and the ‘system-
atic’ property-led gentrification thereafter”48 – can also be paralleled with other 
global Megacities. However, other phenomena cannot, such as the relatively 
substantial living space that still remains in Moscow’s city centre or the absence 
of an intermediate phase with artists and creative professionals in the role of 
“gentrifiers” that later on have to leave themselves after a new wave of recon-
struction.49 Of course, the specific historical circumstances of the Soviet period, 
such as property legislation, city planning, housing shortage, kommunalkas and 
deteriorated buildings, has had an impact. So had the experience of Soviet soci-
ety and its collapse, with the subsequent crisis. Some of Moscow’s urbanisation 
features can be compared to other post-socialist capitals such as Budapest, War-
saw or Prague. But the individual historical, cultural and global context points 
to the unique features of every case study.50
As has been shown, the transition from state owned to personal proper-
ty housing took place especially during the first ten years after the fall of the 
USSR: two thirds of housing stock became private through privatisation and 
new construction. The less well-off population generally stayed in state-owned 
flats they rented or leased. This was the basis for the UN-Habitat-Report human 
settlements in 200351 which aimed at a definition of the term “slum” under such 
circumstances. It is true that there are no big slum areas in Moscow like the Ban-
lieues in France52 or the favelas of South-American cities. Slums are intermixed 
47 Cf. GDanieC, 2005, p. 182, 193; baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 120-123; 
sHeVCHenko, 2009, p. 167, points out the similarities between erecting fences 
around luxury buildings and fortifying the doors of quite ordinary apartments 
with the aim of “warding off outsiders”. Her interpretation is that the fencing 
phenomenon has an identical appearance to that in other globalized cities, but also 
reacts to a specific post-Soviet utopia aspiration (p. 175).
48 Cf. baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 127.
49 The latter example refers to the Paris quarter of Roquette. Cf. GDanieC, 2005, p. 
194f. Cf. for the current state of research on gentrification in general Lees, 2010, 
and for the German debate HoLm , 2010, and tWiCkeL, 2010.
50 Cf. baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 127.
51 Cf. un-Habitat, Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, The Challenge of 
Slums, Earthscan, London; Part IV: ‘Summary of City Case Studies’, p. 195-228: 
http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2003.0.pdf, 07.05.2013.
52 Cf. Weber et al., 2012, p. 50-56.
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into parts of Moscow, as well in Ostozhenka53, where gentrification has now 
been underway for almost 20 years, as in other areas. The report’s listing for 
the nuclei of slums names kommunalkas, which are used by two or more fam-
ilies who share the kitchen and other facilities (including hostels, dormitories 
and hotels) and outdated and dilapidated buildings, typically the first generation 
of mass housing with low quality construction and facilities. They are shab-
by, consist of so called squatter flats or even look abandoned from the outside. 
Residents there are entitled to housing improvement or free alternative accom-
modation, but queues are long and move slowly according to availability of 
municipal housing stock. The most obvious category in 2003 was deteriorated 
houses, primarily post-World War II structures that are recognised as damaged 
or otherwise unsuitable for constant habitation. All these types are sometimes 
in the periphery but quite often, because of the urban growth, in central areas of 
the city.54 The people living there are pensioners, invalids, single parents, stu-
dent families, refugees, run-away-children, orphans, people of no fixed abode 
(”BOMji”) and other kinds of nonregistered people. 
The Putin-government and local administrations tried hard and with some 
success to alter the situation of the pensioners, who live in Moscow probably 
better than in many parts of Russia, but the other groups, especially nonregis-
tered migrant workers (from the former USSR) do not find a place in the housing 
and social policy of state nor city. They are needed for the growing wealth of 
Moscow, but are the social losers of the situation because of difficult access to 
adequate housing, medical care and education.55 The role of supporting NGOs 
is tolerated in this context, but unsecure under contemporary political contexts 
in Russia. 
Current growth and future development
The Russian capital is growing at breath-taking speed. Traffic jams, noise and 
smog are just a few of the negative side effects. Neither the city’s infrastructure, 
nor housing and traffic planning, nor parks and recreational areas can currently 
meet the demands of the inhabitants. The city’s General plan up to 2020 has 
53 In 2004 there were still 77 shared apartments for 440 people (199 families) in 
Ostozhenka. Cf. baDyina/GoLubCHikoV 2005, p. 123.
54 Cf. krasHeninnokoV, 2003: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/
cities/moscow.htm, 07.05.2013.
55 Cf. nazaroVa, 2007, p. 364.
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already been rendered obsolete.56 Another aspect of the housing problem is the 
fact that apartments and houses have become objects of speculation, meaning 
that speculative vacancies exacerbate the housing shortage. It makes sense to 
buy apartments as investment and it does not matter much whether or not they 
are occupied. Of course, this is not true of the majority of flats, but there is still 
no equilibrium between demand for housing and occupation rates of existing 
housing.
In 2007, 33 million cars were registered in Moscow, but only 1.6 million 
parking spaces. Every year sees 200,000 additional cars hit Moscow’s streets, 
800,000 cars are on the street at any one time. Moscow has 1,300 km of streets, 
40 % less than the required road network compared to other major European 
cities. Moscow’s spider-web street grid has not been upgraded, purely because 
the city planners could not anticipate such explosive urban growth.57 Michael 
Blinkin on the other hand argues that these are also the results of socialist plan-
ning heritage that conceived the net of streets as a fishbone system and not as a 
system of urban highways on which the individual transport can flow.58 In April 
2012 the new mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobianin confirmed the ambitious ex-
pansion plan for the Moscow Metro: By 2020, a second Circle line shall help to 
relieve the city’s traffic situation. The costs will be enormous:59 Over the next 
eight years, the backbone of the public transport system in the Russian capital 
will be dramatically strengthened. The expansion plans until 2016 see the con-
struction of 75,6 km of new routes and 37 new stations – at a cost of 460 billion 
Roubles (11,5 billion Euros). The mayor has recently confirmed the next five-
year-plan for the development of the metro: from 2016 to 2020 an additional 
75 km and 33 new stations are to be added – 100 billion Roubles (2,5 billion 
Euros) have to be set aside for this each year. This will bring a change in the 
architecture of the Metro network – the so-called “third interchange”: The first 
is, in metro-language, the group of interchange stations in the city centre, the 
second is the current circle line. These are to be relieved through a significantly 
56 Cf. the official plans: inteGrateD boDy for urban DesiGn PoLiCy anD 
DeVeLoPm ent of mosCoW; http://stroi.mos.ru/eng/default.aspx?m=31&d=31, 
07.05.2013.
57 Cf. russia-noW(1): http://www.russia-now.info/russia/moscow/news/moscow_s_
growth_is_causing_headaches_for_planners_31.html, 07.05.2013.
58 Cf. bLinkin, 2012.
59 Cf. inteGrateD boDy for urban DesiGn PoLiCy anD DeVeLoPm ent of mosCoW; 
http://stroi.mos.ru/eng/default.aspx?m=31&d=31, 07.05.2013.
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further reaching second circle line.60 In comparison to other Megacities, the pub-
lic transport, although very efficient, is at times beyond its capacities and needs 
to be adapted to the mass of commuters on their way to work and home again.61 
During the last months of Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency, a new plan was 
announced that will eventually strongly influence the further development of 
Moscow: the incorporation of vast territories (1,480 additional [!] to the existing 
1,070 square kilometres in 2012) in the South of the city centre. This announce-
ment, as so often, came first − and only then began serious planning and talks 
with the mayor of Moscow and the governor of the surrounding Moscow region, 
Sergei Shoigu. The intention of Medvedev was obviously to create new admin-
istrative quarters for the government and thus to alter the traffic from centre to 
the periphery. But will this work, as Fedor Kudriavcev remarked, with some ten 
thousand government clerks dispatched from the centre?62 
Last but not least: The brief sketch on urban growth always connected with 
the problems of expansion, transport and housing, needs one last comment on mi-
gration within the context of changing political and ideological times. It poses the 
question, of whose city one wants to talk. It was the city of the Moscow bourgeois 
in the 19th century63, of the nationalities of the Tsarist Empire and of the peasants 
and workers of the Soviet Empire who were attracted by a socialist metropolis 
− which despite all problems of housing and urban development offered them 
far more opportunities than other socialist cities in most of the Republics of the 
USSR. This was especially true for migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
They were, not only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, perceived as un-
loved guests at the very least and necessary work force at the same time and have 
been and sometimes still are facing open hatred, as a series of incidents shows.64
Conclusion
In 2008 Monica Rüthers stated that megalopolis Moscow will stay a fancy and 
glamorous city where the rich and the middle class try at any cost to stay as near 
to the city centre as they can. On the other hand, the gap between the rich and 
60 Cf. russia-noW(2): http://www.russia-now.info/russia/russia_news/moscow_to_
build_second_metro-circle_line_cost_22_billion_euro_96.html, 07.05.2013.
61 Cf. bLinkin, 2012, p. 282.
62 Cf. kuDriaVCeV, 2012, p. 377 f.
63 Cf. ruCkm ann, 1984.
64 Cf. zubareViCH, 2012, p. 268.
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the poor widens.65 This is also the tenor in blogs on gentrification.66 The gentri-
fication processes were already reflected in public art exhibitions: The project 
Auditorium Moscow, shown in the White palace (Belaia palata) in the heart 
of old Moscow, was for example initiated by the Museum of Modern Art in 
Warsaw in cooperation with curators Ekaterina Degot and David Riff.67 It also 
reflected on the changes that have been taking place in Ostozhenka. The fact that 
this criticism takes an artistic form is notable in itself, such as the dislocation of 
population cannot happen entirely without upheaval. However, while the more 
resistant tenants sooner or later had to face violent methods used to expel them 
from their quarters, very little concerted protest on their side has taken place. 
This perceived absence of public protest, also against the demolition of historic 
sites, has been assigned to the fact that during the high tide of new development 
in the inner city, the list of severe and of everyday problems for the population 
in this time of crisis was extensive: simply too much to deal with them all, the 
problem of a sound city planning was easily outranked, if one was not the partic-
ular person to be expelled from one’s neighbourhood in the city centre.68 
Indeed, the nearer to the centre, the more coveted the living space. The mid-
dle class has been and still is looking for property in the micro-districts or lives in 
a rented apartment and seeks a dacha. Rüthers has described that there was in fact 
no suburbia outside of Moscow in 2008, just the province. It remains to be seen 
whether the plans for a new administrative centre in the South of big Moscow 
alter the situation. There are slight evidences that suburbs and closely connected 
cities such as Khimki on the way from the airport Sheremetevo downtown, with 
a shorter way to work, shopping malls and Ikea, will bring some change. Here, 
the daily migration does not rise. But it is still an example of neoliberal growth 
and the absence of comprehensive urban planning that sees city, suburbia and 
region in a context.69
65 Cf. rütHers, 2008, p. 505.
66 Cf. GentrifiCation bLoG: http://gentrificationblog.wordpress.com/2008/09/30/
moskau-stadtumbau-fur-neue-reiche/, 07.05.2013; CHtoDeLat neWs: https://
chtodelat.wordpress.com/tag/gentrification/, 07.05.2013.
67 Cf. auDitorium  mosCoW: http://auditorium-moscow.org/en/about.html, 07.05. 
2013. While some enterprises and the Polish government supported the project, 
no participation of the Russian government or the city of Moscow was to be seen. 
68 Cf. baDyina/GoLubCHikoV, 2005, p. 123-126. For the prolonged, even “total crisis” 
and its handling by the Muscovites see sHeVCHenko, 2009.
69 Cf. GoLubCHikoV, 2011.
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